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A PRE- AND POST-EVENT ANALYSIS OF LEVERAGE CHANGES BY JSE-
LISTED FIRMS: UNDERSTANDING THE RATIONALE  
 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the capital structure practices of companies listed on the JSE 
by analysing their operating performance before and after significant leverage events 
defined as increases or decreases of more than 30% in a year. 
We develop a performance scorecard that acts as a complete synopsis of firm 
performance on aspects relating to leverage. We use a fixed effects regression on 
unbalanced panel data to test the relationship between the leverage change and 12 
concurrent performance variables selected on the basis of their pre-established impact 
on firm leverage according to prior studies. We also test the relationship between the 
leverage change and the same set of performance variables five years before and five 
years after the event.  We run a multiple discriminant analysis to test the predictive 
ability of our model. A 20% hold-out sample achieves a 48% correct classification rate. 
Observed trends indicated that firms who increased their leverage introduced more 
operational risk than those who decreased their leverage. Increases were preceded 
by lower profitability but followed by higher profitability and higher ROI. Increases were 
also preceded by higher tax shields and resulted in improved PE ratios. Increases 
were also associated with higher total assets (size indicator). Decreases were 
associated with higher liquidity, DSCR’s, ROI’s, profitability and share prices. 
The regression results identify significant lead- and lag periods only around increase 
events and establish the significance of the variables liquidity, size, operating cash 
and profitability relative to same-year leverage changes.  The study also identifies 
significant performance variables at specific time periods – liquidity (t-3, t-4), operating 
cash (t-2, t-3), effective tax rate (t-4, t+1, t+3), size (t-4) and ROI (t-4). We confirm a 
positive relationship between liquidity, cash and effective tax rate but the coefficients 
for the latter two variables, size and ROI, are contrary to what we expect based on 
previous studies’ findings. On the whole most of the results are inconsistent though 
and fail to conclusively substantiate the practice of any particular theory practiced by 
companies listed on the JSE. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There are many ways in which a company can fund operations or investment. 
Firstly, by means of internally-retained prior year’s profits. Secondly, by means of 
liquid assets such as cash and short-term marketable securities. Thirdly, by means 
of external capital such as short-or long-term debt funding or equity issuances.  
There is much in the way of literature on the rationale behind capital structure 
choices and the effects thereof on company performance (Modigliani & Miller, 
1958, Donaldson, 1961, Myers, 1977, Myers & Majluf, 1984, Jensen, 1986,  
Barclay & Smith, 1999) but limited consistent consensus on the practical 
importance of the factors behind these theories (Long & Malitz, 1985, Harris & 
Raviv, 1991, Rajan & Zingales, 1995, Titman & Wessels, 1988, Shyam-Sunder & 
Myers, 1999, Baker & Wurgler, 2002, Frank & Goyal, 2003). In particular, 
disparities exist between empirical evidence and theoretical models (agency 
conflict, asymmetric information, product market and corporate control) and 
particularly, against the background of the specific context within which each one 
was formulated (Harris & Raviv, 1991).  
Of course, all companies experience a growth lifecycle in which their funding 
requirements and operational activities as well as their asset base change and 
develop. The natural phases of expansion and contraction necessitate different 
management approaches. In the Literature Review that follows, we assimilate 
multiple views on the subject of capital structure. In this study we try to refine the 
different schools of thought into a coherent model which identifies the point at 
which a select combination of performance variables impacts upon management’s 
leverage decisions. In this way we aim to establish which factors drive capital 
structure policy amongst JSE firms and by implication, which capital structure 
theories are being implemented in practice by JSE-listed companies. 
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1.1. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the catalysts and resultant effects of corporate leverage changes 
measured by changes in operating performance at specific leads and lags?  
Previous work on the topic of capital structure has focused on proposed 
methodologies to explain how companies set their debt/equity ratios based on 
a deeper analysis of the particular traits of debt and equity as sources of 
capital while understanding that a trade-off occurs between the risk introduced 
(through higher debt levels or the loss of corporate control through issuing 
equity) and the need to turn the wheels of profit-yielding investment. This is 
important because the DER attests to the fine line that a company walks 
between risk and return.  
Many studies have justified the importance of one or more significant 
influential operators in capital structure decisions due to its/their association 
with leverage decisions in capital structure management. For example, Berger 
and Udell (1988) find the size/age/information continuum, Titman & Wessels 
(1988) find the relevance of profitability and investment opportunities, Barclay 
and Smith(1999) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) find the market-to-book ratio 
as a proxy for investment opportunities, Harris and Raviv (1991) find tangible 
assets, Long and Malitz (1985) find the potential for risk-shifting between 
shareholders and debtholders, Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995) find the 
dividend yield, and Korajczyk and Levy (2003) understand the importance of 
existing financial constraints on leverage decisions. Other papers have 
extended their findings to specifically support certain theories. For example, 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) Irrelevance Theorem is based on the 
importance of the asset capitalisation rate rather than the type of capital used, 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Lucas and McDonald (1990) find the 
importance of recent share price performance in the Market Valuation theory, 
Myers’ (1977) Underinvestment theory highlights the value of future 
discretionary investment spending, Myers and Majluf’s (1984) Pecking Order 
theory centres around the importance of information asymmetry and Jensen’s 
(1986) Free Cash Flow theory has at its core, the usefulness of excess cash.  
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Of notable interest is survey evidence from the US (Graham & Harvey, 2001) 
and international non-US markets (Brounen, de Jong & Koedjik, 2004) which 
finds that financial flexibility is of primary importance for capital structure policy 
makers - in support of the Underinvestment theory. Limited practical evidence 
is found in support of the Pecking Order-, Trade-off- and Market Valuation 
theories.  
The main points of interest in this study are firstly, an analysis of corporate 
practice on the JSE as a reference to the South African market, and secondly, 
the relationship between operational performance (and associated capital 
structure theories to which those variables relate) and leverage events at 
specific points in time. We have distinguished between pre- and post-event 
performance in order to facilitate our understanding of key influential 
operators. 
1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this study is to investigate the catalysts and resultant effects 
of significant capital structure changes by analysing the evolution of certain 
operational factors in the five years leading up to- and following the change.  
1.3. DELIMITATIONS 
 The sample size may be excessively limited if suitable companies on the 
JSE display a trend towards targeting a constant debt/equity ratio (DER). 
 Lack of data availability may limit the sample size if a complete analysis 
cannot be performed.  
 JSE biases may influence the outcome of the study as the exchange tends 
to be predominated by large market capitalisation companies which may 
be united by a common capital structure rationale that determines their 
capital structure choices (correlation between cross-sectional units).  
 Firm heterogeneity may complicate regression testing in a standardised 
model.  
 A quintile categorical study is not particularly precise as it is backward-
looking considering the fact that the sample period values are known up 
front and strong trends may unduly affect the definition of quintile 
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categories. This is the case with the data on Compagnie Finansiere 
Richemonte (Richemonte) where the share price jumped 120% in the last 
two years of the sample period, stretching the period range and raising the 
fifth quintile considerably. A rolling period quintile range would be more 
current and better reflect year-to-year operational considerations. This is 
better measured on an “event-level” in the regression analyses using 
annual percentage changes in both the DER and determinant variables at 
each event time period. 
 In the study it is found that a general increase occurs in most variables and 
most sample companies by the end of the sample period. This is probably 
due to inflationary financial statement swelling that has not explicitly been 
accounted for. Naturally this phenomenon skews the maximum period 
value for each variable upwards and raises the fifth quintile, creating the 
illusion of growth towards the end of the sample. Without indexing the 
performance variables to a base year, the quintile sort deceptively makes 
it look like general operating performance was improved across the board 
towards the end of the sample.  
 Highly correlated determinant variables may raise doubts about the 
strength and authenticity of the link between leverage changes and the 
variables included in the study, potentially exacerbated by omitted 
variables (endogeneity). 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, we outline various different perspectives on the importance of the 
debt/equity ratio as well as the most common theories on what decision factors 
motivate capital structure policy. All studies undertaken were based on the US 
market unless stated otherwise. 
2.1. THE RELEVANCE OF THE DEBT/EQUITY RATIO 
Scott and Martin (1975) note that of great concern to financial managers is the 
absence of a single valuation formula to determine a firm’s optimal capital 
structure. Bhandari (1988) analyses the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
and describes the DER as a ‘natural proxy’ for common equity risk apart from 
that contained within the Beta measure and finds a significant positive 
relationship between leverage and returns.  Barbee, Mukherji and Raines 
(1996) use data from the NYSE and AMEX and find that the sales/price ratio 
(S/P) together with the DER have greater explanatory power than either the 
book-to-market value of equity (BMVE) or the market value of equity (MVE), 
albeit only for the period from 1979 to 1991. 
Along with the findings of Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) - whose study 
finds little significance between BMVE and S&P returns between 1947 and 
1987 - these results are in sharp contrast with the findings of Fama and French 
(1992) who find that the BMVE and firm size (proxied by MVE) have the 
greatest explanatory power for expected equity returns specifically for the 
period from 1963 to 1990.  
Hamada (1972) finds that corporate leverage in the US has a definite impact 
on levels of systematic risk to the extent of 21% to 24%. In this way, a firm’s 
capital structure becomes relevant as an indication of firm operational risk and 
a determinant of future equity performance through compensation for 
operational risk borne. It would appear that firm leverage is recognised and 
rewarded by investors. 
Berger and Udell (1988) describe the different capital structures that arise in 
their study of the US market as the firm moves through the stages of the 
lifecycle, evolving in both size and age. Informational opaqueness becomes 
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of paramount importance in determining suitable sources of funding – public 
or private. The ability to accurately communicate firm quality to potential 
funders of capital and to build credible reputations becomes the solution to 
surmounting informational penalties imposed by nervous lenders. They 
generate a ‘size/age/information’ continuum displaying the lifecycle growth 
stages experienced by developing companies. Smaller, younger, 
informationally-opaque companies often without steady cashflow and with 
predominantly intangible assets, must rely on private insider funding initially 
with aspirations of accessing public external markets becoming a realistic 
option only after proven continued growth. At this later stage, the business can 
be considered informationally-transparent yet moral hazard conflicts may 
arise and business owners may select debt as a preferred source of financing 
to maintain control of their businesses. In contrast, equity financing may 
transfer ownership risk and responsibility to external shareholders.  
Zwiebel (1996) notes that the benefits of debt include constraining entrenched 
management (and promoting responsible investment thereby achieving some 
degree of credible takeover resistance) while also avoiding diffusion of 
ownership and loss of control. However, the costs of debt centre around the 
increased threat of bankruptcy associated with onerous repayments which 
may limit future investment and squeeze bottom-line profits.  
Capital structure decisions thus, revolve around balancing operational 
expansion and future viability with maintaining corporate control (and some 
degree of entrenchment). Positive net present value (NPV) investments and 
enhanced managerial efficiency reduce the need for debt as a means of 
resisting takeovers. Profitable firms tend to have lower leverage and firms with 
higher investment opportunities have lower leverage (Titman & Wessels, 
1988). Furthermore, negative market reactions to new equity issues are 
explained as being a response to a loss in control through diffusion of 
ownership (Myers & Majluf, 1984). This would logically lead to an increase in 
firm value under new debt issues as any corporate activity that reduces 
management’s ownership stake would result in management deciding to lever 
up to fend off the threat of a takeover.  
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2.2. MODIGLIANI AND MILLER: CAPITAL STRUCTURE IRRELEVANCE 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) Irrelevance Theory states that in a perfect 
capital market (no transaction costs, no bankruptcy costs, no income taxes) 
the market value of a company is independent of its capital structure and 
purely a function of the expected return on its assets capitalised at an asset 
class-specific capitalisation rate. Substituting equity funding with cheaper debt 
funding will have no effect on the average cost of funds because the higher 
proportion of debt will offset the lower cost of borrowed funds by increasing 
the cost of equity funds. Similarly, an investment decision “cut-off” point is 
described as being a function of the asset capitalisation rate in all cases, 
regardless of whether debt or equity is used to fund the investment. A feasible 
investment should be evaluated only on the basis of whether the return on 
investment exceeds the relevant capitalisation rate.  
2.3. UNDERINVESTMENT THEORY 
Myer’s (1977) shows that it is rational to limit debt funding because the 
presence of risky debt reduces the present value of future discretionary 
spending on growth opportunities by introducing a sub-optimal investment 
strategy. Firms with risky debt may forego positive investment opportunities. 
The higher the value of future growth opportunities, the lower the amount of 
leverage a company should maintain. This is known as the Underinvestment- 
or Contracting-Costs Theory and it constitutes an agency conflict between 
bondholders and shareholders. Bondholders may be satisfied to invest in low-
risk/low-return projects for which shareholders are never recompensed. When 
existing debt levels are high, any new equity funding would largely be 
allocated to debt service making new equity funding prohibitively expensive. 
In this scenario, it is likely that positive-NPV projects may be foregone. This 
problem is particularly acute for high growth firms with mostly intangible assets 
who need to maintain sufficient reserve debt capacity to fund future growth. 
Barclay and Smith (1999) ask the question, “What is the optimal capital 
structure that maximises firm value?” This study tests the Contracting Costs 
theory using as a proxy for growth opportunities, the ratio of market-to-book 
value of assets. Their regression analysis shows that companies with high 
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market-to-book ratios had significantly lower leverage ratios. The same result 
was also found in the earlier study by Rajan and Zingales (1995) who tested 
data outside the US but came to the same conclusion – firms with higher 
market-to-book ratios had lower leverage. The authors conclude that the 
Contracting Costs theory presents the most unified framework of competing 
theories. Furthermore, they suggest that companies will select “coherent 
packages” of financial policy choices relating not only to capital structure 
choice but also dividend policy and equity option compensation.  
2.4. PECKING ORDER THEORY 
Myers and Majluf (1984) present an “issue-invest” model showing that under 
conditions of asymmetric information between management and investors, 
firms will demonstrate a preference for internal capital funding. Unless the 
increment to existing shareholders from the new investment exceeds the value 
of slack and assets-in-place, a portion of which becomes due to new 
shareholders, the firm will not issue equity to fund the investment. In this case, 
the project will either be funded from internal available funds or not undertaken 
at all. This is known as the Pecking Order theory. The theory presents a 
scenario whereby the company may forego positive-NPV projects rather than 
issue new equity at a discount that would prejudice existing shareholders. 
Finally, according to option pricing theory (used as the basis of the model), the 
opportunity loss of debt is always less than that of equity. Thus, debt is more 
likely to be issued before equity. The motivation hereof, according to the 
authors, is purely in the best interests of existing shareholders and not related 
to the ‘managerial capitalism’ theory discussed later in this paper. 
The Pecking Order theory is primarily motivated by information asymmetry – 
the value of debt is less likely to fluctuate once manager’s inside information 
is revealed. This characteristic makes it more certain and preferred to equity 
for this reason. Likewise, internal funds are tantamount to riskless debt and 
preferred to risky debt for the same reason. Myers (1984) suggests a simple 
rule-of-thumb: issue debt when the firm is undervalued and equity when it’s 
overvalued. This approach would effectively create a Pecking Order policy 
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since equity issuances would always be met with investor scepticism making 
it a ‘last resort’ option.  
Baskin (1989) says, in support of the Pecking Order (which he describes as 
having developed originally as a description of corporate practice), 
“established firms normally avoid new equity issues, and borrowing tends to 
be determined as the residual between desired investment and a relatively 
inelastic supply of retained earnings”. He finds that leverage is positively 
related to past growth, negatively related to past profitability and positively 
related to past dividends.  
Fama and French (2002) find evidence in support of both the Pecking Order 
and Trade-off Theories: firstly, profitable firms have less leverage, firms with 
more investments have less leverage and notably, short-term cashflow 
fluctuations in investment and earnings are managed by means of debt. 
Importantly, they summarise the two primary drivers of both theories as being 
profitability and investment. On the one hand (what the authors describe as 
the ‘simple’ version of the Pecking Order), debt increases when investment 
exceeds earnings providing that new investment cannot be financed with 
retained earnings (or equity under certain favourable conditions as discussed 
below). Leverage is less for profitable firms and more for firms with many 
profitable investment opportunities.  
The ‘complex’ version of the Pecking Order, according to Myers (1984), states 
that firms that anticipate worthwhile forthcoming investment opportunities are 
likely to budget for them by maintaining sufficient debt reserves to avoid 
having to forego valuable business opportunities or reduce future investment 
profits as a result of having to finance them with expensive high-risk funding 
such as risky debt or equity. This becomes something of a trade-off in that 
excessive leverage reduces profitability and increases the threat of 
bankruptcy, thus, firms with many favourable investment opportunities are 
more conservative in their use of debt. Firms with many profitable investment 
opportunities will maintain lower levels of leverage.  
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The fundamental premise of the Pecking Order is one of preference under 
ideal conditions. Common sense and logic would dictate that where the 
informational asymmetry associated with risky debt or equity is favourable to 
new lenders, or where management pre-empts a negative reaction by issuing 
at a discount in order to ensure viable projects are accessible, there may be 
situations where equity finance is preferential to debt - specifically where the 
fundamental premise of the Pecking Order, namely, informational asymmetry, 
actually works in favour of new investors.   
Naturally the Pecking Order is a theory devised in a perfect world which fails 
to explicitly consider every possible financing scenario. Mitigating 
circumstances may include a high level of existing debt, recessionary 
macroeconomic conditions that increase the cost of debt, sudden cashflow 
squeezes, temporary negative earnings shocks or unexpected and irresistibly-
favourable market conditions. By the same token, a particularly uninviting 
equity market (poor market sentiment or a market recession) may be the 
primary reason a company raises debt financing.  
The option to maintain retained earnings to fund operations if management 
anticipates tough times ahead may make new risky security-funding look more 
attractive than cash.  Perhaps above-average investment returns would 
provide sufficient incentive for management to issue new risky securities at a 
discount to avoid the opportunity cost of foregone investment. Alternatively, 
management might be motivated to find ways to successfully communicate 
favourable informational asymmetry to new lenders.  
Under the Pecking Order, new lenders would assume the informational 
asymmetry was negative and further discount the issue price. It doesn’t seem 
entirely reasonable that lenders would always be suspicious of management’s 
intentions but it seems that if management could be transparent in their 
financing decisions and as a result, trusted by the market, then the barriers of 
informational asymmetry would less likely hold power over what funding 
options best suit a company’s cashflow needs over time, through up and 
down-markets and favourable and unfavourable market sentiment such that 
each financing decision would be motivated by the specific merits of individual 
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situations. Fama and French (2002) also note an implied but obvious ‘pecking 
order’ of cashflow expenditure in that the payout ratio, according to Myers 
(1984), is inversely related to investment opportunities and leverage. Debt 
repayments and future positive investment returns take precedence over 
dividend payouts.  
This is logical business sense - certain cashflows are prioritised over others 
for good reason, and in the same way, certain financing options are prioritised 
over others based on their associated advantages and disadvantages but 
clearly such merits are contextual and not fixed in stone. Notably they find 
weak evidence to support the ’simple’ version of the Pecking Order (positive 
relationship between leverage and investment) but strong evidence in support 
of the ‘Complex’ version (also support for the Trade-off Theory). Fama and 
French (2002)  conclude by saying that the biggest ‘scar’ (p. 30) of the Trade-
off model is the negative relationship between leverage and profitability while 
the Pecking Order falls down where small, high-growth non-dividend paying 
firms (high agency cost firms) issue new equity.  
Frank and Goyal (2003) are considerably less enthusiastic about the Pecking 
Order theory in their study of American firms from 1971 to 1998. They find that 
on average, amongst US-listed firms, net equity issues exceed net debt issues 
(after excluding the IPO-effect) and track the financing deficit more closely. 
However, they also acknowledge that many small firms entered the market in 
the 1980’s and 1990’s (preferred equity-issuers). The correlation between net 
equity issues and the financing deficit is 0.80 while that between net long-term 
debt issues and the financing deficit is only 0.48. They also find that despite 
the fact that small, high-growth firms are more vulnerable to adverse selection 
costs as a result of higher information asymmetry, they are even less likely to 
adhere to the Pecking Order.  
The authors state that under the Pecking Order, high-growth companies will 
“end-up with more debt because of a manager’s reluctance to issue equity” 
(p. 219). However, according to the theory this will only happen if internal funds 
are insufficient to fund activities and of course, there are situations where more 
debt may be advantageous (particularly given the lower informational cost 
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associated with debt relative to equity) . Harris and Raviv (1991) clarify that 
according to the theory of the Pecking Order, firms with more tangible assets 
can support more debt. The rationale is twofold: firstly, they can support more 
debt as a result of higher collateral and concomitant lower borrowing costs 
and secondly, even though the probability of bankruptcy is higher, they will 
have a higher liquidation value at bankruptcy due to the nature of their assets 
making liquidation the best option under the circumstances.  
Frank and Goyal (2003) cite evidence that low information-cost debt such as 
capitalised leases and secured debt is generally not issued before high 
information-cost unsecured debt, as it should be according to the Pecking 
Order. Barclay and Smith (1995a, b) find that 50% of their sample firms have 
no short-term debt (less than one year maturity), 23% have no secured debt 
and 54% have no capital leases. This evidence strongly refutes the Pecking 
Order theory.  
Frank and Goyal (2003) further reason that firms with fewer tangible assets 
have a higher degree of information asymmetry (which can be argued given 
the fact that it would be difficult to submit intangible assets to the market for 
valuation purposes) and thus, would accumulate more debt. But this 
conclusion fails to acknowledge that additional debt would become 
progressively more expensive and eventually increase the threat of 
bankruptcy to an unsustainable point. In fact for that very reason, it would be 
difficult to raise a stream of further debt funding backed only by intangible 
assets. 
Of course, the Pecking Order theory addresses separately the ideas of the 
benefits of asset composition and the informational characteristics of sources 
of funds and says nothing of the informational costs of different types of 
assets. The authors find furthermore, that internally retained funds become 
progressively less important as a source of financing in the study sample 
period and for a sub-sample period in the 1990’s that support for the Pecking 
Order is weaker than in the 1970’s and 1980’s.  
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) find that a Pecking Order model explains 
more of the variance of DER’s than a target adjustment model. Simulation 
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results on the Trade-off Theory fail to reject the model when it is false, while 
those on the Pecking Order are more powerful. The authors suggest that the 
Trade-off Theory gives false positives because capital expenditure is serially 
correlated and earnings are cyclical. Furthermore, dividends are inflexible and 
as such, the DER will appear to increase for a few years and then decrease 
for a few years as general operational conditions develop. Thus, the results of 
the model fit are highly dependent on the measurement of the target ratio and 
using an ex-post mean captures natural mean-reversion which may appear to 
be target adjustment. They acknowledge that the Pecking Order model was 
particularly successful for their sample of larger, mature firms.  
2.5. TRADE-OFF THEORY 
Myers (1984) divides the capital structure decision into two schools of thought: 
firstly, a static Trade-off hypothesis (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980) of the risks 
and costs of potential financial distress against the potential tax saving of 
additional interest repayments, and secondly, the Pecking Order theory in 
which internal funds are preferred to debt and debt preferred to equity.  The 
former theory leads the authors to conclude that: a) risky firms should borrow 
less as the threat of financial distress is relatively more likely, and b) that firms 
with specialised intangible assets or growth opportunities have a higher 
opportunity loss in times of financial distress. Firms with more assets-in-place 
with active secondary markets can thus, afford to borrow more than firms with 
more intangible growth opportunities.  
2.6. AGENCY CONFLICT 
Myers (1984) cites Donaldson (1961) who raises the matter of the agency 
conflict known as “managerial capitalism” - managerial avoidance of external 
capital markets as a disciplining mechanism being non-synchronous relative 
to the “maximising shareholder wealth” view frequently espoused in financial 
literature. The suggested solution to this problem is probably best addressed 
by Jensen’s (1986) Free Cash Flow theory. If shareholder wealth is actively 
being maximised, companies generating excess operating cash without 
adequate growth opportunities should apply any operating cashflow that 
cannot be profitably invested within the company, towards new debt funding 
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repayments rather than wasting it on low- or negative-NPV projects. He also 
notes that contractually-obligated debt repayments are a more effective 
means of distributing excess cash than discretionary dividend payments. 
Additional debt in this situation acts as an incentive to management to critically 
evaluate capital spending. 
Long and Malitz (1985) show that under cases of moral hazard where the 
agency conflict of debt may lead to risk shifting between stakeholders, the type 
of available investment opportunities chiefly determines the amount of 
leverage a firm can support. With predominantly intangible assets, firms can 
easily invest in low-return projects (such as R&D) and shift risk towards 
bondholders. However, with predominantly tangible assets, this behaviour is 
observable and easier to control. Firms with more intangible growth 
opportunities can best control the agency conflict of debt by issuing less risky 
debt while firms with tangible assets can support a higher level of risky debt. 
Intangible investment opportunities effectively reduce available debt capacity.  
2.7. LEVERAGE AND OTHER OPERATING VARIABLES 
Frank and Goyal (2009) find that the most important determinant variables of 
leverage decisions are industry median leverage, the market-to-book ratio, 
assets as collateral, profits, whether the company pays a dividend, log of total 
assets and inflation. 
Long and Malitz (1985) analyse firms listed on the NYSE and AMEX and find 
a negative relationship between investment in advertising and R&D (used as 
a proxy for intangible growth opportunities) and leverage, and a positive 
relationship between capital expenditure and leverage - confirming the 
presence of a limit on borrowing for firms with more intangible growth 
opportunities. This is corroborated by Williamson (1981) who used as his 
proxy for intangible growth opportunities, the difference between the market 
value of debt and equity and the replacement cost of tangible assets.  
Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995) introduce the results of their study showing 
that leverage ratios are significantly negatively related to dividend yields. The 
higher the market-to-book ratio, the lower the dividend yield suggesting that 
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dividend policy and capital structure policy are complementary strategies 
motivated by a common goal. The notion of a package of financial policy 
choices is investigated by Smith and Watts (1992) who find that measures of 
a firm’s investment opportunity set (growth opportunities and firm size) have 
implied associations with its financing, dividend and executive-compensation 
policies. Their results show that leverage and dividend yields are positively 
related, and firms with more growth opportunities have lower leverage.  
Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) find a surprising amount of persistence 
in capital structures of US and UK firms over their sample period of two 
decades. This implies stability in factors that determine variation in capital 
structure. They note that existing determinants appear to explain a very small 
portion of the unconditional standard deviation of book leverage (defined as 
the ratio of total debt to total assets).  Interestingly, they notice a transitory 
component associated with rebalancing towards a target, and a long-run 
permanent component which is largely time-invariant. 
Harris and Raviv (1991) find that leverage increases with fixed assets, non-
debt tax shields, investment opportunities, and size; and decreases with 
volatility, advertising expenditure, the probability of bankruptcy, profitability, 
and product uniqueness.  
Rajan and Zingales (1995) examine the determinants of leverage across G7 
countries and find similarities in the extent to which these countries are levered 
despite differences in their regulatory and institutional environments.  They 
note that the size effect is ambiguous – large firms may be more diversified 
and less likely to fail (in which case size and leverage should be positively 
related), but size may also proxy for the degree of information asymmetry 
associated with a firm. The more information outsiders have (the lower the 
information asymmetry), the higher the firm’s preference for equity funding 
should be given the fact that equity is perceived as being more sensitive to the 
market assessments of its true value. However, their results show that large 
firms (lower informational asymmetry) issue less equity. They also find that 
asset composition is consistently positively correlated with leverage, the 
market-to-book (assets) ratio as a proxy for investment opportunities is 
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consistently negatively correlated with leverage, size is positively correlated 
with leverage everywhere except Germany, and profitability is negatively 
correlated with leverage in most countries except Germany and France (where 
it shows no significant correlation).  
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) investigate the US market and find that financially 
unconstrained firms tend to issue equity around market peaks but this is not 
the case for relatively more constrained firms (those without sufficient cash-
generation to fund investments and those subject to material penalty agency 
costs when accessing external funding). They also find that larger firms have 
more leverage, firms with a higher proportion of tangible assets have more 
leverage while those with more unique assets have less. Firms with non-debt 
tax shields such as depreciation have lower leverage. More profitable firms 
(measured by operating income) have less leverage. They reason that this 
evidence supports the Pecking Order theory in that internal funds are 
preferred over external, and debt over equity due to the higher informational 
cost of equity.  
2.8. TAXES 
Miller (1977) adds the effect of investor’s personal income taxes to the Trade-
off theory argument and finds that the additional tax liability that falls to 
investors as a result of being taxed on interest income (taxed at a higher rate 
than equity gains) must be offset by higher corporate bond yields. This 
ultimately negates the tax advantage of issuing more debt at the corporate 
level.  
While Miller (1977) compares the size of expected bankruptcy costs in the 
Trade-off debate as being tantamount to the horse in a horse-and-rabbit stew, 
(unrealistically large to offset the tax savings of debt), DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980) find that the existence of non-debt tax shields such as depreciation and 
investment tax credits effectively overturns the Irrelevancy theorem. They 
present a model in which the market prices of debt and equity adjust so that 
the difference between the personal tax disadvantage and the corporate tax 
advantage is similar in magnitude to the expected cost of bankruptcy. 
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Graham (2000) notes that the tax benefit of debt is 9.7% of firm value (or 4.3% 
net of personal taxes) and most firms could double their use of debt under the 
reasoning of the Trade-off theory. Large, liquid, profitable firms with a low 
threat of bankruptcy are conservative in their use of debt. This is largely due 
to an increasing tax benefit function as tax rates fall as interest expenses 
increase. 
2.9. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Marsh (1982) cites three important studies: Taub (1975), Baxter and Cragg 
(1970) and Martin and Scott (1974). Their results indicate that small 
companies, companies with high PE ratios and highly-geared companies 
showed a greater likelihood of issuing equity. Marsh (1982) studies UK firms 
and concludes that the PE ratio is a “timing’ variable suggesting those equity 
issues were related to current favourable market valuations and/or strong 
share price performance. Baxter and Cragg (1970) also found that companies 
raising larger amounts of capital favoured debt as a means to do this. Marsh 
(1982) suggests that this is due to concerns over loss of control. Companies 
with high market capitalisations relative to total assets favoured equity.  
Martin and Scott (1974) found that a high dividend payout, low profitability and 
a high degree of fixed assets were prevalent amongst debt issues. The first 
two factors support the Pecking Order theory if companies are paying out a 
substantial portion of earnings or if earnings are low, while the third factor 
supports the Asset Composition argument. Marsh (1982) finds that risky 
companies tend to favour equity and concludes by saying that three variables 
appear consistently important – operating risk, size and asset composition 
(although the measurement of operating risk is inconsistent). 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) find a strong relationship between current capital 
structure and historical market values suggesting that companies time equity 
issues and that this method is successful on average. The authors mention a 
‘dynamic’ version of the Pecking Order whereby companies with forthcoming 
investment opportunities reduce leverage to avoid having to issue equity at 
some unknown point in the future. In the sense that the Pecking Order theory 
is based upon informational asymmetry and the associated costs of 
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uncertainty, the use of equity as a ’last resort’ supports the theory and adds 
weight to the preference for issuing equity under conditions of certainty 
particularly where the outcome is positive for shareholders. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) assess the explanatory power of previously 
identified determinants of capital structure. They find that leverage is 
negatively related to firm ‘uniqueness’, transaction costs of debt may be an 
important determinant of leverage (although like Miller, 1977, they conclude 
are insignificant relative to other determinants), and that past profitability is 
negatively related to leverage (scaled by the market value of equity).  
Friend and Hasbrouck (1986) find that in addition to previously identified 
relationships such as asset risk (proxied by operating leverage), variation in 
operating income or return on assets (negative correlation), profitability 
(negative correlation) and firm size (positive correlation), they also find a link 
between past growth and leverage (positive) and the size of insider holdings 
and leverage (negative correlation) due to a higher vested interest in ensuring 
the firm remains viable which is more likely at lower leverage ratios.  
2.10. SURVEY EVIDENCE 
International survey evidence (Brounen, de Jong & Koedjik, 2004) has shown 
that, in setting the appropriate amount of debt, the majority of companies 
consider financial flexibility of above average importance, followed by credit 
ratings (particularly in the US). Earnings volatility and the tax advantage of 
debt are of moderate importance. Costs of financial distress are only slightly 
important and issuing debt as an incentive to management is not a priority to 
most companies. Other factors of moderate importance are the level of 
interest rates on debt and the availability of sufficient profits to fund activities. 
Debt as an alternative source of funds to undervalued equity is of less 
importance. Debt as a signalling device is of little importance as is the effect 
of investors’ personal taxes.  
Graham and Harvey (2001) focus on the US market and find that the 
predominant factors influencing debt issuance are financial flexibility and 
credit ratings (above-average importance), followed by earnings and cashflow 
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volatility, insufficient internal funds, the level of interest rates and the tax 
advantage of debt (slightly less than average importance). Bankruptcy costs 
again are of little importance but are relatively more important for speculative 
firms. Investor’s personal taxes are also of very little importance.  
Despite the appearance of financial flexibility as the most important 
consideration in selecting the amount of debt in both survey’s (confirmed by 
Graham, 2000), the authors conclude that without evidence of informational 
asymmetry (proxied by size or status as dividend-payer), financial flexibility on 
its own does not constitute proof of the Pecking Order theory at work. It does 
lend some support however, to the Underinvestment theory and the good 
sense of limiting debt funding for future investment.  
The appearance of insufficient internal funds as a key determinant in the 
decision to issue debt supports the Pecking Order theory particularly because 
it is more important for small firms who are more affected by information 
asymmetry issues. However, the evidence that firms issue equity when access 
to debt funding is restricted is limited which is contrary to the Pecking Order 
Theory.  
The appearance of a preference for issuing equity when market valuations are 
positive supports the Market Valuation theory that companies take advantage 
of ‘windows of opportunity’ when issuing new equity. Recent share price 
performance is considered to be of above-average importance in the decision 
to issue equity, again supporting the ‘window of opportunity’ theory of market 
timing (Lucas & McDonald, 1990 and Loughran & Ritter, 1995). This is 
corroborated by the Graham and Harvey (2001) survey evidence that 
companies will issue convertible debt instead of undervalued equity. This 
supports Stein’s (1992) theory that convertible debt instruments are “back-
door” equity in that they are a cheaper way of issuing delayed common equity 
also cited by Graham and Harvey, 2001. The indication that companies prefer 
to issue debt when interest rates are favourable lends further support to the 
Market Valuation theory.  
When asked whether debt policy is affected by the desire to repay long-term 
profits to shareholders not bondholders, the scores were low. However, it 
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appeared to be a more important factor for growth firms rather than non-
growth firms which does lend some support for the Underinvestment problem 
being of concern when issuing debt. 
Of interest is the survey finding that firms do not use debt in order to commit 
cashflow to additional interest payments and thereby incentivise managers or 
impose efficiency constraints, contrary to Jensen’s (1986) Free Cashflow 
Theory. 
The survey of 16 European markets by Bancel and Mittoo (2004) largely 
confirms prior evidence – of most importance is financial flexibility (ranked 
stronger than the two previous studies) and credit ratings. The tax advantage 
of additional debt features higher in importance than the two previous studies, 
followed by earnings volatility, customers/suppliers concerns about future 
financial stability and finally the potential costs of distress. This provides more 
support for the Trade-off theory. Again, market valuation affects the timing of 
equity issues in accordance with the Market Valuation theory. The level of 
interest rates also presents itself as a factor relevant in issuing debt again 
supporting the Market Valuation theory.  
According to the survey, however, there is limited support for the Pecking 
Order Theory as few firms issue debt when internal profits are insufficient to 
fund activities. Interestingly, this motivation is stronger for new equity issues 
meaning that firms will resort to equity funding to make up a shortfall in profits 
but less often to debt. This is confirmed by Korajcyk, Lucas and McDonald 
(1990a) who suggest that it is not excessively high current debt capacity that 
prompts companies to issue further equity but rather that equity issues are 
used to finance new investments (based on their finding that Tobin’s q’s – 
market value of assets to book value of assets – rise before an equity issue 
and falls afterwards).  
South African survey evidence by Correia and Cramer (2008) is of limited 
scope but reveals that only 21% of companies do not apply a target debt-
equity ratio, compared to Graham and Harvey’s (2001) finding that 19% of 
companies do not apply any kind of target. However, the Correia and Cramer 
study shows that in South Africa, the targets appear to be applied more strictly. 
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They conclude that the South African market is under-geared according to the 
predictions of the Trade-off theory, possibly due to a combination of high 
profitability and limited growth prospects and an unwillingness to expand into 
foreign markets. High interest rates may also have restricted the use of debt 
along with increased private equity investment involving highly geared 
financing structures.   
In summary, there are a number of feasible theories on what motivates capital 
structure. Survey evidence has shown that these theories are not practiced 
consistently in corporate management. It is this divergence between literature 
and practice that opens up a need for a study, particularly in the South African 
market, to reconcile this gap in order to better understand the driving forces of 
capital structure management decisions and the effects thereof and to what 
extent capital structure theories are supported in South Africa. 
2.11. METHODOLOGIES EMPLOYED 
Marsh (1982) uses a probit and a logit regression applied to a hold-out sample 
to estimate the likelihood of a company issuing either debt or equity based on 
its current debt ratio relative to a target. Their model correctly classified 75% 
of issues. Baxter and Cragg (1970) also use probit and logit regressions. Taub 
(1975) uses logit analysis to generate maximum likelihood estimates for the 
issuance of debt or equity depending on the current debt ratio relative to a 
desired target. Martin and Scott (1974) use multiple discriminant analysis 
(MDA) to classify their sample as either a debt-issuer or an equity-issuer and 
generate a 75% prediction rate on their original sample. They describe the 
MDA approach of making multivariate comparisons based on comparative 
financial ratios as being rational. Interestingly, total assets is the primary 
differentiator between debt- or equity-issuing groups, followed by the PE ratio 
and their liquidity measure CA/TA.  
Baker and Wurgler (2002) run univariate and multivariate regressions on the 
annual Debt/Asset ratio for a period of 10 years after an IPO to assess the 
development over this period of net debt issues, net equity issues and retained 
earnings as well as pre-specified determinants including market-to-book (to 
measure investment opportunities and market mispricing), asset composition 
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(ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets), profitability 
(EBITDA scaled by total assets) and size (log of net sales).  
Elsas and Florysiak (2008) analyse the US market and highlight the 
importance of considering the econometric time series aspect of capital 
structure studies in that the panel structure of the data as well as the 
endogeneity that is likely to be embedded within the independent variable 
determinants may lead to severe biases of estimators unless directly 
accounted for. They suggest that the full information content may not be 
correctly analysed and that inferences drawn may be incorrect. Furthermore, 
they suggest that the Fama/Macbeth (1973) procedure of standard error 
adjustment where firm heterogeneity is present or where endogeneity is 
present due to significant variables being omitted is inadequate for capital 
structure research and produces larger test statistics than are justified thereby 
rejecting the null hypothesis too frequently. They suggest the use of fixed 
effects panel estimators as being more effective in such situations as it allows 
for firm-specific intercepts in the regression. Thus, the time-invariant and firm-
specific component is removed from the regression residual term.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Previous research has established the link between certain operational 
variables and leverage. We employ the following financial variables as specific 
measures of different aspects of operating performance that, according to 
previous research, relate directly to capital structure and the extent of leverage 
employed. Thus, it becomes useful to address these facets of operating 
performance in our study in order to assess how leverage is being determined. 
3.1.1. Liquidity- CA/CL 
Short-term liquidity has a direct bearing on the choice between debt and 
equity as a means of financing working capital requirements. Greater 
liquidity enables greater debt capacity, measured by the ratio of Current 
Assets to Total Assets in the study by Martin and Scott (1974).  
3.1.2. Asset Composition- FA/INTANGIBLES 
Companies with higher tangible assets relative to intangible growth 
opportunities can support higher DER’s (Martin and Scott, 1974, Myers, 
1977, Long and Malitz, 1985). Tangible assets act as collateral against 
debt and reduce the cost of borrowing making debt funding more 
affordable. Firms with higher intangible growth opportunities prefer to 
maintain lower DER’s to preserve further borrowing capacity and avoid 
having to forego profitable investment opportunities. This also introduces 
a potential agency conflict where bondholders may reap all the benefits 
of new debt if existing leverage is very high. Shareholders may become 
compromised as profits from new projects are more likely to be applied 
towards existing debt service. Bondholders may also specifically select 
low-risk/low-return projects from which shareholders reap no benefit. A 
higher degree of fixed assets reduces the potential for wealth transfer. 
We use FA/INTANGIBLE ASSETS as a measure of asset composition. 
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3.1.3. Threat of Bankruptcy – DSCR, log(TA) 
Companies with high existing levels of debt run the risk of having to 
forego new positive NPV investment opportunities (Myers, 1977). They 
are more constrained in terms of raising new funding or adapting to 
changing business conditions. Reduced financial flexibility increases the 
likelihood of financial distress. High leverage companies where financial 
distress is more imminent are likely to find their shares discounted by the 
market at a higher rate (Fama & French, 1992) thereby reducing the 
amount of debt they can afford. We use Debt Service Coverage ratio 
(DSCR) defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to 
interest expense to measure the existing debt burden (Rajan & Zingales, 
1995 and Martin & Scott, 1974) and a size variable (log of total assets) 
as an inverse proxy for potential distress (Marsh, 1982, Harris & Raviv, 
1991, Rajan & Zingales, 1995).  
3.1.4. Cash Flow Generation – CF operations 
Companies that generate large amounts of free cashflow should 
increase their DER in order to allocate excess cashflow to debt 
repayments rather than invest it on low- or negative NPV projects 
(Jensen, 1986). We compare cash generation to profitability of existing 
investment. If excess cash is being generated for which there is no 
suitable use, additional debt would absorb it efficiently without the risk of 
wealth transfer occurring between shareholders and bondholders. We 
use cash from operations to measure cash generation.  
3.1.5. Market Valuation – PE, Share price return 
Companies are more likely to time the issuance of equity to take 
advantage of favourable market conditions. A high market-to-book ratio, 
a high PE ratio and a good recent share price return indicate favourable 
market conditions for issuing equity (Marsh, 1982, Barclay & Smith, 
1999, Baker & Wurgler, 2002). We use the PE ratio and share price 
return to measure market sentiment. 
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3.1.6. Operational Risk – % annual change in OI 
Companies with more earnings volatility are less likely to fund activities 
with debt (Marsh, 1982, Friend & Hasbrouck, 1986). Long and Malitz 
(1985) use an unlevered beta, we use earnings volatility to measure 
operational risk. Contrary to Titman and Wessels (1998) who use the 
standard deviation of operating income, we use the annual percentage 
change in operating income following the methodology used to identify 
significant DER changes.  
3.1.7. Profitability – OI/TA 
Companies prefer to fund growth with internally retained earnings before 
accessing external capital markets in order to reduce the informational 
costs associated with raising funds in external capital markets (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). If companies are forced to access external capital 
markets, debt is preferred to equity due to its lower informational cost. 
This also enables companies to maintain flexibility and avoid prohibitive 
funding commitments unless absolutely necessary. Profitability - 
measured as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation 
[EBITDA] following Baker and Wurgler (2002) or as the ratio of net 
income to total assets following Martin and Scott (1974) - indicates the 
availability of internal funds to fund investment activities. We use as the 
proxy for profitability, the ratio of operating income to total assets (Titman 
& Wessels, 1988). 
3.1.8. Tax Advantage - T 
Companies trade-off the tax advantage of additional debt with the 
increased costs of potential distress (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980, Myers, 
1984). The higher the potential costs of distress, the lower the DER all 
other things equal. We use the effective tax rate (calculated as the ratio 
of the annual taxation expense to net income) to estimate the potential 
tax savings on interest payments based on the actual cost of taxation 
relative to earnings. 
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3.1.9. Underinvestment Risk - ROI 
Where existing debt levels are high, firms may invest in low-risk/low-
return projects to avoid introducing excessive operational risk (Myers, 
1977). However, this may prejudice existing shareholders who earn a 
below-par return on equity.  This situation is exacerbated by high-growth 
companies with predominantly intangible growth opportunities who have 
a greater incentive to maintain lower debt ratios and thereby, preserve 
future borrowing capacity. We use the ratio of net profit to investments 
(ROI) to measure the profitability of current investments and assess this 
in combination with the existing debt burden and asset composition 
discussed above. 
3.1.10. Macroeconomic activity – Real Interest Rates 
We use a macroeconomic indicator, Real Interest Rate (calculated as 
the historic prime rate adjusted by the Consumer Price Index [CPI]) to 
isolate and analyse the change in capital structure within the context of 
the associated business cycle environment to properly understand the 
causes and effects of such a change. In the case where macroeconomic 
conditions are the sole drivers of a change made to leverage, this 
variable should enable us to isolate business environment effects from 
material developments in operational variables. 
Korajczyk et. al, (2003) find that firms are influenced by macroeconomic 
conditions as well as financial variables in their financing decisions. 
However, those firms that are relatively more constrained in their 
financing options are less reliant than unconstrained firms on favourable 
macroeconomic conditions when making the debt-/equity issue decision. 
They also note that equity issues tend to be pro-cyclical (more frequent 
during economic expansions) while debt issues are generally counter-
cyclical (generally relied upon during economic recessions) for 
unconstrained firms. Again this trend is less pronounced for constrained 
firms who appear to have less flexibility in their funding options. It is 
reasoned that in fact leverage for constrained firms is in fact, pro-cyclical. 
The capital structure of such firms tends to be more closely driven by 
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collateral asset values as they tend to lever up when collateral is most 
highly valued during or post-economic expansions.  
Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2004) also find evidence of counter-
cyclical leverage, noting that considerable evidence exists to indicate the 
increased likelihood of default on debt under macroeconomic recessions 
due to constrained cashflows. Their model suggests that optimal capital 
structure should be adjusted to macroeconomic conditions since this is 
the primary determinant of operating cashflows. They cite Schleifer and 
Vishny (2003) who find that a firm’s debt capacity in an expansion is 40% 
greater than during a recession. 
Levy and Hennessy (2007) also find that leverage for unconstrained 
firms that are able to access external public markets is counter-cyclical 
while that for more severely constrained firms is pro-cyclical. 
Furthermore, they find that investment contraction for high agency cost 
firms is particularly acute in economic recessions, leading to a feedback 
effect and resultant excessive volatility in investment that surpasses 
fluctuations in economic activity. Their model suggests that manager 
compensation is lowest during periods of economic recession and thus, 
it becomes reasonable to expect higher leverage ratios during such 
periods. This is re-affirmed by the use of more equity funding and 
concomitant improved risk-sharing during expansions – re-enforcing the 
pattern of counter-cyclical leverage.  
These factors, when assessed in combination, may form a web of 
indicators that are capable of suggesting, irrefutably, the practice of one 
particular capital structure policy over any others. Given the fact that 
most capital structure theories are systematically structured within a 
carefully designed context, addressing the multi-faceted nature of each 
theory is more likely to prove or disprove the practice.  
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3.2. PREDICTIONS 
Reduced profitability and insufficient internal funds leading up to a leverage 
increase would indicate clear support for the Pecking Order theory if combined 
with a clear decision to select debt in preference to equity (corroborating the 
higher informational cost of equity). Positive share price returns would 
increase the appeal of equity in support of the Market Valuation theory. If a 
company, particularly a high informational cost company, chose to issue debt 
despite the context of favourable market sentiment, it would lend support to 
the Pecking Order theory.  
The combination of higher tax rates and a high DER along with comfortable 
debt service levels amidst easily accessible equity financing may indicate that 
the Trade-off theory is being applied. A company generating excess free cash 
flow, particularly one without a high degree of current investment opportunities 
and concomitant use for such excess cashflow, may increase leverage to 
absorb excess cash and increase investment and growth – in support of the 
Free Cashflow theory. A company with high tangible assets should, all things 
equal, be able to support more debt. Thus, an increase in the proportion of 
tangible assets held prior to a leverage increase could be seen as support for 
the Asset Composition theory, all other things being equal. 
Conclusive proof for the Pecking Order theory would be evidence that firms 
prefer to fund internally even when debt-issuance circumstances are 
favourable (or at the least, not unfavourable); or that firms issue debt even 
when there’s no obvious obstacle to issuing equity. A debt issue where 
available internal funds exist or an attractive equity issue before debt capacity 
has been fully (optimally) utilised would irrefutably contradict the Pecking 
Order theory. So if our results show a leverage increase under favourable 
market conditions where debt service capacity and profitability and cashflow 
generation is high, we may conclude that under this scenario the Pecking 
Order is not being applied. 
Conclusive proof of the Trade-off theory would be an indication that the 
company is clearly using the tax benefits of additional debt to its advantage 
and simultaneously and deliberately steering clear of alternative forms of 
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funding such as available internal funds or equity (assuming those options are 
viable). Evidence that a company issues equity when further debt is affordable 
(or when market sentiment is less than favourable) and when the marginal tax 
benefits of debt represent a material reduction to the firm’s tax liability, would 
irrefutably contradict the Trade-off theory.  
A company with a high degree of cash generation that is not fully invested (or 
is investing at below-par returns) could feasibly issue more debt under the 
Free Cash Flow theory to improve current investment returns. Companies with 
high existing levels of debt combined with unprofitable investment returns 
should be concerned about underinvestment and potential agency conflicts 
arising should management become engaged in resource squandering 
activities. While further debt might limit management discretion it may not be 
affordable or accessible. In this scenario we would expect to see an increase 
in investment funded by equity (possibly bringing with it increased shareholder 
monitoring) to lower the debt ratio and improve the profitability of capital 
employment. High-growth companies with promising future discretionary 
opportunities should be particularly concerned with maintaining flexibility in 
their funding options. This doesn’t rule out issuing further debt but it does 
suggest that they shouldn’t lever up to a point where debt repayments limit 
operational capacity or future investment opportunities. Should debt reserve 
capacity become squeezed, we would expect to find that the firm issues equity 
before debt, provided that equity markets are not prohibitively unfavourable.  
In dealing with a multi-faceted argument, the puzzle is likely to become clear 
only when all the pieces are in their proper place.  
3.3. REGRESSION MODELS 
We sort firms into two groups - an increase or decrease group (I or D group) - 
to assess any significant differences that persist between these groups that 
may enhance our understanding of the conditions that lead to either of these 
events. We generate a fixed effects regression for unbalanced panel data for 
both groups around the leverage events identified using lead and lag financial 
indicator variables as the independent variables. We perform this analysis on 
a company-, event- and sector-level basis in anticipation that this will suggest 
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the existence of a sufficiently substantial ‘golden thread’ that could reliably 
indicate an approaching leverage adjustment. We also analyse the 
corresponding changes in the selected performance variables in the build-up 
to the event and subsequent operating years in the hope of identifying key 
variables for either a leverage increase or a decrease.  
In this way we are able to identify and understand the catalysts that collectively 
affect company performance preceding a leverage change via the indicator 
variables used. In this way we can assess the nature of the relationship 
between the leverage change implemented by management and the evolution 
of the relevant determinant variables leading up to- and following on after the 
event. 
We consider financial year-end data regardless of the calendar date thereof, 
given the fact that sample firm’s year-ends are likely to be within six months 
of each other and unlikely to be materially affected by business cycle or other 
effects. 
The regression model for the impact of DER changes at an overall sample-
level on all the selected concurrent performance variables at time t for 
company j appears as follows: 
Equation 1: 
𝛥𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝑎. 𝛥
𝐶𝐴
𝐶𝐿𝑗𝑡
+ 𝑏. 𝛥
𝐹𝐴
𝐼𝑁𝑇. 𝐴𝑗𝑡
+ 𝑐. 𝛥𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝑑. 𝛥𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝑇𝐴)𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒. 𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑗𝑡
+ 𝑓. 𝛥𝑃𝐸𝑗𝑡 + 𝑔. 𝛥𝑆𝑃 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑗𝑡 + ℎ. 𝛥𝑂𝐼𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖. 𝛥
𝑂𝐼
𝑇𝐴𝑗𝑡
+ 𝑗. 𝛥𝑇𝑗𝑡
+ 𝑘. 𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑗𝑡 + 𝑙. 𝛥𝐼𝑗𝑡 
 
At event-level we assess the complete series of variable changes (denoted 
Event) per company in the event-year at time t (events numbered n for 
company j and followed by I or D depending on whether it was an increase or 
decrease) against the five year pre- and post-event complete series of variable 
changes (similarly numbered by company event, followed by I or D and at pre-
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event or post-event years t+-m from 1 to 5). We do this at event-level and then 
stack the data into panel format to run the test at company- and sector-level 
also – and finally, overall sample-level. In this analysis the model appears as 
follows: 
Equation 2: 
𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑗𝑛𝐼,𝐷 = 𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑗𝑛𝐼,𝐷𝑡±𝑚 
Finally, we run a test of the event change only excluding any other concurrent 
variables, against all other variables at each time lead or lag at a sample-level.  
Equation 3: 
𝛥𝐷𝐸𝑅𝐼,𝐷𝑡 = 𝑎. 𝛥
𝐶𝐴
𝐶𝐿𝐼,𝐷𝑡±𝑚
+ 𝑏. 𝛥
𝐹𝐴
𝐼𝑁𝑇. 𝐴𝐼,𝐷𝑡±𝑚
+ 𝑐. 𝛥𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅𝐼,𝐷𝑡±𝑚
+ 𝑑. 𝛥𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝑇𝐴)𝐼,𝐷𝑡±𝑚 + 𝑒. 𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐼,𝐷𝑡±𝑚 + 𝑓. 𝛥𝑃𝐸𝐼,𝐷𝑡±𝑚
+ 𝑔. 𝛥𝑆𝑃 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝐼,𝐷𝑡±𝑚 + ℎ. 𝛥𝑂𝐼𝐼,𝐷𝑡±𝑚 + 𝑖. 𝛥
𝑂𝐼
𝑇𝐴𝐼,𝐷𝑡±𝑚
+ 𝑗. 𝛥𝑇𝐼,𝐷𝑡±𝑚 + 𝑘. 𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐼,𝐷𝑡±𝑚 + 𝑙. 𝛥𝐼𝐼,𝐷𝑡±𝑚 
 
3.4. PERFORMANCE SCORECARD 
We assess leverage ‘performance’ for each company on an annual basis 
using a scale of 1 to 5 (low to high) to evaluate the operational state in nine 
leverage-related categories. We group the performance ratios in each 
category into quintiles for best- to worst performance over the sample period 
to quantify a period high or low measurement. The resultant leverage 
performance dashboard details their performance leading up to the leverage 
event for each of the following criteria, as in the hypothetical scenario below: 
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Table 1: Leverage performance scorecard 
  SCORE  
 CATEGORY 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation 
1 Liquidity    X  Good short-term access to funding 
2 Asset Composition  X    Mainly intangible assets 
3 Threat of Bankruptcy X     Mainly equity-funded 
4 Cash Generation    X  High positive cashflow 
5 Market Valuation    X  Sector favourite 
6 Operational Risk     X Recent profits through new projects, volatile earnings with no track record 
7 Profitability    X  Newly profitable 
8 Tax Advantage   X   Average tax burden 
9 Underinvestment Risk  X    Low due to recent influx of profitable investment ventures 
10 Macroeconomic Activity  X    Interest rates are near historic lows, favourable borrowing costs 
 
The use of a scorecard creates a one-stop evaluation tool for performance 
assessment, albeit a subjective assessment, allowing the user to immediately 
evaluate the various facets of a company’s leverage state in order to better 
understand the rationale behind their capital structure decisions. From the 
hypothetical example above, we might deduce this company is an early-stage 
profitable venture with the capacity for new long-term debt funding and 
tangible asset expansion provided that current operations and investments 
remain profitable and continue to generate sufficient cash to fund such 
financing. If these criteria remain in place, we might anticipate a leverage 
increase event.  
As an example, an analysis of AECI performance (Table 2 below) reveals an 
historic high DER in 2008. The five years prior to this event show higher than 
average profitability (EBIT) and ability to service debt (DSCR). The share price 
was also high in the year immediately preceding the event while the P/E ratio 
(the measure of market valuation) was at its highest historic level in this year. 
The fact that long-term interest-bearing debt peaked on an historic basis in 
2008 does not support the market valuation theory of capital structure. 
However, the low level of operational risk (measured by the consistency of 
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annual operating income) at this time as well as the higher than average 
effective tax rate support both the Pecking Order theory (debt issued in 
preference to informationally-sensitive equity assuming internal funds were 
insufficient to fund new investment) and the Trade-off theory (the usefulness 
of the tax shield provided by debt particularly by profitable companies). 
Furthermore, real interest rates were at their lowest making debt issues more 
affordable. Looking at the company’s performance in the five years after the 
event, we see that the level of fixed assets as well as intangible assets peaked 
at a period-high immediately after leverage was increased. We also see that 
the company was most profitable three years after the event and that cash 
generation improved markedly after 2008. Finally, ROI peaked to its highest 
level for three years after the event from 2009 to 2011. 
 
Table 2: AECI Scorecard 
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Looking at the performance of Mediclinic (Table 3 below), the company 
experienced a significant increase in long-term interest-bearing liabilities in 
2008 (coinciding with AECI) which appears to have resulted in a sustained 
increase in fixed assets. This was pre-empted by low profitability and ability to 
service existing debt. These facts would seem to support the Pecking Order 
theory. After the leverage-increase event, total assets remained high for at 
least the following five years, while cash generation improved significantly in 
the post-event period. Interestingly, just prior to the event in 2007, new equity 
was issued apparently unrelated to an improvement in the share price which 
increased from 2009 onwards. The share price return was at its lowest just 
after the equity issue and operational risk in terms of volatility of earnings was 
most volatile at this point. While profitability was low prior to the event, the 
subsequent increase in total assets after the event rendered the profitability 
measurement relatively high before the event (OI/TA). The company managed 
to sustain a stable and high ROI.  
 
Table 3: Mediclinic Scorecard 
COMPANY: MEDICLINIC – SECTOR: HEALTHCARE 
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Compagnie Finansiere Richemonte (Richemonte) (Table 4 below) shows a 
noticeable reduction in long-term interest-bearing debt from 2000 onwards. 
The DER remains at its period low until the end of the sample period in 2013. 
This is exacerbated by an equally remarkable increase in the value of equity 
through a share issue in 2001, preceded by favourable market sentiment and 
despite a period-low tax rate and a drop in real interest rates. The share price 
remained fairly stable for many years afterwards but increased sharply in 
2012/2013. Immediately prior to the leverage-decrease event, profitability 
increased sharply albeit intermittently. Cash generation was at its lowest point 
from 2001 onwards but investment picked up from 2003 and was maintained 
until 2008.   
 
Table 4: Richemonte Scorecard 
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Further examples of the scorecard are included in the appendix to this study. 
3.5. MULTIPLE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS 
 
We run a multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) to establish whether our model 
generated on 80% of the original sample is an effective predictor of whether a 
firm should increase or decrease leverage based on lead performance. MDA 
enables the classification of data into a priori groups generating a discriminant 
equation that is able to distinguish between classes using multiple independent 
variables (Martin & Scott, 1974). The discriminant function is of the order: 
 
𝑧𝑖 = 𝑣1𝑥1𝑖 +  𝑣2𝑥2𝑖 + 𝑣3𝑥3𝑖 + ⋯ +  𝑣𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖 
 
Where 𝑧𝑖 is the discriminant score for the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ object, 𝑥𝑖 is the value of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ 
observation’s 𝑗𝑡ℎ  independent variable and 𝑣𝑗 is the discriminant coefficient for 
the 𝑗𝑡ℎ independent variable. 
 
3.6. SAMPLE DATA 
The sample is based on all JSE-listed companies with available data to 
calculate the DER for each year of the sample period - 1990 to 2013. All data 
was taken from I-Net Bfa. The specific DER used includes long-term and 
short-term interest-bearing debt including trade debtors and trade creditors. 
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We reasoned that including shorter-term financing requirements such as those 
related to working capital is relevant to the study as we can assess the 
catalysts of both short-term liquidity needs as well as longer-term capital 
requirements.  
The sample includes 79 companies over a period of 24 years from 1990 to 
2013. Companies are drawn from a wide range of sectors including gold and 
platinum mining, food processors, food- and clothing- retailers, consumer 
goods and services, banks, real estate, pharmaceuticals, construction, 
packaging, transport and oil.  
 
Graph 1: Sector breakdown 
 
   Graph 2: Number of events 
 
 
We find that the coefficient of variation (CV) for the DER was considerably 
lower compared to that for the percentage annual change. This indicates far 
less relative volatility in the actual leverage ratio relative to the percentage 
changes experienced each year. This is naturally within the constraints of the 
data adhering to a normal distribution where the mean would represent a 
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reliable measure of central tendency so it is with some caution that we use the 
CV as an indication of relative volatility.  
General share price fluctuations and market volatility or short-term financing 
needs could result in considerable variations in DER’s that are unrelated to 
deliberate capital structure management. We aimed to isolate only the 
intentional adjustments to capital structure that management makes 
consciously in response to specific conditions that arise, rather than gradual 
and inevitable shifts that occur solely due to market movements. Thus, we 
separately analysed the evolution of debt (short-term and long-term) and 
equity (shares in issue and share price movements) over the sample period, 
holding constant share price fluctuations that affect the market value of equity 
capital, to isolate developments in each composite measurement which may 
not be identifiable if analysed in combination within the DER. 
The table below details the overall statistics for the CV per variable employed 
over the complete sample period to give us an indication of the relative risk 
and  dispersion of each variable’s probability distribution around its respective 
mean, particularly effective given that the means are very different and the 
probability distributions non-normal. The lower the standard deviation relative 
to the mean, the better the risk-return trade-off according to the CV measure. 
The DER had one of the narrowest dispersions around its mean with a CV of 
0.322 while that for the mean annual change in DER across all companies 
was considerably higher at 5.359. Net profit had a relatively high dispersion 
with a CV of 2.464. Short-term interest-bearing debt was approximately as 
varied as long-term interest-bearing debt with a CV of 1.424 compared to 
1.543. The DSCR had the one of the highest CV ratios of all the variables 
included in the study with a CV of 2.436; while Operating Cash was also very 
highly varied around its mean with a CV of 2.066. 
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Table 5: Coefficient of Variation (Cv) table 
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 Mean  0.322  5.359  1.543  1.424  0.881  0.453  2.436  1.805  0.073  2.464  0.221  1.057  2.066  1.528  0.820 -1.041  0.826 
 Median  0.480  4.454  1.325  1.236  0.872  0.310  1.133  1.683  0.063  1.160  0.447  0.940  1.004  1.075  0.779  1.559  0.799 
 Maximum  2.643  194.7  4.695  3.383  2.649  3.050  75.56  4.899  0.276  29.57  2.135  4.849  37.92  19.91  1.726  67.94  2.670 
 Minimum -16.59 -109.7  0.000  0.453  0.308  0.067 -2.582 -5.719  0.020 -4.289 -18.73 -5.080 -1.573 -9.925  0.356 -187.4  0.259 
 Std. Dev.  2.143  33.95  0.862  0.682  0.405  0.513  8.475  1.350  0.048  4.538  2.473  1.006  4.678  2.990  0.271  27.07  0.384 
 Skewness -6.736  3.080  1.574  0.933  1.633  3.333  8.295 -1.853  1.774  4.150 -6.427 -1.727  6.267  2.177  1.107 -5.319  1.537 
 Kurtosis  51.87  21.64  6.062  3.261  7.502  15.21  71.99  13.82  6.951  22.07  47.16  21.87  46.16  22.80  4.534  36.04  8.267 
 Jarque-Bera  8457.  1269.  63.49  11.68  101.8  637.4  16575  430.4  92.82  1424.  6962.  1212.  6647.  1352.  23.89  3966.  122.4 
 Probability  0.000  0.000  2E-14  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  6E-06  0.000  0.000 
 Sum  25.44  423.4  121.9  112.5  69.60  35.76  192.4  142.6  5.772  194.6  17.48  83.48  163.2  120.7  64.80 -82.20  65.25 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  358.1  89926  57.99  36.24  12.79  20.51  5602.  142.2  0.178  1606.  477.0  78.99  1707.  697.4  5.714  57155  11.48 
 Observations  79.00  79.00  79.00  79.00  79.00  79.00  79.00  79.00  79.00  79.00  79.00  79.00  79.00  79.00  79.00  79.00  79.00 
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In order to fully assess each event, we first identify an event as being a 30% 
annual change in the DER. We found that measuring the annual change by 
number of standard deviations is flawed due to the non-parametric distribution 
of this and many other operational ratios. However, using as a general 
benchmark a 1 standard deviation change about the sample period mean we 
identified 490 events across the sample of 79 companies. Applying a rule of a 
30% annual increase or decrease we identified 517 events across 79 
companies. At this point, the two measurements approximately converged and 
it is for this reason that we settled on a 30% cut-off point in defining 
significance. A 1.5 (two) standard deviation change about the mean resulted 
in 192 (81) events and is approximately equal to 185 (88) events generated 
by a rule of a 65% (100%) annual change to the DER.  
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Upon isolating each event and its associated variables in the five-year period 
leading up to the event, we eliminated certain events from the study due to 
lack of sufficient pre-event data. Thus, any events before 1995 which had less 
than five years of data prior to an event were eliminated from the study. This 
involved Barclays Africa, Firstrand and Shoprite who all had significant 
leverage events in between 1991 and 1993. This reduced the number of 
events from 517 to 431. 
Table 6: Number of Companies/Events identified under different criteria 
ID METHOD 
BASIC 
MATERIALS 
CONSUMER 
GOODS 
CONSUMER 
SERVICES 
FINANCIALS HEALTHCARE INDUSTRIALS 
OIL & 
GAS 
TOTAL 
COMPANIES 20 11 11 15 2 19 1 79 
EVENTS – 1 S.D.  130 72 59 80 6 133 10 490 
EVENTS - 30% 
CHANGE 
160 62 50 111 20 111 3 517 
EVENTS – 1.5 S.D.  49 28 28 37 3 45 2 192 
EVENTS - 65% 
CHANGE 
56 12 11 64 7 34 1 185 
EVENTS – 2 S.D.  17 8 12 24 3 17 0 81 
EVENTS - 100% 
CHANGE 
23 6 5 34 5 14 1 88 
 
According to Scott and Martin (1975), capital structures are significantly 
different for different industry classes. We sort the sample by industry to 
separately analyse sector-specific variables. Elsas and Florysiak (2008) 
suggest that the high level of significance of industry median debt ratios as 
explanatory variables for leverage ratios might be due to the fact that variables 
not included in the study are proxied for by industry medians. They mention 
as examples, product market interactions or market competition.  
We found some variation between leverage ratios across sectors when using 
a median measurement. Median DER’s ranged from 0.46 in the Healthcare 
sector to 1.86 for Industrials. This trend was more pronounced for mean DER’s 
– 0.59 for the Oil & Gas sector to 9.67 in the Financial sector. Particularly in 
the case of the Financials sector, we found vast departures from the aggregate 
– possibly due to the inclusion of property development companies alongside 
both big- and small market capitalisation banks and insurance companies. We 
did not find any evidence of sector mean reversion. 
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Table 7: DER Summary Statistics 
DER Summary Statistics by Sector 
SECTORID  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Quant.*  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Basic Materials 0.626375 0.460000 3.480000 -0.250000 0.460000 0.532333 1.621478 6.745852 480 
Consumer Goods 0.867576 0.630000 9.170000 0.050000 0.630000 0.796673 4.973814 47.68461 264 
Consumer 
Services 2.288750 1.505000 61.72000 0.120000 1.505000 4.695961 9.664693 112.8746 264 
Financials 9.671694 1.860000 552.1000 -92.59000 1.860000 50.18508 10.34936 111.6721 360 
Healthcare 1.445417 1.030000 8.190000 0.250000 1.030000 1.368445 2.832587 13.61735 48 
Industrials 1.637654 1.530000 46.95000 -293.0000 1.530000 14.41088 -18.61842 385.3862 456 
Oil&Gas 0.590417 0.575000 0.940000 0.290000 0.575000 0.199488 -0.011397 1.714704 24 
All 2.872395 0.960000 552.1000 -293.0000 0.960000 23.26823 19.36100 494.0387 1896 
          
          
*Quantiles computed for p=0.5, using the Rankit (Cleveland) definition. 
 
Graph 5: Mean DER by Sector    Graph 6: Median DER by Sector 
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Within-sector leverage ratios generally highlighted a few sector-anomalies 
(AECI, Sappi and Spanjaard in the Basic Materials sector; Seardel CP and 
Tigerbrands in the Consumer Goods sector; Culinan, Nictus Beperk, PicknPay 
and Sun International in the Consumer Services sector; Barclays Africa, 
Firstrand, Hyprop, Investec, Standard Bank and Nedbank in the Financials 
sector; and Basil Read, ELB Group, Grindrod, Group 5 and Trencor in the 
Industrials sector). The Financials sector showed the most significant variation 
between companies, but more consistency amongst the big banks – namely, 
Barclays Africa, Firstrand, Investec Limited, Nedbank and Standard Bank. The 
inclusion of Hyprop more than doubled the sector mean. HCI and Winhold had 
considerably lower levels of leverage on average over the period relative to 
their respective sector means (Financials and Industrials). 
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The mean DER for all sample companies shows a decline since the beginning 
of the period with the overall level of leverage looking more or less stable in 
the final years of the sample. 
Graph 7: Mean DER by Year   Graph 8: Real Interest rates 
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Upon further analysis we find that the Financials sector dominates the overall 
mean.  Within sectors we see more variation over time – namely, a peak for 
Basic Materials and Healthcare around 2004/2005 with a subsequent decline. 
Consumer Services peaks just shortly before in 2001 while Financials and 
Industrials are relatively stable following a more volatile period at the beginning 
of the period. Consumer Goods shows a clear decline following its peak in 2000. 
Overall the data indicates a definite decline in the use of leverage across all 
sectors and even for most companies. We contrast this trend with real interest 
rates (above) where it is clear that interest rates have declined markedly since 
their peak in 1998 at 15.1% to a far more affordable level of 2.46% in 2013. 
 
   Graph 9: Mean DER by Sector and Year 
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An analysis of the mean DER annual change by sector shows that overall, the 
sample companies experienced higher annual volatility around 1998, which 
returned to some extent in 2008 but stabilised considerably towards the end 
of the sample. However, this coincides with the interest rate peak experienced 
in 1998 and it is interesting that leverage annual volatility (specifically annual 
increases to DER’s) occurred at a point when real interest rates were at their 
highest.  
    Graph 10: Mean DER Change by Sample Year 
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Within-sector analysis shows considerable fluctuations in the extent to which 
DER’s changed for Basic Materials (BM) and Consumer Goods (CG), with 
once-off volatility more prevalent for Consumer Services (CS), Financials (FI), 
Healthcare (HE), Industrials (IN) and Oil & Gas (OI). 
  
  Graph 11: Mean DER Change by Sector and Year 
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 Table 8: DER Change Summary Statistics 
 
DER CHANGE Summary Statistics by Sector 
SECTORID  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Quant.*  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
BM 0.101662 0.000000 8.896552 -6.000000 0.000000 0.786203 4.155983 55.92985 459 
CG 0.038389 -0.036364 4.625767 -0.758065 -0.036364 0.469915 5.582851 49.43877 253 
CS 0.151423 -0.035088 30.48980 -0.877702 -0.035088 1.978227 14.43117 220.5928 253 
FI 0.463856 -0.016717 134.5000 -27.57716 -0.016717 7.472617 16.70554 303.2639 344 
HE 0.306890 -0.067357 9.636364 -0.650794 -0.067357 1.529618 5.141728 31.55121 46 
IN 0.106245 0.000000 22.50000 -9.049451 0.000000 1.337505 11.07947 192.4288 437 
OI 0.036604 -0.060241 1.361111 -0.264151 -0.060241 0.350730 2.655822 10.20400 23 
All 0.173906 -0.014706 134.5000 -27.57716 -0.014706 3.435124 33.26660 1296.549 1815 
          
          
*Quantiles computed for p=0.5, using the Rankit (Cleveland) definition. 
 
An analysis of mean changes in some of the other key variables aggregated 
across all sample companies for each year of the sample period reveals that 
average annual changes were considerably distinct in different years. This 
may warrant further investigation in terms of discovering the cause of this, 
perhaps an annual market factor that exerts a strong influence on specific 
variables or company-specific events large enough to exert a material 
influence on the aggregate. We find that the spike in long-term debt in 1996 is 
related to a few specific companies and not confined to one sector – Arcelor 
Mittal, HCI, Jasco, Mediclinic, Merafe and PicknPay. Interest rates had been 
reduced in the prior year by 2.25% and were brought down again in 2006 by 
a further 1%. This may be a relevant factor in the increased use of long-term 
debt at this time. The spike in short-term debt in 1998 is purely related to the 
new listing of Brait S.A. as is that for operating income. The dramatic increase 
in the ratio of fixed assets/total assets is related to Village Main Reef in 2011 
and for equity, a new equity issuance by Hyprop and Firstrand in 1993. The 
increase in operating cash relates to Af and Ovr in 1996. So we are able to 
drill down to company-level and isolate outlying data points that affect the 
averages and help us to understand company operations on a year-by-year 
basis. 
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Graph12: Mean Variable Changes by Year 
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A simple OLS regression shows that a significant relationship (at 5% 
significance) exists between the DER change and certain concurrent changes 
in operating variables; namely, short-term interest-bearing debt, book value of 
equity, liquidity (CA/CL), DSCR, size (Log TA), profitability (OI/TA) and 
operating cash (at 10% significance). The regression R-squared measure 
(indicating goodness of fit) shows that only a very small proportion of the 
variance of the data is properly explained by the model. Similarly, the adjusted 
R-squared (considering the number of predictors) is low. The Durbin-Watson 
statistic is close to 2 which indicates no autocorrelation amongst the model 
residual terms and a more accurate model.  
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Table 9:  DER Change regressed against Performance Variables Change 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
DER CHANGE 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
T-
STATISTIC 
R-squared: 0.079947 
Adj. R-squared: 0.065325 
Durbin-Watson: 2.1625 
F-statistic: 5.467640 
Prob(F-statistic): 0.0000 
ST DEBT 0.011500 2.685146 
EQUITY -0.241661 -4.151783 
CA/CL -0.250339 -2.530231 
DSCR 0.010948 2.911642 
LOG TA 10.78001 4.660034 
OI/TA -0.062964 -3.324077 
OPERATING 
CASH 
0.008542 1.793428 
 
 
The Hausman test reveals a significant result at 5% testing implying that the 
coefficients estimated by a fixed and random effects model are materially 
different. So we proceed with a fixed effects model which gives a better 
account of heterogeneity and time invariant effects. We find that the following 
variables are significant at 5%: short-term debt, equity, liquidity, size, cash; 
and profitability at 10%. 
 
Table 10: Hausman test: Fixed or Random Effects Panel Regression 
 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
28.821906 13 0.0069 
 
 
Table 11: DER Change regression: Fixed Effects 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
DER CHANGE 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
T-
STATISTIC 
R-squared: 0.157043 
Adj. R-squared: 0.06247 
Durbin-Watson: 2.245684 
F-statistic: 1.748891 
Prob(F-statistic): 0.000124 
ST DEBT 0.014237 3.142190 
EQUITY -0.588699 -5.394833 
CA/CL -0.234820 -2.327815 
LOG TA 15.46816 5.756162 
OI/TA -0.035706 -1.755752 
OPERATING 
CASH 
0.010198 2.052985 
 
 
 
All the significant coefficients are small except for the size indicator. The 
significance of DSCR is lost. It is surprising that neither long-term interest-
bearing debt nor real interest rates have any significant impact on same-year 
DER changes. The significance of short-term interest-bearing debt indicates 
that short-term borrowing plays an important role in defining capital structure, 
more so than long-term debt in this study. Liquidity also appears to have a 
material effect on DER changes. Furthermore, the relationship between real 
interest rates and long-term debt has not been established but with further 
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investigation, may prove to be of interest. The coefficients for equity, liquidity 
and profitability are negative. This is interesting as it suggests that the impact 
of these variables is asymmetrical – a decrease is related to a DER change to 
a greater extent than an increase.  
Further points of interest are that firstly, net profit is subsumed by operating 
income, losing its significance with the inclusion of the latter variable; and 
secondly, none of the market valuation indicators prove significant.  
Trend analysis around a leverage event has a dual aspect to it – before and 
after the event. Both aspects are relevant to this study. The analysis shows 
consistent evidence across all sectors that total assets is unrelated to leverage 
changes. This pattern also emerges for the share price, cashflow generation, 
operating income and equity variables.  
We find a clear trend of declining DSCR following an increase event, and 
increasing DSCR following a decrease event (a logical outcome considering 
the impact on debt repayments under either scenario). From the graph below, 
one can see that DSCR for the D group appears to be more erratic. Leading 
up to the event, the DSCR for the I group appears to be higher and more stable 
before the increase, while that for the D group falls off dramatically two years 
before leverage is reduced. 
 
Graph 13: Mean DSCR at leads/lags for I group Graph 14: Mean DSCR at leads/lags for D group 
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The I group is defined by declining liquidity prior to the increase with short-
term improvements immediately following the event, while the D group shows 
the opposite pattern. This pattern would most certainly allude to the role of 
debt as a response to short-term liquidity requirements. 
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Graph 15: Mean CA/CL at leads/lags for I group Graph 16: Mean CA/CL at leads/lags for D group 
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Volatility appears to increase following either an increase or decrease, but 
appears to be more persistent following an increase. The pattern for the I 
group appears to confirm that debt introduces operational risk (Hamada, 1972 
and Myers, 1977) and in the case of the D group, volatility appears to fall off 
by year three following the event. 
 
Graph 17: Mean Volatility at leads/lags for I group Graph 18: Mean Volatility at leads/lags for D group 
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Profitability increases on average following an increase, and decreases 
following a decrease. In terms of prior conditions, we can say that the pattern 
below offers moderate support for the Pecking Order theory in that 
improvements in past profitability result in lower leverage (Titman & Wessels, 
1988, Baskin, 1989, Fama & French, 2002). 
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Graph 19: Mean Profitability at leads/lags for I group Graph 20: Mean Profitability at leads/lags for D 
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The I group showed more pronounced growth in ROI following the event 
relative to the D group. The increase group was faced with declining ROI 
before increasing leverage, while the opposite is true for the decrease group.  
This lends support to the Underinvestment theory in that debt may serve as a 
vehicle to alleviate the risk of agency conflict including low ROI’s. Interestingly, 
following the decrease, the ROI in the short-term falls close to zero and 
investment returns are not replaced until five years later. 
 
Graph 21: Mean ROI at leads/lags for I group Graph 22: Mean ROI at leads/lags for D 
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Interestingly, the I group had a higher potential tax shield leading up to the 
event, while the D group experienced a temporary decline in the effective tax 
rate paid (up to t+3) in support of the Trade-off theory (DeAngelo & Masulis, 
1980 and Myers, 1984). 
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Graph 23: Mean Effective Tax rate at leads/lags for I group Graph 24: Mean Effective Tax rate at leads/lags for 
D group 
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Finally, a leverage increase results in a gradual improvement in the PE ratio 
not matched by the decrease group. The direction of the results provides some 
support for the notion that the market responds unfavourably to equity issues 
due to the concerns over earnings dilution and possible overvaluation (Myers 
& Majluf, 1984) or that positive market sentiment initiates more equity issues 
(Lucas & McDonald, 1990 and Loughran & Ritter, 1995). 
 
Graph 25: Mean P/E at leads/lags for I group   Graph 26: Mean P/E at leads/lags for D group 
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Although not proven to be statistically significant, these trends suggest a 
certain degree of relevance regarding operating performance around leverage 
changes. 
 
An analysis of the relative differences between the I and D groups shows that 
for the former, the DER change was accompanied by a concurrent increase 
in short-term debt and total assets. Again this lends support to the fact that the 
DER changes are a response to short-term capital requirements. It suggests 
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a positive relationship between size and leverage (Berger & Udell, 1988, 
Harris & Raviv, 1991 and Rajan & Zingales, 1995). The PE for this group 
increased by considerably more than that for the decrease group confirming 
the positive relationship between leverage and share returns identified by the 
occurrence of negative returns following announcements of equity issues 
(Masulis & Korwar, 1986). This ties in with the Market Valuation theory that 
equity issues are timed to take advantage of positive market sentiment 
(Marsh, 1982, Barclay & Smith, 1999, Baker & Wurgler, 2002) and 
corroborates Myers and Majluf (1984) that under conditions of asymmetric 
information, the market assumes that equity issues are synonymous with 
overvalued equity. The change in real interest rates was negative suggesting 
that the decision to increase leverage was partly motivated by borrowing 
costs.  
On the other hand, for the D group the change was accompanied by an 
increase in book value of equity rather than any change in interest-bearing 
debt. Liquidity increased by more than that for the I group (lending support to 
the role of debt as a response to short-term liquidity requirements) as did the 
DSCR (suggesting that it was partly a practical matter of the affordability of 
debt that played a role in the decision to de-lever and possibly an effort to 
maintain financial flexibility according to Fama and French, 1992). ROI 
increased for the D group relative to a negative change for the I group. Again 
this suggests that leverage decreases may have been a response to higher 
ROI’s and little risk of underinvestment or other type of agency conflict. Higher 
profitability (OI/TA), shares issued and share price increases were associated 
with the D group. This confirms the negative relationship found by numerous 
prior studies between profitability and leverage (Titman & Wessels, 1988, 
Harris & Raviv, 1991, Rajan & Zingales, 1995 and Fama & French, 2002). This 
suggests that the DER reductions were founded in increased shares issued 
(and higher issue prices) rather than leverage reductions. These findings 
support evidence that positive market valuations present ripe opportunities to 
issue equity (Lucas & McDonald, 1990 and Loughran & Ritter, 1995). 
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Graph 27: Mean Variable Change by I/D Group 
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4. RESULTS 
The regression results at event-level reveal significance at 5% for various leads 
and lags around the event. For example, in the case of Italtile’s first event in 2013 
(Italtile1D), a decrease of 52%, we find significance at t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4. For the 
second event, a similar size increase in 2007 (Italtile2I), we find significance for the 
series of performance variables at t+1, t+2, t+3, t+4, and t-3 and t-5. For the third 
event (Italtile3D) in 2003, we find significance for the series of performance 
variables at t+3, t-2, and t-4. 
 
Table 12: ITALTILE: Event-level regression of I/D event year performance against lead/lag performance 
 
 
ITALTILE 
SIGNIFICANT 
LEAD/LAG 
CO-EFFICIENT 
T-
STATISTIC 
EVENT 1 – Decrease 
R-squared 0.7996 
F-statistic 19.9483 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0000 
B1 -12.1017 -3.9760 
B2  8.2099  9.8702 
B3 -3.0137 -3.8950 
B4 -1.4791 -2.6186 
EVENT 2 – Increase 
R-squared 0.7327 
F-statistic 5.7873 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0006 
A1 -1.2782 -5.4104 
A2  3.0731  3.0938 
A3 -5.7223 -2.7455 
A4 -0.4093 -2.5166 
B3  1.0209  2.7091 
EVENT 3 – Decrease 
R-squared 0.9532 
F-statistic 26.4485 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0000 
A1  0.3470  2.9146 
A3  3.4182  8.6550 
B2 -1.0776 -4.2481 
 
 
 
The results for the sample are again random – we find significance at varied leads 
and lags. For Hudaco, the first event in 1996, an increase in DER of 64%, we find 
significance at t+1, t+2, t+3, t+4 and t-5. For the second event, an increase in 
2007, we find significance only at t-1. For the third event, a decrease of 70% in 
2013, we find significance at t-2. A table of results at event-level is included in the 
appendix. For AECI, the first event was an increase of 62% in 2008, we find 
significance for the series at t-3 and t-4. For the second event, an increase of 78% 
in 2001, we find significance at t+3, t+4, t-3 and t-4. And the final event, an 
increase of 51% in 1998, we find significance at t+1, t+3, t-2 and t-3.  
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Table 13: HUDACO: Event-level regression of I/D year performance against lead/lag performance 
 
HUDACO 
SIGNIFICANT 
LEAD/LAG 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
T-
STATISTIC 
EVENT 1 – Decrease 
R-squared 0.9047 
F-statistic 47.4843 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0000 
B2  -0.7918 -12.3381 
EVENT 2 – Increase 
R-squared 0.5273 
F-statistic 2.0081 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0951 
B1 -144.9941 -3.4358 
EVENT 3 – Increase 
R-squared 0.9219 
F-statistic 17.7183 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0000 
A1 -0.1460 -4.3227 
A2 -0.4881 -2.1809 
A3 -0.4333 -2.3289 
A4 -0.5248 -2.3704 
B5 -1.0717 -4.5356 
 
 
Table 14: AECI: Event-level regression of I/D year performance against lead/lag performance 
 
 
AECI 
SIGNIFICANT 
LEAD/LAG 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
T-STATISTIC 
EVENT 1 – Increase 
R-squared 0.9281 
F-statistic 27.1021 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0000 
B3  0.3024  2.7780 
B4  0.5368  6.4183 
EVENT 2 – Increase 
R-squared 0.9745 
F-statistic 72.6229 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0000 
A3  6.5020  12.9582 
A4  2.0055  3.5092 
B3  2.3569  7.1269 
B4 -2.2819 -2.9202 
EVENT 3 – Increase 
R-squared 0.9964 
F-statistic 529.7747 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0000 
A1 -0.1406 -5.9505 
A3  0.1179  14.9005 
B2 -0.1439 -2.2384 
B3 -0.0614 -3.0460 
 
 
 
A summary of results is shown at the top of the following page detailing the 
frequency with which each independent series occurs as being significant (where 
I or D denotes the group to which the event belongs – increase or decrease, A 
indicates that it falls after the event, and B that it falls before the event). So we 
read IA2 as t+2 after an increase and DB2 as t-2 before a decrease. 
 
Table 15: Frequency of significance for specific leads/lags 
 
 IA1 IA2 IA3 IA4 IA5 IB1 IB2 IB3 IB4 IB5 DA1 DA2 DA3 DA4 DA5 DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4 DB5 
EVENT 52 52 51 54 42 56 67 59 53 56 33 51 36 29 34 39 50 47 45 43 
% 5% 5% 5% 6% 4% 6% 7% 6% 6% 6% 3% 5% 4% 3% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
COMPANY 18 21 28 18 18 20 24 20 22 19 16 19 19 15 16 13 14 12 15 19 
% 5% 6% 8% 5% 5% 5% 7% 5% 6% 5% 4% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 4% 5% 
SECTOR 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
% 13% 13% 13% 7% 7% 0% 0% 7% 7% 0% 7% 7% 0% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 7% 
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A more detailed table of results at company-level is included in the Appendix. For 
the sake of conciseness, the results at event-level are not included as they are not 
materially different from those at company-level – individual events aggregated at 
company level - but involve significantly more data points. 
At a sector-level, we find significance at A1, A3 and A4 for Consumer Services (I 
group), B4 for Healthcare and Industrials (D group), at A1 and A2 for Industrials (I 
group), and A2, A5 and B3 for Oil & Gas (I group). Again these results do not 
suggest the existence of any particular trend. 
 
Table 16: Sector-level regression of I/D group against lead/lag performance 
 
 
SECTOR, EVENT 
SIGNIFICANT 
LEAD/LAG 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
T-STATISTIC 
Consumer Services - 
Increase 
R-squared 0.0918 
F-statistic 5.8707 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0000 
A1  0.6775  7.3570 
A3  0.4730  2.1565 
A4 -0.6695 -6.1685 
Healthcare - Increase 
R-squared 0.2615 
F-statistic 9.8089 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0000 B4  24.0082  9.6828 
Industrials - Decrease 
R-squared 0.1277 
F-statistic 13.3126 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0000 B4 -0.1744 -10.4197 
Industrials - Increase 
R-squared 0.0885 
F-statistic 13.0813 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0000 
A1 0.0229 3.0353 
A2 0.6427 10.8910 
Oil & Gas - Increase 
R-squared 0.8722 
F-statistic 36.1593 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0000 
A2 -1.1122 -5.7618 
A5  1.2228  2.7826 
B3  0.9947  2.7755 
 
 
 
At overall sample-level, we find no significant variables at either lead or lag.  
Perhaps it is not surprising that upon aggregating the events at sector-level, we 
lose a certain amount of model relevance. However, this would imply that the 
changes being made to DER are less related to sectoral factors than company-
specific conditions. If we assess the significance of the results at event-level then 
it appears that there is a link between operating performance in the years leading 
up to the event and to a lesser extent, in the subsequent years following after the 
event.  
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In isolating specific variables at each time lead or lag we find, at sample-level, a 
significant relationship (at 5% significance) between the leverage change and for 
the D group, the PE ratio (DA1), issued share capital (DA4), book value of equity, 
long-term debt, real interest rates and issued share capital (DB5); and a single 
variable for the I group, the effective tax rate (IA1).  
 
Table 17: Sample-level regression of I/D group against variables at leads/lags 
 
REGRESSION 
SIGNIFICANT 
LEAD/LAG 
VARIABLE 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
T-STATISTIC 
Decrease 
R-squared 0.3811 
F-statistic 2.4634 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0057 A1 PE  0.0160 5.8111 
Decrease 
R-squared 0.6236 
F-statistic 7.1442 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0000 A4 
SHARES 
ISSUED  0.0960 6.4677 
Decrease 
R-squared 0.3692 
F-statistic 2.0853 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0220 
 
B5 
EQUITY -0.0954 -2.7724 
LT DEBT 0.0505 2.6381 
INTEREST 
RATES 0.2034 2.5183 
SHARES 
ISSUED -0.0239 -2.5805 
Increase 
R-squared 0.4028 
F-statistic 3.5406 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0001 A1 TAX RATE 0.0427 2.3985 
 
 
The PE ratio is most immediately affected by a decrease while for an increase, it 
is the effective tax rate that is directly and immediately changed. This evidence 
supports the notion that the market responds directly and positively (although the 
coefficient is very small) to leverage increases (Myers & Majluf, 1984 and Masulis 
& Korwar, 1986). Higher debt levels lead to more taxation after the event. Results 
showing an increase in shares issued four years after a decrease and a decrease 
five years before suggest that the motivation is not rebalancing but this would 
require more investigation to validate. The significance of long-term debt and real 
interest rates five years prior to a decrease seems somewhat spurious if we are to 
assume that capital structure management is a dynamic response to current 
business conditions - especially considering that these variables do not show any 
significance at shorter lead times.  
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At sector-level and starting with Basic Materials (Table 18 below), we find 
significance for asset composition and share price (DA4), debt service cover, 
profitability, cash generation, PE ratio and short-term debt (DB2), asset 
composition and short-term debt (DB4), and finally, volatility, tax rate and long-term 
debt (IA1).  
Table 18: Sector-level regression of I/D group against variables at leads/lags: Basic Materials 
 
REGRESSION 
SIGNIFICANT 
LEAD/LAG 
VARIABLE 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
T-STATISTIC 
Decrease 
R-squared 0.9353 
F-statistic 5.4180 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0231 
A4 
FA/TA 0.1537 3.6402 
SHARE 
PRICE 
0.2404 3.6593 
Decrease 
R-squared 0.8271 
F-statistic 3.5877 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0151 
B2 
DSCR -0.0561 -3.2209 
OI/TA  0.0667  2.8204 
OPERATING 
CASH 
-0.0482 -2.4200 
PE -0.0277 -2.2178 
ST DEBT -0.0636 -4.2106 
Decrease 
R-squared 0.8383 
F-statistic 2.9172 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0537 
B4 
FA/TA -0.0069 -2.9648 
ST DEBT -0.0023 -2.8205 
Increase 
R-squared 0.9577 
F-statistic 19.7864 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0000 
A1 
CHANGE IN 
OI 
-0.0415 -6.9904 
TAX RATE  0.0370  9.3134 
LT DEBT  0.9152  2.1481 
 
 
The results reveal that a leverage decrease is related to a subsequent increase in 
the proportion of fixed assets held some four years later (albeit a very small 
increase). This evidence is contrary to the theory that asset composition is 
positively related to leverage (Martin & Scott, 1974, Myers, 1977, Long & Malitz, 
1985). However, a possible explanation for this is that equity issues are favoured 
when intangible assets are high and this ultimately leads to subsequent additional 
investment in fixed assets as growth opportunities are realised. The positive share 
price change is also found to follow a leverage decrease which again confirms that 
the market reacts positively to less leverage (Marsh, 1982, Barclay & Smith, 1999, 
Baker & Wurgler, 2002). Although the coefficients are small, we find a negative 
relationship two years prior to a decrease for debt service, operating cash and PE 
ratio.  
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This is as expected – reduce debt following a reduction in ability to service 
repayments and a reduction in cash generated and a lower market valuation. The 
positive relationship for prior profitability is, however, surprising and contrary to the 
theory that more profitable companies have less leverage (Baskin, 1989, Harris & 
Raviv, 1991, Fama & French, 2000). These findings suggest that profitability is 
subsumed by debt service ability, cash generated and market valuation. The fact 
that asset composition appears significant again at four years before a decrease 
(this time with a slightly negative coefficient) is contrary to our previous findings but 
corroborates the positive relationship found in prior evidence that a higher 
proportion of intangible assets is associated with subsequent leverage decreases 
(Martin & Scott, 1974, Myers, 1977, Long & Malitz, 1985). 
Finally, we find that leverage increases are followed immediately by reduced 
earnings volatility suggesting that additional leverage enables the company to 
stabilise earnings by means of the continuation of operations (contrary to Marsh, 
1982 and Friend & Hasbrouck, 1986). Debt may be risky in that it carries with it the 
burden of debt service, but it is also an immediate source of capital that enables 
operational functions to persist. Once again we find that an increase is followed 
immediately by a higher effective tax rate. 
For the Industrials sector (Table 19 below) we find that it is volatility, profitability, 
PE, real interest rates and share price that show significance (DA5), volatility, 
liquidity, DSCR, equity, tax rate, asset composition, size, profitability, long-term 
debt, cashflow generation, PE, real interest rates, ROI, share price, shares issued 
and short-term debt (DB4), tax rate (IA3), and liquidity, short-term debt and the 
share price (IB3).  
 
Table 19: Sector-level regression of I/D group against variables at leads/lags: Industrials 
 
REGRESSION 
SIGNIFICANT 
LEAD/LAG 
VARIABLE 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
T-STATISTIC 
Decrease 
R-squared 0.9955 
F-statistic 27.5062 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0356 
A5 
 
CHANGE IN OI  0.0660  5.5530 
OI/TA -0.7355 -7.7892 
PE -0.2979 -6.7004 
INTEREST 
RATES 
-0.3323 -4.1974 
SHARE PRICE  0.3656  6.6709 
Decrease 
R-squared 1.0000 
F-statistic 598541.477 
Prob. F-stat. 0.001 
B4 
CHANGE IN OI  0.0068  399.0482 
CA/CL -0.2551 -464.6125 
DSCR  1.0259  1341.6793 
EQUITY -0.3887 -1177.8072 
TAX RATE -0.3068 -1193.3356 
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FA/TA  0.1785  1430.4981 
LOG TA  1.7786  309.5292 
LT DEBT -0.0147 -212.8788 
OI/TA -1.0040 -1075.1878 
CASH -0.1114 -1497.2467 
PE -0.0304 -104.1461 
INTEREST 
RATES 
 0.6201  1062.8963 
ROI -0.0628 -1099.4261 
SHARE PRICE  0.3500  884.6975 
SHARES 
ISSUED 
-0.3551 -298.6740 
ST DEBT  0.1456  658.3210 
Increase 
R-squared 0.8201 
F-statistic 3.7039 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0109 
A3 TAX RATE 0.8385 2.3911 
Increase 
R-squared 0.8840 
F-statistic 4.7619 
Prob. F-stat. 0.0082 
B3 
 
CA/CL  3.2455  2.8498 
SHARE PRICE  0.6310  2.5137 
ST DEBT  0.3791  4.0959 
 
 
A leverage decrease appears to result, five years later, in an eventual increase in 
volatility, reduction in profitability (the highest coefficient) and market valuation, and 
a higher share price. Real interest rates also appear significant but it is hard to 
imagine that this result is anything but spurious. Higher volatility in earnings 
following a leverage decrease supports our previous finding for the Basic Materials 
sector that debt has a stabilising effect on earnings (contrary to Marsh, 1982 and 
Friend & Hasbrouck, 1986). This is the only instance we find of reduced 
subsequent profitability following a decrease. It suggests to some extent that debt 
may stimulate profit-generation but this cannot be substantiated on this evidence 
alone particularly because the impact occurs five years after the event. Reduced 
market valuation as evidenced by a lower PE ratio refutes prior evidence that the 
market prefers less debt. However, we also find a concurrent increase in the share 
price variable which supports this theory (Marsh, 1982, Barclay & Smith, 1999, 
Baker & Wurgler, 2002) and calls into question the most accurate measure of 
market sentiment. 
We find multiple significant variables appear to be catalysts for a decrease four 
years later – increased volatility, reduced liquidity, improved debt service ability, a 
lower effective tax rate, a higher proportion of fixed assets, an increase in size, 
reduced profitability, operating cash and market valuation, ROI and shares issued, 
and finally, an increase in the share price. The result for our volatility measure is 
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inconsistent with prior results but supports the work of Marsh (1982) and Friend 
and Hasbrouck (1986) that firms with a high degree of earnings volatility are less 
likely to fund with debt. Better debt service capability would not result in a 
subsequent decrease so this result does not tie in with previous studies. However, 
lower liquidity, lower profitability, operating cash and market valuation would 
necessitate a reduction in leverage (Martin & Scott 1974, Titman & Wessels, 1988, 
Baskin, 1989, Harris & Raviv, 1991, Rajan & Zingales, 1995, Fama & French, 
2002). The increase in the share price variable opens up the ‘window of 
opportunity’ to issue equity (Lucas & McDonald, 1990 and Loughran & Ritter, 1995) 
and a lower tax rate should result in the use of less leverage (support for the Trade-
off theory). However, higher fixed assets should enable the company to borrow 
more not less (contrary to Harris & Raviv, 1991) contradicting our findings for the 
Basic Materials sector. 
The reduction in shares issued suggests that a subsequent decrease in leverage 
may be an effort to rebalance capital structure to a target or reference point but our 
initial selection criteria do not suggest that any of these companies were operating 
in a predetermined range. An increase in size measured by total assets is generally 
equated with lower informational asymmetry making equity capital more 
accessible. This could feasibly result in lower leverage if the company is able to 
raise equity more readily but contradicts the positive size relationship found by 
Berger and Udell (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995). Higher volatility in 
earnings suggests that a subsequent reduction in leverage is an attempt to limit 
operational risk (Myers, 1977). Lower ROI data suggests the potential for 
underinvestment. If existing debt levels were also found to be onerous (however, 
not suggested by the improvement in debt cover), then reducing leverage at this 
point is likely to be an effort to avoid underinvestment. The coefficient of 1 for DSCR 
does not corroborate the multi-faceted proof of Underinvestment risk we were 
aiming for.  
Increases are preceded by improved short-term liquidity - support for Martin and 
Scott (1974) - and higher share prices - contrary to Lucas and McDonald (1990) 
and Loughran and Ritter (1995) - and followed once again by an immediately 
higher effective tax rate.  
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The other sectors proved to be too small to test given the large number of 
independent variables.  The test was not possible at company- or event-level due 
to the large size of the data. 
Finally, we performed a multiple discriminant analysis on the data. Due to the 
different measurement units between the variables, the discriminant coefficient 
was adjusted by the respective standard deviation resulting in an adjusted 
coefficient measurement used to rank each variable in terms of its contribution to 
the overall z-score (following Martin & Scott, 1974). Long-term debt made the 
highest contribution to the z-score in years t-5 to t-2, at t-1 it was asset composition, 
and for the current year performance it was liquidity. 
 
Table 20: Standard deviation-adjusted variable ranking 
Variable RANKING 
 CURRENT Lead 1 Lead 2 Lead 3 Lead 4 Lead 5 
% CHANGE IN OI 8 10 10 10 7 2 
CA/CL 1 3 3 16 16 15 
DSCR 10 16 4 14 15 3 
EFFECTIVE TAX RATE 13 7 15 9 10 11 
EQUITY 2 11 16 3 3 4 
FA/INT.A 3 1 2 7 4 9 
LOG TA 14 13 5 12 13 14 
LT DEBT 16 2 1 1 1 1 
MARKET CAPITALISATION 4 14 12 15 2 13 
OI/TA 9 5 8 13 14 10 
OPERATING CASH 11 9 7 2 11 7 
PE 7 12 13 6 9 12 
ROI 12 8 6 8 6 6 
SHARE PRICE 6 6 9 5 8 8 
SHARES ISSUED 5 4 14 4 12 5 
ST DEBT 15 15 11 11 5 16 
 
 
An analysis of group means (included in the Appendix) indicated that the means of 
7 out of 16 variables were significantly different and thus, able to reliably 
discriminate between the two groups. These were the size variable, share price, 
shares issued, market capitalisation, profitability, effective tax rate and ROI. 
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The results of the multiple discriminant analysis, on which we achieved a correct 
classification percentage of between 43% and 55%, when applied to a 20% hold-
out sample showed a correct classification of between 43% and 57% depending 
on the lead period. Model predictions above (below) the relevant cut-off point 
indicate that the company should decrease (increase) leverage.  
 
 
Table 21: Results - multiple discriminant analysis 
Classification Current Lead 1 Lead 2 Lead 3 Lead 4 Lead 5 
Original 
sample 
D I Totals D I Totals D I Totals D I Totals D I Totals D I Totals 
D 1 152 153 149 4 153 137 16 153 142 11 153 141 12 153 151 2 153 
I 4 188 192 187 5 192 172 20 192 179 13 192 183 9 192 189 3 192 
Percentage 55% 45% 46% 45% 43% 45% 
z-score 3.23498 -1.25461 0.34074 0.03899 0.21360 -0.30609 
20% holdout 
sample 
D I Totals D I Totals D I Totals D I Totals D I Totals D I Totals 
D 0 38 38 34 4 38 25 13 38 34 4 38 33 4 38 16 22 38 
I 5 43 48 45 3 48 28 20 48 44 4 48 44 4 48 15 33 48 
Percentage 50% 43% 52% 44% 43% 57% 
z-score 1.16560 0.22752 0.50293 -0.04019 0.37583 0.54785 
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5. CONCLUSION 
In this study we have set out to investigate the causes and effects of significant 
performance in the five years preceding the change and following on from the 
change. It is a broad-based study incorporating many independent factors at 
multiple time periods. The objective of establishing a thread that tells the story of 
operating conditions around a leverage event and the way in which aspects of 
operating performance develop before and after a leverage event is challenging 
given the wide scope of the task at hand and furthermore, the analysis needed to 
be thorough enough to convincingly suggest the prevalence of one or more capital 
structure theories in the leverage decisions taken by company management. 
We used a fixed effects regression for unbalanced panel data with current, lead 
and lag financial indicators used to assess the debt/equity change on a company, 
event, sector and overall sample-level. This allowed us to examine the relationship 
between the debt/equity change and concurrent as well as past and future 
performance.  
We have ascertained that the use of leverage as measured by sample mean DER’s 
differs across sectors with the most highly leveraged sectors being Consumer 
Services, Financials and Industrials. We have also established that different 
sectors have experienced varied peaks and troughs in their use of leverage over 
the sample period. The cause of these cycles has not been established but 
appears to be unrelated to South African interest rate cycles. However, in terms of 
the annual changes made to DER’s amongst sample companies, we find a 
particularly volatile year occurred in 1998 which coincides with the highest real 
interest rates experienced during the sample period. We have also ascertained that 
DER’s declined on average towards the end of the sample period. 
The annual DER change was shown to be statistically dependent, at 5% 
significance, for the variables short-term debt, equity, liquidity, size, cash and 
profitability (at 10%). We find confirmation that short-term debt plays a key role in 
DER changes, specifically in supplementing liquidity requirements.  The coefficient 
for profitability was negative although close to zero – confirming the evidence of 
Titman and Wessels (1988), Harris and Raviv (1991), Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
and Fama and French (2002). The positive coefficients for the size and operating 
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cash variables also confirm prior evidence (Harris & Raviv, 1991 and Rajan & 
Zingales, 1995) and remove the ambiguity of the size effect introduced by the 
information asymmetry considerations that suggest the size effect may be 
negative.  
Looking at the path along which key influential operational variables developed 
around the leverage event, we find that increase events are followed by lower 
DSCR’s while decrease events are followed by improved DSCR’s. DSCR’s appear 
to be more volatile around decreases. Increases are preceded by poorer liquidity 
and appear to result in improved liquidity after the event. This points to the fact that 
leverage adjustments appear to supplement short-term liquidity requirements. 
Increases introduce more operational risk thereby confirming Myers (1977) and 
Hamada (1972) and also result in more persistent volatility after the event. 
Increases are pre-empted by drops in profitability and decreases by rises. This 
confirms the negative relationship identified previously between leverage and 
profitability lending support to the Pecking Order theory (Titman & Wessels, 1988, 
Baskin, 1989, Harris & Raviv, 1991, Rajan & Zingales, 1995, Fama & French, 
2002).  
Increases also resulted in superior subsequent profitability as well as better growth 
in ROI. The decrease group was defined by better ROI leading up to the event.  
This suggests that debt may be an effective means of controlling agency conflict 
associated with underinvestment risk (Myers & Majluf, 1984). This indicates that 
invested capital is earning satisfactory profits meaning that there is less opportunity 
for agency conflict between shareholders and debtholders following increases. 
This offers some confirmation of the more rigid nature of debt as a result of fixed 
repayments and the concomitant higher security of debt as a suitable external 
source of capital relative to equity (due to its lower informational cost). Companies 
that levered up were less volatile before the event and more volatile after the event, 
more profitable following the event, and experienced better short- to medium-term 
growth in ROI.  
We find some support for the Trade-off theory (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980 and 
Myers, 1984) in that increases are preceded by higher potential tax shields. We 
find that both increases and decreases were preceded by rising PE ratios. 
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Leverage increases resulted in subsequent short-term increases in PE ratios in 
support of Masulis and Korwar (1986) who find a positive relationship between 
share price returns and leverage changes. This offers some support for the Market 
Valuation theory which suggests that equity issues are discounted by the market 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984) as they tend to occur during periods of inflated market 
valuations (Loughran & Ritter, 1995).  
Companies that increased their leverage also experienced an increase in short-
term debt, total assets and PE ratio all against the backdrop of a real interest rate 
decrease. This is evidence of the key role that short-term debt plays in influencing 
DER’s. It also confirms the existence of a positive size effect (Harris & Raviv, 1991) 
and a direct relationship between share returns and leverage changes (Masulis & 
Korwar, 1986). Those companies that decreased their leverage did so in 
conjunction with increases in equity and not increased long-term debt. This group 
experienced higher liquidity, DSCR’s, ROI’s and profitability. The two latter findings 
lend support to the negative relationship between leverage and profitability found 
by Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Fama and French 
(2002) and the suggestion associated with the Underinvestment theory that debt 
may reduce potential agency conflict including low ROI’s due to its fixed repayment 
structure and higher concomitant certainty relative to equity (Myers & Majluf, 1984).  
The decrease group also experienced a higher concurrent share price increase 
and more shares in issue (assumedly related to the equity increase). This supports 
the evidence found by Masulis and Korwar (1986) suggesting that leverage 
increases are accompanied by positive share price returns as well as Lucas and 
McDonald (1990) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) that equity issues are timed to 
coincide with positive market sentiment which ties in with Myers and Majluf (1984) 
that these equity issues are presumed to take place under conditions of inflated 
market valuations. It suggests to some extent that equity issues are timed to 
coincide with higher share prices in support of the Market Valuation theory.  
The results show that the most frequently significant leads or lags on an event-
basis are t+2, t+3, t+4 and t-1, t-2, t-3, t-5 both around increase events. On a 
sectoral-basis, significance shifts towards lag factors t+1, t+2 and t+3. On a 
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company-basis, the results are somewhere in between – a combination of t+2, t+3 
and t-1, t-2 and t-4.  
Table 22: Summary of significant variables at lead/lag times 
DECREASE GROUP A1 A3 A4 A5 B2 B3 B4 B5 
PE +   - -  -  
SHARES ISSUED*   +    - - 
FA/TA   +    -,+  
SHARE PRICE   + +   +  
EQUITY*       - - 
LT DEBT       - + 
INTEREST RATES*    -   + + 
DSCR     -  +  
OI/TA    - +  -  
OPERATING CASH*     -  -  
ST DEBT     -  -,+  
VOLATILITY    +   +  
CA/CL*       -  
TAX RATE*       -  
SIZE*       +  
ROI*       -  
INCREASE GROUP A1 A3 A4 A5 B2 B3 B4 B5 
TAX RATE* +,+ +       
VOLATILITY -        
LT DEBT +        
CA/CL*      +   
SHARE PRICE      +   
ST DEBT      +   
   * Consistent result 
 
Significant catalytic variables are equity, long-term debt, real interest rate and 
issued share capital at t-5 (D group) while significant resultant variables are PE at 
t+1 (D group), shares issued at t+4 (D group), and the tax rate at t+1 (I group). 
Unfortunately our results have not revealed a continuous thread for any of the key 
variables but rather isolated points of influence. Looking at the sector breakdown 
we find that for the Basic Materials sector only, it is asset composition and share 
price at t+4 (D group), DSCR, profitability, cash generation, PE ratio and short-term 
debt at t-2 (D group), asset composition and short-term debt at t-4 (D group), and 
finally, volatility, tax rate and long-term debt at t+1 (I group). For the Industrials 
sector, we find that it is volatility, profitability, PE, real interest rates and share price 
that show significance at t+5 (D group); volatility, liquidity, DSCR, equity, tax rate, 
asset composition, size, profitability, long-term debt, cashflow generation, PE, real 
interest rates, ROI, share price, shares issued and short-term debt at t-4 (D group); 
tax rate at t+3 (I group); and liquidity, short-term debt and the share price at t-3 (I 
group). 
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The results are largely mixed. We find market sentiment improvements following 
leverage decreases - contrary to Masulis and Korwar (1986) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984) - via a higher PE ratio as well as increases in the share price variable.  
However, results for the Industrial sector show a reduction in the PE ratio along 
with a higher share price following a decrease revealing a divergence between 
these two variables both used as measurements of market sentiment. We find one 
instance of higher share prices following leverage increases disputing our previous 
finding. This supports the findings of Masulis and Korwar (1986) that share price 
returns are positively related to leverage changes.  
Our findings on profitability are also mixed - we find a direct positive relationship 
between leverage and profitability in reduced profitability following deleveraging 
(refuting Titman & Wessels, 1988, Harris & Raviv, 1991, Rajan & Zingales, 1995, 
Fama & French, 2002) but this is contradicted in our later results for prior 
relationships.  
Again the results are mixed regarding the relationship between leverage and asset 
composition. We find mixed evidence regarding volatility – higher volatility following 
leverage decreases which disputes both Hamada (1972) and Myers (1977) that 
debt introduces additional operational risk, and the reverse result in a subsequent 
finding of higher volatility following increases. We find support for higher effective 
taxes following increases. The results also suggest a direct positive relationship 
between liquidity and leverage supporting the notion that greater liquidity enables 
greater debt capacity (Martin & Scott, 1974). 
The results leading up to events are also mixed in our findings that profitability both 
increases and decreases before a leverage decrease. We find the same 
contradiction for DSCR’s and asset composition. We find that the effective tax rate 
is lower leading up to a decrease (in support of the Trade-off theory), as is cash 
generation, liquidity (corroborating the positive relationship established by Martin 
and Scott, 1974) and ROI (this is contrary to the Underinvestment theory that debt 
reduces agency conflict in the form of low ROI’s according to Myers, 1977). The 
size variable is higher before a decrease which also runs contrary to the positive 
size effect of Harris and Raviv (1991) but supports the notion of the ambiguous 
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size effect which is negative under conditions of asymmetric information (Rajan & 
Zingales, 1995). 
The contradictions on many variables are interesting and raise the question of 
whether sectoral idiosyncrasies have a material influence on the relevance of 
operational variables in leverage decisions. However, we also find numerous 
contradictions between what we observed from the observed trends and the 
statistical tests. This may suggest that a more narrowly-focused test may be more 
informative.  
In summary, the event-level regressions have produced interesting specific details 
of operating performance before and after leverage events. We have found some 
significance in terms of identifying key periods both before and after an event. The 
evidence implies that before- and after- performance has a material bearing on 
operations in an event-year. Much of this significance falls away when we 
aggregate at sector-level, and all of it disappears at sample-level. This suggests 
that the capital structure mystery may be embedded within whatever factors govern 
individual leverage event decisions. 
The data suggests that capital structure theories are not followed strictly. This 
implies that leverage decisions are taken with regard to financing requirements as 
they arise based on the availability of internal funds or cashflow or consideration 
of borrowing costs and tax savings. The underlying rationale of using debt appears 
to relate to the practical considerations of managing capital. Event analysis seems 
to indicate that the majority of leverage decisions are event-specific rather than 
justified by any generic theoretical framework.  
Nonetheless, the observed trend results show some support for the Pecking Order 
theory – levering up occurs on average after drops in profitability, the Trade-off 
theory - in a higher potential tax shield for the increase group, the notion that 
existing debt determines future borrowing capacity (higher and more stable 
DSCR’s for the increase group), and some evidence supporting the 
Underinvestment theory that debt may reduce the occurrence of low ROI’s and 
other agency conflict (Myers, 1977). It would appear that short-term debt is 
frequently employed to satisfy liquidity requirements including working capital 
funding. There is some evidence that equity issues (associated with leverage 
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decreases) occur alongside concurrent higher share prices supporting the Market 
Valuation theory. This supports the “window of opportunity” theory associated with 
equity issues (Lucas & McDonald, 1990 and Loughran & Ritter, 1995). Higher 
concurrent PE ratios associated with those companies that levered up supports the 
positive relationship found between announcement share price returns and 
leverage changes (Masulis & Korwar, 1986) and the notion that equity issues under 
scenarios of asymmetric information are perceived as being associated with 
overvalued equity and therefore, discounted by investors (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
Finally, there is no evidence to suggest that bigger companies prefer less leverage 
(contradicting the positive size effect suggested by Harris and Raviv (1991).  
We have not achieved conclusive proof of any particular capital structure theory in 
practice on the JSE apart from hints (based on the observed patterns not 
corroborated by test results) of the Pecking Order-, Trade-off- and Market 
Valuation theories and one observed instance of support for the Underinvestment 
theory. However, these observed trends around events contradict the results of our 
regression tests calling into question the research design. We have not 
successfully established a continuous development path for performance 
indicators but we have shed light on the rationale behind the use of debt to some 
extent and identified relevant time periods around individual events. We have found 
some evidence of key influential operator variables - namely effective tax rate, 
operating cash, liquidity, size and ROI but the signs of the latter two variables are 
contrary to the findings of previous studies. The multiple discriminant analysis 
achieved a correct prediction rate of only approximately 50% on a hold-out sample 
suggesting that the model could be improved upon.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
6. REFERENCES 
 
Baker, M., & Wurgler, J. (2002). Market Timing and Capital Structure. The Journal of 
Finance Vol. 57 No. 1, 1-32. 
Bancel, F., & Mittoo, U. R. (2004). Cross-Country Determinants of Capital Structure 
Choice: A Survey of European Firms. Financial Management Vol. 33 No. 4, 
103-132. 
Barbee, Jr., W. C., Mukherji, S., & Raines, G. A. (1996). Do Sales-Price and Debt-
Equity Explain Stock Returns Better than Book-Market and Firm Size? Financial 
Analysts Journal Vol. 52 No. 2, 56-60. 
Barclay, M. J., & Smith, Jr., C. W. (1999). The Capital Structure Puzzle: Another Look 
at the Evidence. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance Vol. 12.1, 8-20. 
Barclay, M. J., & Smith, Jr., C. W. (2005). The Capital Structure Puzzle: The Evidence 
Revisited. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance Vol. 17 No. 1, 8-17. 
Barclay, M. J., Smith, Jr., C. W., & Watts, R. L. (1997). The Determinants of Corporate 
Leverage and Dividend Policies. Journal of Financial Education Vol. 23, 1-15. 
Baskin, J. (1989). An Empirical Investigation of the Pecking Order Hypothesis. 
Financial Management Vol. 18 No. 1, 26-35. 
Baxter, N. D., & Cragg, J. G. (1970). Corporate Choice among Long-term Financing 
Instruments. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 225-235. 
Berger, A. N., & Udell, G. F. (1998). The Economics of Small Business Finance: The 
Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle. Journal 
of Banking and Finance Vol. 22, 613-673. 
Bhandari, L. C. (1988). Debt/Equity Ratio and Expected Common Stock Returns: 
Empirical Evidence. The Journal of Finance Vol. 43 No. 2, 507-528. 
Brounen, D., de Jong, A., & Koedjik, K. (2004, March). Corporate Finance in Europe 
Confronting Theory with Practice. EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 
2769. 
71 
 
Correia, C., & Cramer, P. (2008). An Analysis of Costof Capital, Capital Structure and 
Capital Budgeting Practices: A Survey of South African Listed Companies. 
Meditari Accountancy Research Vol. 16 No. 2, pp. 31-52. 
deAngelo, H., & Masulis, R. (1980). Optimal Capital Structure under Corporate and 
Personal Taxation. Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 8, 3-29. 
Donaldson, G. (1961). Corporate Debt Capacity: A Study of Corporate Debt Policy 
and the Determination of Corporate Debt Capacity. Boston: Division of 
Research, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. 
Elsas, R., & Florysiak, D. (2008). Empirical Capital Structure Research: New Ideas, 
Recent Evidence and Methodological Issues. Munich School of Management 
Discussion Paper 2008-10. 
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1992). The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns. 
The Journal of Finance Vol. 47 No. 2, 427-465. 
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2002). Testing Trade-off and Pecking Order Predictions 
about Dividends and Debt. The Review of Financial Studies Vol. 15 No. 1, 1-
33. 
Ferri, M. G., & Jones, W. H. (1979). Determinants of Financial Structure: A New 
Methodological Approach. Journal of Finance Vol. 34, 631-644. 
Frank, M. Z., & Goyal, V. K. (2003). Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital 
Structure . Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 67, 217-248. 
Frank, M. Z., & Goyal, V. K. (2009). Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors are 
Reliably Important? Financial Management Vol. 38 No. 1, 1-37. 
Friend, I., & Hasbrouck, J. (1986). Determinants of Capital Structure. Rodney L. White 
Centre for Financial Research. 
Gordon, M. J. (1982). The Investment, Financing and Valuation of the Corporation. 
Illinois: Greenwood Press. 
Graham, J. R. (2000). How Big are the Tax Benefits of Debt? The Journal of Finance 
Vol. 55 No. 5, 1901-1941. 
72 
 
Graham, J. R., & Harvey, C. R. (2001). The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance: 
Evidence from the Field. Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 60, 187-243. 
Hackbarth, D., Miao, J., & Morellec, E. (2006). Capital Structure, Credit Risk and 
Macroeconomic Conditions. Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 82 No. 3, 519-
550. 
Hamada, R. S. (1972). The Effect of the Firm's Capital Structure on the Systematic 
Risk of Common Stocks. The Journal of Finance Vol. 27 No. 2, 435-452. 
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1991). The Theory of Capital Structure. The Journal of Finance 
Vol. 46 No. 1, 297-355. 
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and 
Takeovers. The American Economic Review Vol. 76 No. 2, 323-329. 
Korajczyk, R. A., & Levy, A. (2003). Capital Structure Choice: Macroeconomic 
Conditions and Financial Constraints. Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 68, 
75-109. 
Korazjczyk, R. A., Lucas, D., & McDonald, R. L. (1990a). The Effect of Information 
Releases on the Pricing and Timing of Equity Issues. In R. G. Hubbard, 
Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment (pp. 257-277). 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Kothari, S. P., Shanken, J., & Sloan, R. G. (1995). Another Look at the Cross-Section 
of Expected Stock Returns . The Journal of Finance Vol. 50 No. 1, 185-224. 
Lemmon, M. L., Roberts, M. R., & Zender, J. F. (2008). Back to the Beginning: 
Persistence and the Cross-Section of Corporate Capital Structure. The Journal 
of Finance Vol. 63 No. 4, 1575-1608. 
Levy, A., & Hennessy, C. (2007). Why does Capital Structure Choice Vary with 
Macroeconomic Conditions? Journal of Monetary Economics Vol. 54 No. 6, 
1545-1564. 
Long, M. S., & Malitz, I. B. (1985). Investment Patterns and Financial Leverage. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
73 
 
Loughran, T., & Ritter, J. R. (1995). The New Issues Puzzle. Journal of Finance Vol. 
50 No. 1, 23-52. 
Lucas, D. J., & McDonald, R. L. (1990). Equity Issues and Stock Price Dynamics. 
Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 45, 1019-1043. 
Marsh, P. (1982). The Choice between Equity and Debt: An Empirical Study. The 
Journal of Finance Vol. 37 No. 1, 121-144. 
Martin, J. D., & Scott, Jr., D. F. (1974). A Discriminant Analysis of the Corporate Debt-
Equity Decision. Financial Management Vol. 3 No. 4, 71-79. 
Masulis, R. W., & Korwar, A. N. (1986). Seasoned Equity Offerings: An Empirical 
Investigation. Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 15, 91-118. 
Miller, M. H. (1977). Debt and Taxes. The Journal of Finance Vol. 32 No. 2, 261-275. 
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and 
the Theory of Investment. The American Economic Review Vol. 48 No. 3, 261-
297. 
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of Corporate Borrowing. Journal of Financial 
Economics Vol. 5, 147-175. 
Myers, S. C. (1984). The Capital Structure Puzzle. The Journal of Finance Vol. 39 No. 
3, 575-592. 
Myers, S. C. (2001). Capital Structure. The Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 15 
No. 2, 81-102. 
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions 
when Firms have Information that Investors do not have. Journal of Financial 
Economics Vol. 13, 187-221. 
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (1995). What do we know about Capital Structure? Some 
Evidence from International Data. The Journal of Finance Vol. 50 No. 5, 1421-
1460. 
Scott, Jr., D. F., & Martin, J. D. (1975). Industry Influence on Financial Structure. 
Financial Management Vol. 4 No. 1, 67-73. 
74 
 
Shyam-Sunder, L., & Myers, S. C. (1999). Testing Static Trade-off against Pecking 
Order Models of Capital Structure. Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 51, 219-
244. 
Smith, C. W., & Watts, R. L. (1992). The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate 
Financing, Dividend and Compensation Policies . Journal of Financial 
Economics Vol. 32, 263-292. 
Stein, J. C. (1992). Convertible Bonds as Backdoor Equity Financing. Jounal of 
Financial Economics Vol. 32, 3-21. 
Taub, A. J. (1975). Determinants of the Firm's Capital Structure. The MIT Press, 410-
416. 
Titman, S., & Wessels, R. (1988). The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice. The 
Journal of Finance Vol. 43 No. 1, 1-19. 
Toy, N., Stonehill, A., Remmers, L., & Beekhuisen, T. (1974). A Comparative 
International Study of Growth, Profitability and Risk as Determinants of 
Corporate Debt Ratios in the Manufacturing Sector. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis Vol. 9, 875-886. 
Williamson, S. (1981). The Moral Hazard Theory of Corporate Financial Structure: An 
Empirical Test. MIT. 
Zwiebel, J. (1996). Dynamic Capital Structure under Managerial Entrenchment. The 
American Economic Review Vol. 86 No. 5, 1197-1215. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
7. APPENDIX 
7.1. Contents 
7.1.1. List of companies 
7.1.2. DER Summary Statistics by Company 
7.1.3. Sample Company Scorecards 
7.1.4. Variable covariance table 
7.1.5. Company-level synopsis of regression results detailing significant 
independent variables around I or D event 
7.1.6. Analysis of MDA group means with F-ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
List of Companies by Sector 
Sector   Company (Financial Y/E) 
Basic Materials  1 A E C I (December) 
  2 AFROX (December) 
  3 ANGGOLD (December) 
  4 ANGLO (December) 
  5 ANGLOPLAT (December) 
  6 ARCMITTAL (December) 
  7 ARM (June) 
  8 ASSORE (June) 
  9 DELTA (December) 
  10 EHSV (December) 
  11 GFIELDS (December) 
  12 HARMONY (June) 
  13 IMPLATS (June) 
  14 LONMIN (September) 
  15 MERAFE (December) 
  16 NORTHAM (June) 
  17 SAPPI (September) 
  18 SPANJAARD (February) 
  19 TRNSHEX (March) 
  20 VILLAGE (June) 
Consumer 
Goods 
 
21 
A V I (June) 
  22 CROOKES (March) 
  23 DISTELL (June) 
  24 METAIR (December) 
  25 NUWORLD (August) 
  26 OCEANA (September) 
  27 RCL (June) 
  28 RICHEMONT (March) 
  29 SAB (March) 
  30 SEARDEL CP (March) 
  31 TIGBRANDS (September) 
Consumer 
Services 
 
32 
AF & OVR (June) 
  33 CASHBIL (June) 
  34 CAXTON (June) 
  35 CMH (February) 
  36 CULINAN (September) 
  37 ITLTILE (June) 
  38 NICTUS (March) 
  39 PICKNPAY (February) 
  40 REX TRUE -A- (June) 
  41 SHOPRIT (June) 
  42 SUNINT (June) 
Financials  43 B-AFRICA (December) 
  44 BRAIT (March) 
  45 FIRSTRAND (June) 
  46 FPT (August) 
  47 HCI (March) 
  48 HYPROP (December) 
  49 INVLTD (March) 
  50 LIB HOLD (December) 
  51 LONFIN (June) 
  52 NEDBANK (December) 
  53 PUTPROP (June) 
  54 SANTAM (December) 
  55 SASFIN (June) 
  56 STANBANK (December) 
  57 ZURICH SA (December) 
Healthcare  58 ASPEN (June) 
  59 MEDCLIN (March) 
Industrials  60 ALTRON A (February) 
  61 BARWORLD (September) 
  62 BASREAD (December) 
  63 BIDVEST (June) 
  64 CARGO (February) 
  65 ELBGROUP (June) 
  66 GRINDROD (December) 
  67 GROUP 5 (June) 
  68 HUDACO (November) 
  69 IMPERIAL (June) 
  70 JASCO (June) 
  71 M&R HLD (June) 
  72 MASNITE (December) 
  73 NAMPAK (September) 
  74 PPC (September) 
  75 REUNERT (September) 
  76 SUPRGRP (June) 
  77 TRENCOR (December) 
  78 WINHOLD (September) 
Oil & Gas  79 SASOL (June) 
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DER Summary Statistics by Company 
COMPANYID  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Quant.*  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
A E C I 
(December) 1.115000 1.075000 1.650000 0.810000 1.075000 0.206734 0.765392 3.202606 24 
A V I (June) 0.825000 0.715000 1.650000 0.410000 0.715000 0.307147 1.037331 3.492366 24 
AF & OVR (June) 0.381250 0.370000 0.700000 0.210000 0.370000 0.097771 1.589860 6.328142 24 
AFROX 
(December) 0.895833 0.820000 1.480000 0.660000 0.820000 0.213886 1.436775 4.566950 24 
ALTRON A 
(February) 1.459167 1.430000 2.160000 0.980000 1.430000 0.332290 0.481874 2.265409 24 
ANGGOLD 
(December) 0.827917 0.775000 2.370000 0.130000 0.775000 0.682113 0.535473 2.165459 24 
ANGLO 
(December) 0.414583 0.320000 0.780000 0.180000 0.320000 0.215850 0.561799 1.658418 24 
ANGLOPLAT 
(December) 0.519167 0.470000 0.970000 0.210000 0.470000 0.242360 0.668765 2.098151 24 
ARCMITTAL 
(December) 0.408750 0.450000 0.910000 0.150000 0.450000 0.188549 0.508771 3.040358 24 
ARM (June) 0.778333 0.735000 1.520000 0.270000 0.735000 0.410574 0.217533 1.574432 24 
ASPEN (June) 1.500833 1.000000 8.190000 0.360000 1.000000 1.564444 3.437253 15.24341 24 
ASSORE (June) 0.336667 0.255000 1.150000 0.130000 0.255000 0.241421 1.924622 6.618660 24 
B-AFRICA 
(December) 13.88583 14.54500 17.10000 9.640000 14.54500 1.894814 -0.710650 2.856679 24 
BARWORLD 
(September) 1.605000 1.470000 2.640000 0.970000 1.470000 0.462348 1.164959 3.362024 24 
BASREAD 
(December) 6.114583 3.840000 30.80000 1.470000 3.840000 6.710797 2.450704 8.959071 24 
BIDVEST (June) 1.511250 1.600000 2.060000 0.450000 1.600000 0.401024 -1.330897 4.605962 24 
BRAIT (March) 0.553333 0.200000 2.710000 0.010000 0.200000 0.773050 1.635883 4.411104 24 
CARGO 
(February) 0.856250 0.840000 1.260000 0.530000 0.840000 0.197590 0.092867 2.094063 24 
CASHBIL (June) 2.362500 2.560000 3.350000 0.780000 2.560000 0.713474 -0.729893 2.688619 24 
CAXTON (June) 0.392083 0.285000 0.820000 0.130000 0.285000 0.219940 0.471200 1.796440 24 
CMH (February) 2.238750 2.070000 4.300000 1.150000 2.070000 0.786469 0.898585 3.291066 24 
CROOKES 
(March) 0.133333 0.095000 0.340000 0.050000 0.095000 0.083336 1.065418 3.043014 24 
CULINAN 
(September) 4.332083 2.390000 39.33000 1.260000 2.390000 7.670196 4.200045 19.67908 24 
DELTA 
(December) 0.546250 0.560000 1.040000 0.120000 0.560000 0.313144 -0.047110 1.547143 24 
DISTELL (June) 0.610417 0.520000 1.040000 0.230000 0.520000 0.252199 0.387329 1.726271 24 
EHSV (December) 0.834167 0.820000 1.680000 0.220000 0.820000 0.352555 0.454338 2.980165 24 
ELBGROUP 
(June) 2.538333 2.460000 4.870000 1.330000 2.460000 0.929393 0.699117 2.837752 24 
FIRSTRAND 
(June) 10.05125 11.01000 14.88000 0.450000 11.01000 4.005338 -1.471116 4.178750 24 
FPT (August) 0.135417 0.090000 0.410000 0.050000 0.090000 0.095961 1.901945 5.838056 24 
GFIELDS 
(December) 0.248750 0.230000 0.670000 0.070000 0.230000 0.135689 1.287609 5.135396 24 
GRINDROD 
(December) 2.065000 2.045000 4.300000 0.920000 2.045000 0.826943 0.632484 3.246655 24 
GROUP 5 (June) 4.039583 3.415000 6.710000 2.230000 3.415000 1.481261 0.591126 1.813109 24 
HARMONY (June) 0.227500 0.225000 0.530000 0.060000 0.225000 0.139010 0.775627 2.474411 24 
HCI (March) -2.890833 0.575000 3.820000 -92.59000 0.575000 19.16042 -4.544880 21.79486 24 
HUDACO 
(November) 1.374583 1.135000 3.420000 0.550000 1.135000 0.721556 1.198063 3.970503 24 
HYPROP 
(December) 71.43542 4.205000 552.1000 0.820000 4.205000 184.3216 2.267281 6.141959 24 
IMPERIAL (June) 1.495417 1.485000 2.450000 0.450000 1.485000 0.556659 -0.223466 2.408732 24 
IMPLATS (June) 0.394167 0.360000 1.130000 0.170000 0.360000 0.213275 1.753598 6.900556 24 
INVLTD (March) 16.59917 15.13000 31.50000 7.590000 15.13000 6.411647 0.822819 2.702929 24 
ITLTILE (June) 0.568750 0.480000 1.390000 0.150000 0.480000 0.273087 1.560649 5.506583 24 
JASCO (June) 1.773333 1.275000 7.870000 0.460000 1.275000 1.522977 2.896907 11.95342 24 
LIB HOLD 
(December) 2.135417 1.885000 6.260000 0.470000 1.885000 1.477586 1.527180 4.800509 24 
LONFIN (June) 0.176667 0.180000 0.430000 0.050000 0.180000 0.086057 0.873342 4.343805 24 
LONMIN 
(September) 0.718333 0.685000 1.690000 0.090000 0.685000 0.511848 0.439783 1.915391 24 
M&R HLD (June) 1.742083 1.575000 3.140000 0.780000 1.575000 0.641601 0.629264 2.432569 24 
MASNITE 
(December) 0.355833 0.370000 0.620000 0.150000 0.370000 0.132301 0.015113 1.817839 24 
MEDCLIN (March) 1.390000 1.190000 4.170000 0.250000 1.190000 1.171669 1.025809 3.031441 24 
MERAFE 
(December) 0.595000 0.300000 3.480000 0.130000 0.300000 0.780992 2.737091 9.816418 24 
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METAIR 
(December) 0.545417 0.520000 0.820000 0.330000 0.520000 0.131148 0.412425 2.344815 24 
NAMPAK 
(September) 1.023333 0.965000 1.640000 0.520000 0.965000 0.321797 0.321741 2.155913 24 
NEDBANK 
(December) 14.17875 14.22500 22.44000 9.070000 14.22500 2.814451 0.849370 4.323974 24 
NICTUS (March) 3.384583 2.845000 7.270000 1.240000 2.845000 2.061673 0.595867 1.933122 24 
NORTHAM (June) 0.110833 0.080000 0.270000 0.030000 0.080000 0.077343 0.647405 2.169536 24 
NUWORLD 
(August) 0.818750 0.565000 1.970000 0.260000 0.565000 0.574330 0.905579 2.276133 24 
OCEANA 
(September) 0.908333 0.800000 1.830000 0.390000 0.800000 0.424885 0.696074 2.340130 24 
PICKNPAY 
(February) 3.652500 3.425000 6.700000 2.080000 3.425000 1.272551 1.027933 3.546141 24 
PPC (September) 1.322083 0.490000 5.020000 0.320000 0.490000 1.576755 1.470438 3.415791 24 
PUTPROP (June) 0.247083 0.090000 0.950000 0.010000 0.090000 0.305222 1.104418 2.918355 24 
RCL (June) 0.630417 0.550000 1.350000 0.240000 0.550000 0.272388 1.409204 4.368953 24 
REUNERT 
(September) 1.710417 1.840000 2.820000 0.440000 1.840000 0.760597 -0.277289 1.834627 24 
REX TRUE -A- 
(June) 0.210833 0.200000 0.390000 0.120000 0.200000 0.057174 1.548482 5.590328 24 
RICHEMONT 
(March) 0.897083 0.390000 2.360000 0.200000 0.390000 0.747177 0.574985 1.680629 24 
SAB (March) 1.086250 0.940000 2.240000 0.320000 0.940000 0.652672 0.383264 1.771456 24 
SANTAM 
(December) 1.121250 0.765000 2.660000 0.150000 0.765000 0.803321 0.546179 1.976888 24 
SAPPI 
(September) 1.278750 1.350000 1.970000 0.450000 1.350000 0.391966 -0.633602 2.557187 24 
SASFIN (June) 3.249583 3.050000 6.310000 1.130000 3.050000 1.457074 0.514955 2.529986 24 
SASOL (June) 0.590417 0.575000 0.940000 0.290000 0.575000 0.199488 -0.011397 1.714704 24 
SEARDEL CP 
(March) 1.377083 1.255000 2.460000 0.620000 1.255000 0.605514 0.185778 1.534503 24 
SHOPRIT (June) 2.930833 2.900000 5.080000 1.130000 2.900000 1.042826 0.253134 2.415284 24 
SPANJAARD 
(February) 1.381667 1.155000 3.230000 0.470000 1.155000 0.739498 0.888054 2.822013 24 
STANBANK 
(December) 13.71000 13.29500 19.55000 8.390000 13.29500 2.796321 0.264985 2.292068 24 
SUNINT (June) 4.722083 1.015000 61.72000 0.530000 1.015000 12.48188 4.223582 19.74597 24 
SUPRGRP (June) 1.841667 1.455000 7.230000 0.040000 1.455000 1.438673 2.351737 9.369493 24 
TIGBRANDS 
(September) 1.711250 1.285000 9.170000 0.470000 1.285000 1.808555 3.237286 13.49436 24 
TRENCOR 
(December) 2.093333 1.865000 3.960000 0.700000 1.865000 1.154239 0.151058 1.518361 24 
TRNSHEX 
(March) 0.558333 0.315000 2.870000 0.190000 0.315000 0.610201 2.660213 9.887065 24 
VILLAGE (June) 0.337500 0.200000 2.540000 -0.250000 0.200000 0.543453 3.075379 12.66126 24 
WINHOLD 
(September) -3.805833 2.145000 46.95000 -293.0000 2.145000 63.14025 -4.209446 20.00819 24 
ZURICH SA 
(December) 0.487083 0.375000 1.680000 0.140000 0.375000 0.366564 2.296490 7.640551 24 
All 2.872395 0.960000 552.1000 -293.0000 0.960000 23.26823 19.36100 494.0387 1896 
          
          
*Quantiles computed for p=0.5, using the Rankit (Cleveland) definition. 
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COMPANY AVI – SECTOR: CONSUMER GOODS 
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COMPANY: SUN INTERNATIONAL – SECTOR: CONSUMER SERVICES 
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COMPANY: BRAIT S.A – SECTOR: FINANCIALS 
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COMPANY: BARLOWORLD – SECTOR: INDUSTRIALS 
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COMPANY: GROUP 5 – SECTOR: INDUSTRIALS 
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Covariance Analysis: Kendall's tau              
Pairwise samples (pairwise missing deletion)             
tau-b               
tau-a 
D
_
E
  
L
T
 _
D
E
B
T
  
S
T
_
 E
B
T
  
E
Q
U
IT
Y
  
C
A
/C
L
  
D
S
C
R
  
F
A
/I
N
T
A
N
G
IB
L
E
_
A
. 
 
R
O
I 
 
L
O
G
_
T
A
  
O
I/
T
A
  
O
P
E
R
A
T
IN
G
_
C
A
S
H
  
P
/E
P
S
  
S
H
A
R
E
_
P
R
IC
E  
 
S
H
A
R
E
S
_
IS
S
U
E
D
  
R
E
A
L
_
IN
T
E
R
E
S
T
_
R
A
T
E
S
  
D_E  1.000000               
 0.998404               
LT_INTEREST_BEARING_DEBT  0.203614 1.000000              
 0.203377 0.998370              
ST_INTEREST_BEARING_DEBT  0.193576 0.057634 1.000000             
 0.193354 0.057589 0.998536             
EQUITY  -0.233409 0.043737 0.046148 1.000000            
 -0.233222 0.043702 0.046115 0.999999            
CA_CL  -0.238853 0.054688 -0.305689 0.103352 1.000000           
 -0.238662 0.054644 -0.305465 0.103351 1.000000           
DSCR  -0.140954 -0.101204 -0.117874 0.159087 0.077208 1.000000          
 -0.140861 -0.101126 -0.117800 0.159077 0.077203 0.999872          
FA_INTANGIBLE_ASSETS  0.026862 -0.024378 -0.023540 -0.015992 0.012741 0.042460 1.000000         
 0.026798 -0.024318 -0.023479 -0.015959 0.012714 0.042377 0.995890         
ROI  -0.115767 -0.051152 -0.064921 0.194646 0.128934 0.330044 0.020473 1.000000        
 -0.115677 -0.051110 -0.064875 0.194632 0.128925 0.330006 0.020430 0.999859        
LOG_TA_  0.137953 0.214493 0.211221 0.460362 -0.037146 0.068872 0.053745 0.095803 1.000000       
 0.137842 0.214318 0.211066 0.460362 -0.037146 0.068868 0.053635 0.095796 1.000000       
OI_TA  -0.106740 -0.072215 -0.112875 0.153306 0.069356 0.452714 0.005015 0.430230 0.035125 1.000000      
 -0.106654 -0.072156 -0.112792 0.153306 0.069356 0.452686 0.005005 0.430199 0.035125 1.000000      
OPERATING_CASH  0.002995 0.015366 -0.061939 0.103987 0.006388 0.092825 0.029367 0.127775 0.123160 0.183224 1.000000     
 0.002993 0.015354 -0.061898 0.103987 0.006388 0.092821 0.029310 0.127766 0.123160 0.183224 1.000000     
P_EPS  -0.000502 0.010468 -0.001138 -0.027811 0.033455 -0.042028 0.023767 -0.076898 -0.043484 -0.139288 -0.018614 1.000000    
 -0.000502 0.010460 -0.001137 -0.027811 0.033455 -0.042026 0.023719 -0.076892 -0.043484 -0.139288 -0.018614 1.000000    
SHARE_PRICE  -0.022106 -0.021645 -0.024301 0.116584 0.031326 0.141313 -0.006581 0.096498 0.065475 0.140833 0.094854 0.310034 1.000000   
 -0.022086 -0.021626 -0.024282 0.116570 0.031322 0.141291 -0.006567 0.096481 0.065468 0.140818 0.094844 0.310000 0.999777   
SHARES_ISSUED  -0.025940 0.036428 0.034498 0.171066 -0.007524 0.005296 -0.024809 -0.003300 0.150549 0.007052 0.030139 -0.002962 0.021714 1.000000  
 -0.023241 0.033400 0.031608 0.153380 -0.006746 0.004790 -0.022760 -0.002980 0.134984 0.006323 0.027191 -0.002655 0.019467 0.803912  
REAL_INTEREST_RATES  -0.038218 -0.023322 -0.035245 0.008219 0.017505 -0.019212 -0.000391 -0.006497 -0.005789 0.012834 -0.003920 0.034401 0.026995 0.037912 1.000000 
 -0.037359 -0.022797 -0.034456 0.008041 0.017125 -0.018793 -0.000381 -0.006355 -0.005663 0.012556 -0.003835 0.033654 0.026406 0.033254 0.957048 
 
85 
 
EQAECII Dep. Var: AECII      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
AECIIA1 -0.2518  0.2571 -0.9792  0.3302 0.2924 3.5943 0.0005 
AECIIA2 -1.0168  0.6171 -1.6477  0.1030    
AECIIA3  0.1577  0.1011  1.5596  0.1225    
AECIIA4  0.1027  0.2679  0.3834  0.7024    
AECIIA5 -0.1287  0.3510 -0.3667  0.7147    
AECIIB1 -1.7476  0.6471 -2.7008  0.0083    
AECIIB2 -0.3002  0.2368 -1.2676  0.2083    
AECIIB3  0.0947  0.0623  1.5214  0.1318    
AECIIB4 -0.7012  0.4883 -1.4359  0.1546    
AECIIB5 -1.2357  0.3740 -3.3044  0.0014    
C  1.0116  0.3940  2.5676  0.0119    
EQAFOVRI Dep. Var: AF_OVRI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
AF_OVRIB1 -1.2569  0.5885 -2.1355  0.0436 0.5805 6.3666 0.0008 
AF_OVRIB2  0.0931  0.1053  0.8844  0.3856    
AF_OVRIB3 -2.5609  0.7780 -3.2916  0.0032    
AF_OVRIB4  0.8774  0.6222  1.4102  0.1718    
AF_OVRIB5 -0.0101  0.0169 -0.5998  0.5545    
C -0.3192  0.1557 -2.0500  0.0519    
EQAFROXD Dep. Var: AFROXD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
AFROXDA1  0.4929  0.4058  1.2146  0.2380 0.8505 11.9442 0.0000 
AFROXDA2  0.6600  0.2989  2.2078  0.0385    
AFROXDA3 -0.0603  0.1032 -0.5846  0.5650    
AFROXDA4 -0.0351  0.0332 -1.0574  0.3023    
AFROXDA5  0.0250  0.0162  1.5447  0.1373    
AFROXDB1  0.1919  0.3752  0.5114  0.6144    
AFROXDB2 -0.0571  0.0639 -0.8936  0.3817    
AFROXDB3 -0.0008  0.2144 -0.0039  0.9970    
AFROXDB4 -0.3237  0.1914 -1.6912  0.1056    
AFROXDB5  0.0038  0.0153  0.2509  0.8043    
C  0.0011  0.0726  0.0150  0.9882    
EQAFROXI Dep. Var: AFROXI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
AFROXIA1  0.8102  0.9581  0.8457  0.4073 0.6821 4.5054 0.0018 
AFROXIA2 -0.0640  0.6324 -0.1012  0.9203    
AFROXIA3 -2.2741  1.1369 -2.0004  0.0586    
AFROXIA4  0.3357  0.8723  0.3848  0.7042    
AFROXIA5  0.1588  0.2299  0.6906  0.4974    
AFROXIB1 -1.8237  0.7181 -2.5396  0.0191    
AFROXIB2 -0.3054  0.3029 -1.0083  0.3248    
AFROXIB3 -0.0525  0.0526 -0.9976  0.3298    
AFROXIB4 -0.1612  0.0772 -2.0876  0.0492    
AFROXIB5  0.3178  0.2668  1.1912  0.2469    
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C  0.5404  0.2039  2.6501  0.0150    
EQALTROND Dep. Var: ALTRON_AD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
ALTRON_ADA1 -0.7711  1.3550 -0.5691  0.5717 0.2840 2.0627 0.0450 
ALTRON_ADA2  0.7715  1.0768  0.7165  0.4769    
ALTRON_ADA3  0.4339  0.9961  0.4356  0.6649    
ALTRON_ADA4  0.8413  0.3514  2.3939  0.0203    
ALTRON_ADA5  0.2007  0.7876  0.2548  0.7999    
ALTRON_ADB1 -1.6927  1.1749 -1.4407  0.1557    
ALTRON_ADB2 -0.0264  0.0566 -0.4675  0.6421    
ALTRON_ADB3 -1.3600  2.0955 -0.6490  0.5192    
ALTRON_ADB4 -2.1632  0.6781 -3.1902  0.0024    
ALTRON_ADB5 -0.6142  0.8612 -0.7132  0.4789    
C  1.5082  0.9668  1.5600  0.1248    
EQANGLOGOLDD Dep. Var: ANGGOLDD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
ANGGOLDDA1 -0.4560  0.1487 -3.0662  0.0033 0.7649 18.5417 0.0000 
ANGGOLDDA2  1.4281  0.1612  8.8620  0.0000    
ANGGOLDDA3  1.0744  0.2761  3.8915  0.0003    
ANGGOLDDA4  0.8331  0.2179  3.8233  0.0003    
ANGGOLDDA5  0.7740  0.4112  1.8823  0.0649    
ANGGOLDDB1 -0.5229  0.1213 -4.3113  0.0001    
ANGGOLDDB2 -0.6720  0.1035 -6.4955  0.0000    
ANGGOLDDB3 -1.2333  0.4190 -2.9431  0.0047    
ANGGOLDDB4 -1.4986  0.1986 -7.5478  0.0000    
ANGGOLDDB5 -1.1510  0.1748 -6.5859  0.0000    
C  0.8689  0.2011  4.3196  0.0001    
EQANGLOGOLDI Dep. Var: ANGGOLDI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
ANGGOLDIA1  0.0139  0.0159  0.8716  0.3849 0.4983 14.3014 0.0000 
ANGGOLDIA2  0.2097  0.0685  3.0634  0.0026    
ANGGOLDIA3 -0.0403  0.0158 -2.5460  0.0119    
ANGGOLDIA4 -0.4362  0.0548 -7.9652  0.0000    
ANGGOLDIA5 -0.0790  0.0464 -1.7028  0.0908    
ANGGOLDIB1 -0.0341  0.0113 -3.0081  0.0031    
ANGGOLDIB2  0.2608  0.0953  2.7366  0.0070    
ANGGOLDIB3  0.0353  0.0256  1.3819  0.1691    
ANGGOLDIB4  0.0164  0.0918  0.1788  0.8584    
ANGGOLDIB5 -0.0015  0.0119 -0.1252  0.9006    
C  0.1163  0.0938  1.2396  0.2171    
EQANGLOI Dep. Var: ANGLOI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
ANGLOIA1 -0.0559  0.0425 -1.3174  0.1902 0.1902 2.8648 0.0031 
ANGLOIA2  0.0288  0.2144  0.1344  0.8933    
ANGLOIA3  0.0002  0.0644  0.0028  0.9978    
ANGLOIA4  0.0465  0.0648  0.7177  0.4743    
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ANGLOIA5 -0.0380  0.0340 -1.1152  0.2670    
ANGLOIB1 -0.0516  0.0485 -1.0630  0.2899    
ANGLOIB2 -0.0940  0.0766 -1.2261  0.2225    
ANGLOIB3 -0.5611  0.1257 -4.4648  0.0000    
ANGLOIB4 -0.0364  0.1474 -0.2472  0.8052    
ANGLOIB5 -0.1568  0.1791 -0.8754  0.3831    
C  0.6409  0.1525  4.2019  0.0001    
EQANGLOPLATD Dep. Var: ANGLOPLATD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
ANGLOPLATDA1  0.0380  0.0959  0.3966  0.6927 0.3116 3.6666 0.0005 
ANGLOPLATDA2 -0.1290  0.1291 -0.9991  0.3207    
ANGLOPLATDA3  0.2220  0.0651  3.4112  0.0010    
ANGLOPLATDA4 -0.0801  0.0999 -0.8023  0.4247    
ANGLOPLATDA5 -0.0961  0.0773 -1.2430  0.2175    
ANGLOPLATDB1  0.0852  0.0773  1.1023  0.2736    
ANGLOPLATDB2  0.0966  0.0773  1.2506  0.2147    
ANGLOPLATDB3 -0.0343  0.0664 -0.5163  0.6070    
ANGLOPLATDB4  0.0002  0.0023  0.1019  0.9191    
ANGLOPLATDB5  0.0683  0.0452  1.5106  0.1348    
C  0.0550  0.1247  0.4409  0.6604    
EQANGLOPLATI Dep. Var: ANGLOPLATI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
ANGLOPLATIA1 -1.0423  0.1681 -6.2004  0.0000 0.4460 9.0170 0.0000 
ANGLOPLATIA2  1.0390  0.1671  6.2180  0.0000    
ANGLOPLATIA3  0.7829  0.1731  4.5234  0.0000    
ANGLOPLATIA4  0.9985  0.2173  4.5951  0.0000    
ANGLOPLATIA5  1.0752  0.1420  7.5718  0.0000    
ANGLOPLATIB1 -0.6346  0.1704 -3.7231  0.0003    
ANGLOPLATIB2 -0.8967  0.1995 -4.4940  0.0000    
ANGLOPLATIB3 -0.0005  0.0032 -0.1424  0.8870    
ANGLOPLATIB4 -0.0138  0.0991 -0.1397  0.8892    
ANGLOPLATIB5 -0.0991  0.0527 -1.8795  0.0628    
C  0.2092  0.1911  1.0949  0.2759    
EQARCMITTALD Dep. Var: ARCMITTALD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
ARCMITTALDA1  0.2058  0.1316  1.5639  0.1215 0.3070 3.8537 0.0002 
ARCMITTALDA2  1.5060  0.7312  2.0595  0.0424    
ARCMITTALDA3 -0.0728  0.1058 -0.6883  0.4931    
ARCMITTALDA4 -0.1434  0.0664 -2.1587  0.0336    
ARCMITTALDA5  0.0925  0.2082  0.4440  0.6581    
ARCMITTALDB1 -0.0451  0.0791 -0.5701  0.5701    
ARCMITTALDB2  0.1015  0.1221  0.8314  0.4080    
ARCMITTALDB3 -0.0696  0.0716 -0.9716  0.3340    
ARCMITTALDB4  0.0233  0.0725  0.3217  0.7484    
ARCMITTALDB5 -0.3426  0.0941 -3.6396  0.0005    
C  0.6359  0.3556  1.7885  0.0772    
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EQARCMITTALI Dep. Var: ARCMITTALI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
ARCMITTALIA1  0.0634  0.0461  1.3747  0.1825 0.8954 19.6858 0.0000 
ARCMITTALIA2 -0.2795  0.2954 -0.9461  0.3539    
ARCMITTALIA3 -0.7656  0.2669 -2.8686  0.0087    
ARCMITTALIA4 -1.0935  0.5175 -2.1132  0.0456    
ARCMITTALIA5  0.0557  0.0380  1.4664  0.1561    
ARCMITTALIB1  0.0142  0.0087  1.6282  0.1171    
ARCMITTALIB2  0.7042  0.2100  3.3538  0.0027    
ARCMITTALIB3 -0.5569  0.0883 -6.3079  0.0000    
ARCMITTALIB4 -0.5930  0.1957 -3.0296  0.0060    
ARCMITTALIB5  0.4819  0.3753  1.2838  0.2120    
C  0.4166  0.1887  2.2081  0.0375    
EQASPENI Dep. Var: ASPENI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
ASPENIA1 -0.0801  0.1019 -0.7868  0.4327 0.1036 1.6981 0.0862 
ASPENIA2 -0.6075  4.9789 -0.1220  0.9031    
ASPENIA3  0.0015  0.0910  0.0160  0.9873    
ASPENIA4  3.4067  5.8163  0.5857  0.5590    
ASPENIA5 -0.0446  15.5915 -0.0029  0.9977    
ASPENIB1 -1.1133  4.3981 -0.2531  0.8005    
ASPENIB2  4.9974  14.1367  0.3535  0.7242    
ASPENIB3  6.2219  5.3831  1.1558  0.2496    
ASPENIB4  8.7472  2.2555  3.8781  0.0002    
ASPENIB5 -0.1004  4.5926 -0.0219  0.9826    
C  15.0003  23.0703  0.6502  0.5166    
EQAVID Dep. Var: AVID      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
AVIDA1 -0.4162  0.0856 -4.8602  0.0000 0.7439 13.0729 0.0000 
AVIDB1 -0.0063  0.0146 -0.4299  0.6707    
AVIDB2  0.0090  0.0083  1.0931  0.2840    
AVIDB3 -0.7556  0.3446 -2.1930  0.0371    
AVIDB4 -0.7220  0.2017 -3.5794  0.0013    
AVIDB5  1.0354  0.2326  4.4512  0.0001    
C  0.1572  0.0635  2.4770  0.0198    
EQAVII Dep. Var: AVII      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
AVIIA1  0.8892  0.6201  1.4338  0.1571 0.2454 1.8535 0.0716 
AVIIA2 -0.3682  0.3973 -0.9266  0.3580    
AVIIA3 -1.0641  0.4184 -2.5431  0.0137    
AVIIA4 -0.0154  0.0290 -0.5316  0.5970    
AVIIA5  0.1346  0.0507  2.6565  0.0102    
AVIIB1 -0.7798  0.5127 -1.5210  0.1338    
AVIIB2  1.0325  0.4268  2.4191  0.0188    
AVIIB3  0.3692  0.3924  0.9410  0.3507    
AVIIB4 -0.0600  0.7313 -0.0820  0.9349    
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AVIIB5  0.5250  0.8126  0.6461  0.5208    
C  0.1625  0.2149  0.7562  0.4526    
EQBARLOWORLDD Dep. Var: BARLOWORLDD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
BARLOWORLDDA1  0.1868  0.0601  3.1096  0.0053 0.9251 25.9346 0.0000 
BARLOWORLDDA2  0.8133  0.5176  1.5712  0.1311    
BARLOWORLDDA3 -0.0323  0.1763 -0.1833  0.8563    
BARLOWORLDDA4  0.2257  0.0889  2.5386  0.0191    
BARLOWORLDDA5  1.3890  0.2563  5.4196  0.0000    
BARLOWORLDDB1  0.0140  0.0103  1.3603  0.1882    
BARLOWORLDDB2  0.9215  0.3310  2.7837  0.0111    
BARLOWORLDDB3 -0.0973  0.1768 -0.5502  0.5880    
BARLOWORLDDB4  0.3062  0.1330  2.3027  0.0316    
BARLOWORLDDB5  1.1246  0.3653  3.0784  0.0057    
C  0.0330  0.0750  0.4403  0.6642    
EQBARLOWORLDI Dep. Var: BARLOWORLDI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
BARLOWORLDIA1  0.3170  0.0976  3.2474  0.0039 0.9174 23.3256 0.0000 
BARLOWORLDIA2 -0.0225  0.0618 -0.3633  0.7200    
BARLOWORLDIA3  0.6285  0.2342  2.6833  0.0139    
BARLOWORLDIA4  0.2068  0.2641  0.7829  0.4424    
BARLOWORLDIA5  0.2848  0.2948  0.9659  0.3451    
BARLOWORLDIB1  0.0627  0.0351  1.7855  0.0886    
BARLOWORLDIB2 -0.2940  0.1292 -2.2764  0.0334    
BARLOWORLDIB3  0.0202  0.0336  0.6014  0.5540    
BARLOWORLDIB4  0.5668  0.1843  3.0761  0.0057    
BARLOWORLDIB5 -0.1686  0.1285 -1.3120  0.2037    
C  0.0245  0.0527  0.4654  0.6464    
EQBASILREADI Dep. Var: BASILREADI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
BASILREADIA1 -0.0291  0.0264 -1.1014  0.2739 0.2880 3.3983 0.0009 
BASILREADIA2 -0.0836  0.0268 -3.1162  0.0025    
BASILREADIA3 -0.0403  0.0320 -1.2577  0.2120    
BASILREADIA4 -0.0832  0.0540 -1.5404  0.1272    
BASILREADIA5 -0.1212  0.0573 -2.1146  0.0374    
BASILREADIB1 -0.4028  0.1096 -3.6769  0.0004    
BASILREADIB2 -0.0804  0.0263 -3.0629  0.0029    
BASILREADIB3 -0.0411  0.0835 -0.4917  0.6242    
BASILREADIB4  0.0291  0.0381  0.7642  0.4469    
BASILREADIB5 -0.0815  0.0956 -0.8526  0.3963    
C  0.2371  0.2089  1.1350  0.2596    
EQBIDVESTD Dep. Var: BIDVESTD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
BIDVESTDA1 -0.5668  0.2664 -2.1280  0.0382 0.6125 8.0616 0.0000 
BIDVESTDA2  1.6393  0.7762  2.1121  0.0396    
BIDVESTDA3 -6.4044  1.3379 -4.7869  0.0000    
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BIDVESTDA4  3.0415  1.1452  2.6558  0.0105    
BIDVESTDA5  8.9246  3.0218  2.9534  0.0047    
BIDVESTDB1 -0.6402  0.2536 -2.5243  0.0147    
BIDVESTDB2 -0.2648  0.3233 -0.8188  0.4167    
BIDVESTDB3 -0.0770  0.0583 -1.3210  0.1924    
BIDVESTDB4 -0.2573  0.0869 -2.9610  0.0046    
BIDVESTDB5  3.5367  0.8667  4.0808  0.0002    
C -0.5287  1.0257 -0.5155  0.6085    
EQBIDVESTI Dep. Var: BIDVESTI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
BIDVESTIA1 -1.2089  1.6038 -0.7538  0.4598 0.6735 4.1259 0.0034 
BIDVESTIA2 -0.2878  0.5174 -0.5563  0.5842    
BIDVESTIA3  3.9135  1.3960  2.8033  0.0110    
BIDVESTIA4  1.5161  1.3703  1.1064  0.2817    
BIDVESTIA5  0.4247  1.8420  0.2306  0.8200    
BIDVESTIB1 -0.0429  0.0814 -0.5268  0.6041    
BIDVESTIB2 -0.1593  0.1695 -0.9397  0.3586    
BIDVESTIB3  0.0971  1.5880  0.0611  0.9519    
BIDVESTIB4  0.2417  0.0764  3.1645  0.0049    
BIDVESTIB5 -0.0758  0.0413 -1.8348  0.0815    
C -0.2538  0.5115 -0.4962  0.6252    
EQBRAITD Dep. Var: BRAITD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
BRAITDA1 -0.0001  0.0001 -1.0131  0.3136 0.9513 183.5633 0.0000 
BRAITDA2  0.0000  0.0001  0.1677  0.8672    
BRAITDA3  0.0346  0.0660  0.5237  0.6017    
BRAITDA4 -0.0079  0.0196 -0.4007  0.6895    
BRAITDA5  0.9558  0.0318  30.0237  0.0000    
BRAITDB1 -0.0160  0.0048 -3.3229  0.0013    
BRAITDB2 -0.1138  0.0467 -2.4344  0.0168    
BRAITDB3 -0.0146  0.0122 -1.1980  0.2339    
BRAITDB4 -0.0128  0.0187 -0.6857  0.4946    
BRAITDB5 -0.0104  0.0107 -0.9734  0.3329    
C  0.1750  0.0590  2.9665  0.0038    
EQBRAITI Dep. Var: BRAITI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
BRAITIA1 -0.0653  0.0394 -1.6577  0.1017 0.9996 16603.8805 0.0000 
BRAITIA2  0.9829  0.0057  173.2841  0.0000    
BRAITIA3  0.0008  0.0001  7.0274  0.0000    
BRAITIA4 -0.0190  0.0065 -2.9255  0.0046    
BRAITIA5 -0.0646  0.0356 -1.8135  0.0739    
BRAITIB1 -0.1979  0.0522 -3.7930  0.0003    
BRAITIB2 -0.0086  0.0149 -0.5746  0.5673    
BRAITIB3  0.1616  0.0848  1.9054  0.0607    
BRAITIB4  0.0100  0.0131  0.7647  0.4469    
BRAITIB5  0.0022  0.0064  0.3440  0.7318    
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C  0.0135  0.0825  0.1636  0.8705    
EQCARGOI Dep. Var: CARGOI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
CARGOIA1 -0.2232  0.4344 -0.5139  0.6120 0.8483 19.1712 0.0000 
CARGOIA2 -0.1906  0.1088 -1.7520  0.0925    
CARGOIB1 -0.0208  0.2457 -0.0846  0.9333    
CARGOIB2 -0.3102  0.1063 -2.9186  0.0075    
CARGOIB3 -0.1524  0.1388 -1.0981  0.2831    
CARGOIB4  1.1896  0.1815  6.5541  0.0000    
CARGOIB5  0.0012  0.0777  0.0151  0.9881    
C -0.0913  0.0774 -1.1791  0.2499    
EQCASHBUILDD Dep. Var: CASHBUILDD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
CASHBUILDDA1 -2.5615  1.7328 -1.4782  0.1549 0.9804 100.2491 0.0000 
CASHBUILDDA2 -1.6350  0.4238 -3.8576  0.0010    
CASHBUILDDA3 -0.1147  0.0525 -2.1844  0.0410    
CASHBUILDDA4 -0.2567  0.0734 -3.4962  0.0023    
CASHBUILDDA5  0.0523  0.0731  0.7148  0.4830    
CASHBUILDDB1  0.1695  0.1030  1.6447  0.1157    
CASHBUILDDB2 -1.1000  0.7487 -1.4691  0.1574    
CASHBUILDDB3 -0.1048  0.0980 -1.0688  0.2979    
CASHBUILDDB4  0.2341  0.4923  0.4755  0.6396    
CASHBUILDDB5  5.1748  0.4043  12.8009  0.0000    
C -0.1547  0.2341 -0.6608  0.5163    
EQCASHBUILDI Dep. Var: CASHBUILDI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
CASHBUILDIA1 -2.1252  0.0864 -24.6102  0.0000 0.9852 139.5097 0.0000 
CASHBUILDIA2 -0.0411  0.2246 -0.1831  0.8564    
CASHBUILDIA3  6.2723  0.1831  34.2488  0.0000    
CASHBUILDIA4 -0.2273  0.1949 -1.1666  0.2564    
CASHBUILDIA5 -0.1962  0.1272 -1.5422  0.1380    
CASHBUILDIB1  0.0071  0.0039  1.8381  0.0802    
CASHBUILDIB2  1.3316  0.5375  2.4774  0.0218    
CASHBUILDIB3  0.1493  0.1581  0.9445  0.3557    
CASHBUILDIB4  3.2624  3.4440  0.9473  0.3543    
CASHBUILDIB5 -0.9234  1.3357 -0.6913  0.4969    
C  0.6426  0.6032  1.0653  0.2988    
EQCAXTONI Dep. Var: CAXTONI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
CAXTONIA1 -0.8872  0.2159 -4.1083  0.0005 0.7555 8.1095 0.0001 
CAXTONIA2 -0.3214  0.2813 -1.1423  0.2662    
CAXTONIA3  2.2770  0.9023  2.5235  0.0197    
CAXTONIB1 -0.5020  0.1577 -3.1835  0.0045    
CAXTONIB2  0.0548  0.0423  1.2947  0.2095    
CAXTONIB3  0.0573  0.0407  1.4086  0.1736    
CAXTONIB4 -1.1703  0.4735 -2.4718  0.0221    
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CAXTONIB5  0.1217  0.0500  2.4335  0.0240    
C  0.1793  0.0617  2.9041  0.0085    
EQCMHD Dep. Var: CMHD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
CMHDA1 -0.5221  0.1685 -3.0981  0.0033 0.5137 5.0712 0.0001 
CMHDA2  0.1103  0.1217  0.9057  0.3696    
CMHDA3  0.0636  0.1000  0.6359  0.5279    
CMHDA4 -0.0542  0.1087 -0.4992  0.6199    
CMHDA5 -0.1115  0.1324 -0.8420  0.4040    
CMHDB1  0.0812  0.0797  1.0199  0.3129    
CMHDB2 -0.2151  0.0785 -2.7421  0.0086    
CMHDB3 -0.0639  0.0966 -0.6618  0.5113    
CMHDB4 -0.0463  0.0985 -0.4700  0.6405    
CMHDB5 -0.0554  0.1399 -0.3960  0.6938    
C  0.0692  0.0652  1.0620  0.2935    
EQCROOKESD Dep. Var: CROOKESD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
CROOKESDA1  0.1239  0.0899  1.3782  0.1722 0.8800 55.7084 0.0000 
CROOKESDA2  0.1894  0.0490  3.8636  0.0002    
CROOKESDA3  0.2096  0.0763  2.7479  0.0075    
CROOKESDA4  0.8804  0.0600  14.6688  0.0000    
CROOKESDA5  1.0249  0.0725  14.1267  0.0000    
CROOKESDB1 -0.2325  0.0497 -4.6764  0.0000    
CROOKESDB2 -0.0215  0.0292 -0.7382  0.4627    
CROOKESDB3  0.0281  0.0351  0.8011  0.4255    
CROOKESDB4 -0.4091  0.0800 -5.1160  0.0000    
CROOKESDB5 -0.0175  0.0660 -0.2650  0.7917    
C -0.0312  0.0788 -0.3961  0.6932    
EQCROOKESI Dep. Var: CROOKESI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
CROOKESIA1 -0.2143  0.1348 -1.5905  0.1145 0.7365 31.5891 0.0000 
CROOKESIA2 -0.0183  0.1057 -0.1734  0.8627    
CROOKESIA3  0.8535  0.0536  15.9261  0.0000    
CROOKESIA4  0.0902  0.0590  1.5301  0.1288    
CROOKESIA5  0.0272  0.1169  0.2328  0.8163    
CROOKESIB1 -0.0102  0.0393 -0.2589  0.7962    
CROOKESIB2 -0.0035  0.0740 -0.0479  0.9619    
CROOKESIB3 -0.4174  0.0712 -5.8655  0.0000    
CROOKESIB4  0.0940  0.0373  2.5187  0.0132    
CROOKESIB5  0.0824  0.0396  2.0832  0.0395    
C  0.2784  0.0922  3.0214  0.0031    
EQCULINAND Dep. Var: CULINAND      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
CULINANDA1 -0.7063  0.3553 -1.9877  0.0532 0.8874 33.8793 0.0000 
CULINANDA2 -0.0381  0.0377 -1.0088  0.3187    
CULINANDA3  0.0102  0.5981  0.0171  0.9864    
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CULINANDA4  0.2522  0.3492  0.7223  0.4740    
CULINANDA5  0.8920  0.0723  12.3365  0.0000    
CULINANDB1  0.1532  0.1813  0.8453  0.4026    
CULINANDB2 -0.6309  0.1379 -4.5746  0.0000    
CULINANDB3  0.2828  0.1286  2.1987  0.0333    
CULINANDB4  0.0001  0.0354  0.0024  0.9981    
CULINANDB5 -0.0675  0.1112 -0.6070  0.5471    
C  0.0825  0.2631  0.3134  0.7555    
EQCULINANI Dep. Var: CULINANI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
CULINANIA1 -0.0009  0.0106 -0.0860  0.9317 0.5080 6.8149 0.0000 
CULINANIA2  0.0243  0.0497  0.4886  0.6267    
CULINANIA3 -0.3606  0.0954 -3.7779  0.0003    
CULINANIA4 -0.0060  0.0107 -0.5601  0.5773    
CULINANIA5  0.4697  0.2283  2.0576  0.0436    
CULINANIB1  0.0125  0.0521  0.2401  0.8110    
CULINANIB2  0.0366  0.0106  3.4538  0.0010    
CULINANIB3 -0.0610  0.0120 -5.0771  0.0000    
CULINANIB4 -0.0916  0.1655 -0.5536  0.5817    
CULINANIB5  0.0304  0.0088  3.4447  0.0010    
C  0.4014  0.2912  1.3781  0.1728    
EQDELTAD Dep. Var: DELTAD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
DELTADA1 -0.1040  0.1696 -0.6132  0.5430 0.5463 5.1771 0.0001 
DELTADA2 -1.3828  0.4040 -3.4225  0.0014    
DELTADA3  0.0547  0.1484  0.3685  0.7143    
DELTADA4  2.3293  1.0876  2.1417  0.0379    
DELTADA5  0.0733  0.7497  0.0977  0.9226    
DELTADB1 -4.1967  1.2208 -3.4376  0.0013    
DELTADB2  0.1256  0.1779  0.7060  0.4840    
DELTADB3 -0.4116  0.5943 -0.6926  0.4923    
DELTADB4 -0.2501  0.1772 -1.4117  0.1652    
DELTADB5 -0.1397  0.1724 -0.8106  0.4221    
C  0.2221  0.3946  0.5629  0.5764    
EQDELTAI Dep. Var: DELTAI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
DELTAIA1  0.1493  0.1517  0.9846  0.3281 0.8335 36.0400 0.0000 
DELTAIA2 -0.7352  0.6251 -1.1761  0.2434    
DELTAIA3 -1.3022  0.5473 -2.3794  0.0200    
DELTAIA4  1.6002  0.5039  3.1756  0.0022    
DELTAIA5 -0.5220  0.4501 -1.1598  0.2500    
DELTAIB1 -0.2364  0.1331 -1.7758  0.0800    
DELTAIB2  0.0226  0.1179  0.1913  0.8488    
DELTAIB3  0.0836  0.3262  0.2563  0.7984    
DELTAIB4  0.8967  0.4337  2.0678  0.0423    
DELTAIB5  4.0495  0.2333  17.3562  0.0000    
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C  0.2993  0.2702  1.1076  0.2717    
EQDISTELLI Dep. Var: DISTELLI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
DISTELLIA1 -5.0673  4.2142 -1.2024  0.2350 0.3045 2.1448 0.0381 
DISTELLIA2  22.0501  5.7752  3.8181  0.0004    
DISTELLIA3 -21.9262  7.8743 -2.7845  0.0076    
DISTELLIA4  5.0558  7.4286  0.6806  0.4993    
DISTELLIA5  15.7867  8.1779  1.9304  0.0594    
DISTELLIB1  4.2371  1.4888  2.8460  0.0064    
DISTELLIB2  13.7373  11.9473  1.1498  0.2558    
DISTELLIB3  4.0689  11.1394  0.3653  0.7165    
DISTELLIB4 -17.4711  14.0957 -1.2395  0.2211    
DISTELLIB5 -2.7102  4.0723 -0.6655  0.5088    
C  0.0819  5.0454  0.0162  0.9871    
EQEHSVI Dep. Var: EHSVI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
EHSVIA1  0.2898  0.5429  0.5339  0.5949 0.1807 1.7423 0.0857 
EHSVIA2 -0.0113  0.1233 -0.0914  0.9274    
EHSVIA3 -0.3343  0.4377 -0.7638  0.4473    
EHSVIA4  0.0432  0.1100  0.3927  0.6956    
EHSVIA5  0.0254  0.0861  0.2946  0.7691    
EHSVIB1 -0.2096  0.1757 -1.1925  0.2366    
EHSVIB2  0.8333  0.2800  2.9759  0.0039    
EHSVIB3  0.2947  0.3097  0.9517  0.3442    
EHSVIB4  0.5809  0.4835  1.2015  0.2331    
EHSVIB5 -1.1400  0.6331 -1.8008  0.0756    
C -3.1281  1.1524 -2.7143  0.0082    
EQELBI Dep. Var: ELBI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
ELBIA1  0.0094  0.0203  0.4603  0.6465 0.4715 7.5845 0.0000 
ELBIA2 -0.1119  0.1083 -1.0332  0.3044    
ELBIA3 -0.0051  0.0385 -0.1319  0.8954    
ELBIA4  0.7508  0.0982  7.6486  0.0000    
ELBIA5  0.0433  0.0842  0.5144  0.6083    
ELBIB1 -0.0591  0.1187 -0.4981  0.6197    
ELBIB2  0.0437  0.0371  1.1781  0.2420    
ELBIB3 -0.0922  0.1012 -0.9112  0.3648    
ELBIB4  0.5134  0.1246  4.1221  0.0001    
ELBIB5 -0.0742  0.0863 -0.8596  0.3924    
C  0.9974  0.3310  3.0133  0.0034    
EQFPTD Dep. Var: FPTD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
FPTDA1  0.0881  0.1337  0.6591  0.5223 0.9459 20.9730 0.0000 
FPTDA2 -0.1598  0.1266 -1.2617  0.2310    
FPTDA3  0.1399  0.0837  1.6718  0.1204    
FPTDA4  0.4968  0.2949  1.6847  0.1179    
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FPTDA5 -0.5929  0.2675 -2.2165  0.0467    
FPTDB1  0.3229  0.3287  0.9822  0.3454    
FPTDB2  0.0230  0.0563  0.4090  0.6897    
FPTDB3  0.4691  0.0972  4.8250  0.0004    
FPTDB4  0.1998  0.3491  0.5724  0.5776    
FPTDB5 -0.3849  0.1483 -2.5953  0.0234    
C  0.0204  0.0632  0.3237  0.7517    
EQFPTI Dep. Var: FPTI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
FPTIA1 -0.4832  0.0892 -5.4188  0.0000 0.9725 226.6681 0.0000 
FPTIA2  0.3775  0.0949  3.9766  0.0002    
FPTIA3 -1.0056  0.2198 -4.5752  0.0000    
FPTIA4  0.8898  0.0281  31.6292  0.0000    
FPTIA5  0.5299  0.0841  6.2982  0.0000    
FPTIB1  0.0075  0.1521  0.0496  0.9606    
FPTIB2  0.2745  0.2579  1.0645  0.2911    
FPTIB3 -0.0055  0.0488 -0.1135  0.9100    
FPTIB4 -0.0135  0.0318 -0.4258  0.6717    
FPTIB5 -0.3746  0.0632 -5.9311  0.0000    
C  0.1210  0.0460  2.6283  0.0107    
EQGOLDFIELDSD Dep. Var: GOLDFIELDSD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
GOLDFIELDSDA1  0.0004  0.0009  0.4770  0.6355 0.3697 2.8159 0.0079 
GOLDFIELDSDA2 -0.5833  0.2280 -2.5581  0.0137    
GOLDFIELDSDA3 -0.0554  0.0484 -1.1444  0.2581    
GOLDFIELDSDA4  0.2446  0.1625  1.5051  0.1389    
GOLDFIELDSDA5 -0.3607  0.3549 -1.0163  0.3146    
GOLDFIELDSDB1  0.0046  0.1278  0.0363  0.9712    
GOLDFIELDSDB2  0.2817  0.3429  0.8215  0.4154    
GOLDFIELDSDB3 -0.3188  0.2086 -1.5281  0.1331    
GOLDFIELDSDB4  0.0282  0.0139  2.0289  0.0480    
GOLDFIELDSDB5  0.5857  0.2271  2.5791  0.0130    
C -0.3608  0.2321 -1.5542  0.1267    
EQGOLDFIELDSI Dep. Var: GOLDFIELDSI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
GOLDFIELDSIA1 -0.0195  0.1073 -0.1814  0.8567 0.3433 2.7702 0.0079 
GOLDFIELDSIA2  0.0689  0.0623  1.1058  0.2738    
GOLDFIELDSIA3 -0.4152  0.1784 -2.3269  0.0238    
GOLDFIELDSIA4 -0.0675  0.0623 -1.0842  0.2832    
GOLDFIELDSIA5 -0.0092  0.1115 -0.0826  0.9345    
GOLDFIELDSIB1 -0.1214  0.1450 -0.8375  0.4061    
GOLDFIELDSIB2  0.0087  0.0080  1.0921  0.2797    
GOLDFIELDSIB3 -0.0073  0.0085 -0.8530  0.3975    
GOLDFIELDSIB4 -0.0568  0.1290 -0.4399  0.6618    
GOLDFIELDSIB5  0.2292  0.0742  3.0905  0.0032    
C  0.0014  0.1687  0.0082  0.9935    
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EQGRINDRODD Dep. Var: GRINDRODD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
GRINDRODDA1 -0.6329  0.1205 -5.2527  0.0000 0.7462 16.7606 0.0000 
GRINDRODDA2 -0.3570  0.2365 -1.5092  0.1368    
GRINDRODDA3 -0.1308  0.0135 -9.7151  0.0000    
GRINDRODDA4  0.2812  0.1362  2.0645  0.0435    
GRINDRODDA5 -0.0841  0.2313 -0.3638  0.7174    
GRINDRODDB1  0.1912  0.2030  0.9418  0.3503    
GRINDRODDB2 -0.0484  0.1116 -0.4334  0.6664    
GRINDRODDB3  0.0769  0.0568  1.3551  0.1807    
GRINDRODDB4 -0.1809  0.0990 -1.8265  0.0730    
GRINDRODDB5  0.4662  0.1614  2.8879  0.0055    
C  0.1657  0.1185  1.3981  0.1675    
EQGRINDRODI Dep. Var: GRINDRODI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
GRINDRODIA1 -0.2374  0.2377 -0.9984  0.3209 0.3976 5.6094 0.0000 
GRINDRODIA2  0.1230  0.1878  0.6547  0.5144    
GRINDRODIA3  0.0334  0.0834  0.4003  0.6900    
GRINDRODIA4 -0.1987  0.0511 -3.8878  0.0002    
GRINDRODIA5 -0.0743  0.2153 -0.3450  0.7309    
GRINDRODIB1 -0.0929  0.0382 -2.4292  0.0172    
GRINDRODIB2  0.0591  0.0774  0.7641  0.4469    
GRINDRODIB3  0.0882  0.1192  0.7400  0.4613    
GRINDRODIB4  1.3924  0.1987  7.0082  0.0000    
GRINDRODIB5 -0.0220  0.0853 -0.2575  0.7974    
C -0.0318  0.2816 -0.1129  0.9104    
EQGROUP5I Dep. Var: GROUP5I      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
GROUP5IA1 -0.3517  0.1936 -1.8165  0.0728 0.4229 6.2290 0.0000 
GROUP5IA2 -0.7339  0.1294 -5.6711  0.0000    
GROUP5IA3  0.0158  0.5120  0.0309  0.9754    
GROUP5IA4  0.5677  0.2992  1.8975  0.0612    
GROUP5IA5  0.0390  0.0546  0.7142  0.4771    
GROUP5IB1 -0.1065  0.1010 -1.0549  0.2945    
GROUP5IB2  0.2750  0.3566  0.7710  0.4428    
GROUP5IB3  0.0879  0.0335  2.6203  0.0104    
GROUP5IB4 -0.1128  0.0497 -2.2680  0.0259    
GROUP5IB5  1.0320  0.1558  6.6253  0.0000    
C  0.4891  0.1744  2.8038  0.0063    
EQHARMONYD Dep. Var: HARMONYD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
HARMONYDA1 -0.0989  0.0342 -2.8906  0.0056 0.8672 33.9495 0.0000 
HARMONYDA2 -0.0062  0.2867 -0.0217  0.9828    
HARMONYDA3 -0.1364  0.0768 -1.7758  0.0816    
HARMONYDA4 -0.0236  0.1656 -0.1427  0.8871    
HARMONYDA5  0.8511  0.1116  7.6241  0.0000    
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HARMONYDB1 -0.2661  0.1652 -1.6104  0.1134    
HARMONYDB2 -0.8899  0.1146 -7.7679  0.0000    
HARMONYDB3 -0.1421  0.1154 -1.2313  0.2238    
HARMONYDB4 -0.7654  0.0761 -10.0595  0.0000    
HARMONYDB5 -0.0189  0.0123 -1.5370  0.1304    
C  0.6674  0.2632  2.5355  0.0143    
EQHARMONYI Dep. Var: HARMONYI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
HARMONYIA1 -0.6703  0.4349 -1.5414  0.1274 0.2912 3.0806 0.0025 
HARMONYIA2  0.2704  0.2765  0.9777  0.3314    
HARMONYIA3 -0.4334  0.3126 -1.3867  0.1696    
HARMONYIA4  2.5145  0.7317  3.4364  0.0010    
HARMONYIA5 -0.6610  0.3412 -1.9375  0.0565    
HARMONYIB1  0.0251  0.2651  0.0945  0.9250    
HARMONYIB2 -0.2685  0.3843 -0.6987  0.4869    
HARMONYIB3 -0.0493  0.0770 -0.6397  0.5243    
HARMONYIB4  0.0522  0.0648  0.8055  0.4231    
HARMONYIB5  0.7278  0.2834  2.5678  0.0122    
C  0.1280  0.8974  0.1426  0.8870    
EQHCII Dep. Var: HCII      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
HCIIA1  0.6673  0.0802  8.3225  0.0000 0.2507 7.1272 0.0000 
HCIIA2 -0.0014  0.0154 -0.0936  0.9255    
HCIIA3 -0.0213  0.1474 -0.1444  0.8853    
HCIIA4  0.0329  0.3773  0.0872  0.9306    
HCIIA5 -0.0018  0.1682 -0.0107  0.9915    
HCIIB1 -0.0346  0.1321 -0.2620  0.7936    
HCIIB2  0.0054  0.0110  0.4917  0.6234    
HCIIB3 -0.0259  0.0595 -0.4351  0.6639    
HCIIB4 -0.0042  0.0110 -0.3798  0.7044    
HCIIB5 -0.0018  0.0110 -0.1652  0.8690    
C  0.9683  1.0780  0.8982  0.3701    
EQHUDACOD Dep. Var: HUDACOD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
HUDACODB1 -0.0485  0.0293 -1.6563  0.1092 0.9036 50.6235 0.0000 
HUDACODB2 -0.7981  0.0616 -12.9651  0.0000    
HUDACODB3  0.2298  0.3429  0.6701  0.5085    
HUDACODB4 -0.4835  0.3869 -1.2495  0.2222    
HUDACODB5 -0.3101  0.2083 -1.4887  0.1481    
C  0.0293  0.1237  0.2371  0.8144    
EQHUDACOI Dep. Var: HUDACOI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
HUDACOIA1  0.6529  6.3788  0.1024  0.9189 0.3029 2.0855 0.0444 
HUDACOIA2  0.2379  25.0196  0.0095  0.9925    
HUDACOIA3  16.0893  22.4419  0.7169  0.4769    
HUDACOIA4  2.9306  7.7625  0.3775  0.7074    
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HUDACOIA5 -1.2373  1.9348 -0.6395  0.5255    
HUDACOIB1 -94.3699  22.1955 -4.2518  0.0001    
HUDACOIB2 -21.5291  24.0921 -0.8936  0.3760    
HUDACOIB3 -2.2573  13.7905 -0.1637  0.8707    
HUDACOIB4 -13.7379  25.0842 -0.5477  0.5865    
HUDACOIB5 -32.6858  26.9731 -1.2118  0.2315    
C  26.4990  8.1279  3.2602  0.0021    
EQHYPROPD Dep. Var: HYPROPD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
HYPROPDA1 -0.4019  0.1902 -2.1124  0.0379 0.5407 8.9479 0.0000 
HYPROPDA2  1.0099  0.2966  3.4052  0.0011    
HYPROPDA3 -0.0443  0.2966 -0.1495  0.8816    
HYPROPDA4 -0.2976  0.3536 -0.8416  0.4026    
HYPROPDA5 -0.2231  0.1827 -1.2207  0.2260    
HYPROPDB1  0.7883  0.1059  7.4433  0.0000    
HYPROPDB2  0.0004  0.0950  0.0045  0.9964    
HYPROPDB3 -0.0421  0.1628 -0.2584  0.7968    
HYPROPDB4 -0.0104  0.0629 -0.1655  0.8690    
HYPROPDB5 -0.1071  0.2879 -0.3721  0.7108    
C -0.0607  0.2959 -0.2052  0.8379    
EQIMPERIALD Dep. Var: IMPERIALD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
IMPERIALDA1 -0.0491  0.0166 -2.9643  0.0083 0.8591 10.9789 0.0000 
IMPERIALDA2  0.1005  0.1192  0.8431  0.4102    
IMPERIALDA3 -0.7753  0.2582 -3.0024  0.0076    
IMPERIALDA4 -0.0070  0.3859 -0.0181  0.9858    
IMPERIALDA5  0.6165  0.1199  5.1402  0.0001    
IMPERIALDB1  0.0008  0.2135  0.0038  0.9970    
IMPERIALDB2  0.1055  0.1209  0.8727  0.3943    
IMPERIALDB3  0.2230  0.1662  1.3417  0.1964    
IMPERIALDB4  1.3729  0.4125  3.3279  0.0037    
IMPERIALDB5 -0.2403  0.2617 -0.9183  0.3706    
C  0.0639  0.1166  0.5480  0.5904    
EQIMPERIALI Dep. Var: IMPERIALI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
IMPERIALIA1 -3.5227  0.7263 -4.8503  0.0000 0.5685 10.9341 0.0000 
IMPERIALIA2  0.4541  0.4798  0.9465  0.3467    
IMPERIALIA3 -1.7374  0.4094 -4.2442  0.0001    
IMPERIALIA4 -0.5482  0.2995 -1.8303  0.0708    
IMPERIALIA5  2.1249  0.2822  7.5289  0.0000    
IMPERIALIB1 -0.0284  0.0737 -0.3850  0.7012    
IMPERIALIB2  0.0014  0.0619  0.0218  0.9826    
IMPERIALIB3  0.8519  0.4943  1.7235  0.0885    
IMPERIALIB4  1.1005  0.3137  3.5079  0.0007    
IMPERIALIB5  0.2157  0.3311  0.6515  0.5165    
C -0.1294  0.4510 -0.2868  0.7750    
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EQIMPLATSI Dep. Var: IMPLATSI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
IMPLATSIA1 -0.4200  0.7869 -0.5337  0.5949 0.4462 6.7683 0.0000 
IMPLATSIA2  1.2921  1.5029  0.8597  0.3924    
IMPLATSIA3 -8.4007  2.6657 -3.1514  0.0023    
IMPLATSIA4 -2.3848  2.4462 -0.9749  0.3324    
IMPLATSIA5  0.9267  0.5002  1.8527  0.0674    
IMPLATSIB1  4.9108  2.2196  2.2125  0.0296    
IMPLATSIB2  11.6051  2.1946  5.2880  0.0000    
IMPLATSIB3 -0.1752  0.0889 -1.9706  0.0521    
IMPLATSIB4  4.9186  3.1837  1.5449  0.1261    
IMPLATSIB5  4.1725  1.8834  2.2154  0.0294    
C -4.1270  1.3518 -3.0529  0.0030    
EQINVESTECD Dep. Var: INVESTECD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
INVESTECDA1  0.8348  0.2095  3.9840  0.0010 0.8842 12.9865 0.0000 
INVESTECDA2  0.7563  0.2192  3.4501  0.0031    
INVESTECDA3  0.7665  0.1720  4.4556  0.0003    
INVESTECDA4  0.0843  0.1786  0.4723  0.6427    
INVESTECDA5 -0.3489  0.1847 -1.8885  0.0761    
INVESTECDB1 -0.2957  0.0424 -6.9746  0.0000    
INVESTECDB2 -0.0880  0.1808 -0.4870  0.6325    
INVESTECDB3 -0.1855  0.1863 -0.9959  0.3332    
INVESTECDB4  0.0016  0.0174  0.0928  0.9271    
INVESTECDB5  0.5898  0.2153  2.7401  0.0140    
C  0.2011  0.1228  1.6376  0.1199    
EQINVESTECI Dep. Var: INVESTECI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
INVESTECIA1 -0.5785  0.1699 -3.4051  0.0014 0.6392 8.1499 0.0000 
INVESTECIA2  0.2601  0.2793  0.9316  0.3564    
INVESTECIA3  0.2437  0.1925  1.2658  0.2120    
INVESTECIA4 -0.0751  0.0359 -2.0930  0.0419    
INVESTECIA5  2.4597  0.6968  3.5299  0.0010    
INVESTECIB1 -0.9485  0.3078 -3.0817  0.0035    
INVESTECIB2  1.0607  0.3306  3.2088  0.0024    
INVESTECIB3  0.0422  0.0170  2.4842  0.0167    
INVESTECIB4 -0.0692  0.1300 -0.5322  0.5971    
INVESTECIB5 -0.0114  0.0080 -1.4271  0.1603    
C  0.5194  0.2695  1.9271  0.0602    
EQITALTILEI Dep. Var: ITALTILEI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
ITALTILEIA1 -1.1545  0.2357 -4.8990  0.0001 0.6864 5.1080 0.0010 
ITALTILEIA2  2.1488  0.8730  2.4614  0.0226    
ITALTILEIA3 -3.7100  1.7937 -2.0684  0.0511    
ITALTILEIA4 -0.2456  0.1394 -1.7620  0.0926    
ITALTILEIB1  0.0184  0.0174  1.0573  0.3024    
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ITALTILEIB2  0.0043  0.0097  0.4437  0.6618    
ITALTILEIB3  0.8304  0.3719  2.2327  0.0366    
ITALTILEIB4  0.3281  0.7012  0.4679  0.6447    
ITALTILEIB5  0.0311  0.0308  1.0085  0.3247    
C  0.2862  0.1613  1.7748  0.0904    
EQJASCOD Dep. Var: JASCOD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
JASCODA1  0.0014  0.0185  0.0766  0.9391 0.6337 24.2191 0.0000 
JASCODA2 -0.0005  0.0019 -0.2404  0.8104    
JASCODA3  0.0003  0.0019  0.1754  0.8610    
JASCODA4  0.0002  0.0019  0.0902  0.9282    
JASCODA5 -0.0003  0.0019 -0.1706  0.8648    
JASCODB1 -0.0051  0.0183 -0.2771  0.7821    
JASCODB2  0.0018  0.0183  0.0988  0.9215    
JASCODB3  0.0086  0.0190  0.4532  0.6511    
JASCODB4 -0.2845  0.0222 -12.7985  0.0000    
JASCODB5 -0.1844  0.1509 -1.2219  0.2238    
C  0.6251  0.3190  1.9595  0.0520    
EQJASCOI Dep. Var: JASCOI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
JASCOIA1  0.0168  0.0209  0.8003  0.4258 0.3380 4.3393 0.0001 
JASCOIA2 -1.2075  1.0764 -1.1218  0.2651    
JASCOIA3 -0.3442  1.2018 -0.2864  0.7752    
JASCOIA4  1.0398  2.3148  0.4492  0.6544    
JASCOIA5  0.5669  0.1623  3.4934  0.0008    
JASCOIB1  0.5077  1.5649  0.3244  0.7464    
JASCOIB2  0.1858  2.9169  0.0637  0.9494    
JASCOIB3  5.2994  3.1449  1.6851  0.0956    
JASCOIB4  0.1840  0.8563  0.2149  0.8304    
JASCOIB5  0.1687  0.7351  0.2295  0.8191    
C -5.0218  3.5870 -1.4000  0.1651    
EQLIBHOLDD Dep. Var: LIBHOLDD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
LIBHOLDDA1  0.0038  0.0172  0.2224  0.8244 0.5151 11.0495 0.0000 
LIBHOLDDA2 -0.2557  0.0525 -4.8713  0.0000    
LIBHOLDDA3 -0.1533  0.0530 -2.8919  0.0047    
LIBHOLDDA4 -0.1696  0.0245 -6.9326  0.0000    
LIBHOLDDA5 -0.0143  0.0174 -0.8243  0.4116    
LIBHOLDDB1 -0.1324  0.0311 -4.2610  0.0000    
LIBHOLDDB2  0.5977  0.2184  2.7364  0.0073    
LIBHOLDDB3 -0.0797  0.0538 -1.4805  0.1418    
LIBHOLDDB4  0.0191  0.0393  0.4847  0.6289    
LIBHOLDDB5  0.3215  0.3249  0.9896  0.3247    
C  0.3878  0.1373  2.8253  0.0057    
EQLONFIND Dep. Var: LONFIND      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
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LONFINDA1  0.1510  0.3717  0.4063  0.6864 0.9315 63.9101 0.0000 
LONFINDA2  0.6635  0.0814  8.1479  0.0000    
LONFINDA3 -0.5066  0.5334 -0.9496  0.3472    
LONFINDA4  0.0834  0.1302  0.6404  0.5250    
LONFINDA5  0.8739  0.1978  4.4175  0.0001    
LONFINDB1 -0.0496  0.0932 -0.5321  0.5971    
LONFINDB2 -0.6057  0.1748 -3.4641  0.0011    
LONFINDB3 -0.6265  0.1030 -6.0847  0.0000    
LONFINDB4 -0.6314  0.4103 -1.5388  0.1305    
LONFINDB5 -0.3897  0.1296 -3.0073  0.0042    
C  0.1414  0.1338  1.0569  0.2960    
EQLONFINI Dep. Var: LONFINI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
LONFINIA1 -0.0759  0.0611 -1.2412  0.2173 0.4173 7.5198 0.0000 
LONFINIA2 -0.2462  0.0640 -3.8499  0.0002    
LONFINIA3 -0.0583  0.0508 -1.1483  0.2535    
LONFINIA4 -0.1529  0.0840 -1.8212  0.0714    
LONFINIA5  0.0301  0.0829  0.3637  0.7168    
LONFINIB1 -0.0852  0.0351 -2.4297  0.0168    
LONFINIB2 -0.1389  0.0343 -4.0478  0.0001    
LONFINIB3 -0.0001  0.0004 -0.2404  0.8105    
LONFINIB4  0.2783  0.1184  2.3506  0.0206    
LONFINIB5 -0.0078  0.0592 -0.1318  0.8954    
C  0.0367  0.0922  0.3983  0.6913    
EQLONMIND Dep. Var: LONMIND      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
LONMINDA1 -0.4029  0.2929 -1.3755  0.1725 0.2279 2.5384 0.0099 
LONMINDA2  0.1998  0.1511  1.3224  0.1895    
LONMINDA3  0.3009  0.1749  1.7208  0.0889    
LONMINDA4  0.0773  0.2028  0.3812  0.7040    
LONMINDA5 -0.0329  0.0409 -0.8045  0.4234    
LONMINDB1 -0.2175  0.1322 -1.6447  0.1037    
LONMINDB2  0.5828  0.2444  2.3848  0.0193    
LONMINDB3 -0.0112  0.2097 -0.0532  0.9577    
LONMINDB4 -0.2396  0.1498 -1.5990  0.1135    
LONMINDB5 -0.2010  0.1512 -1.3291  0.1873    
C  0.5190  0.2349  2.2096  0.0298    
EQMEDICLINICD Dep. Var: MEDICLINICD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
MEDICLINICDA1 -4.0292  1.4555 -2.7683  0.0069 0.1773 1.8965 0.0561 
MEDICLINICDA2  0.7493  0.7674  0.9765  0.3315    
MEDICLINICDA3  1.0957  1.6387  0.6687  0.5055    
MEDICLINICDA4 -3.7651  3.5936 -1.0477  0.2976    
MEDICLINICDA5  0.5315  1.3808  0.3849  0.7012    
MEDICLINICDB1  1.1634  1.3875  0.8385  0.4040    
MEDICLINICDB2 -0.2100  0.3513 -0.5978  0.5515    
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MEDICLINICDB3  1.2660  1.5297  0.8276  0.4101    
MEDICLINICDB4  1.9604  1.5037  1.3037  0.1958    
MEDICLINICDB5 -0.1758  0.3436 -0.5116  0.6102    
C -0.5830  1.2241 -0.4763  0.6351    
EQMERAFEI Dep. Var: MERAFEI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
MERAFEIA1  0.2174  0.1780  1.2216  0.2238 0.2297 4.3825 0.0000 
MERAFEIA2 -0.2166  0.1780 -1.2166  0.2257    
MERAFEIA3 -0.0083  0.0039 -2.1001  0.0374    
MERAFEIA4  0.0017  0.0075  0.2228  0.8240    
MERAFEIA5 -0.0243  0.0073 -3.3498  0.0010    
MERAFEIB1  0.0181  0.0817  0.2218  0.8248    
MERAFEIB2  0.2788  0.0635  4.3890  0.0000    
MERAFEIB3 -0.0463  0.0794 -0.5830  0.5608    
MERAFEIB4 -0.0067  0.0240 -0.2778  0.7816    
MERAFEIB5 -0.0157  0.0239 -0.6558  0.5130    
C  0.1883  0.4181  0.4503  0.6532    
EQMETAIRD Dep. Var: METAIRD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
METAIRDA1 -0.3459  0.2363 -1.4637  0.1568 0.8936 19.3190 0.0000 
METAIRDA2  0.0151  0.1072  0.1404  0.8896    
METAIRDA3  0.1056  0.1028  1.0271  0.3151    
METAIRDA4 -0.0014  0.0049 -0.2869  0.7767    
METAIRDA5 -0.0289  0.0481 -0.6011  0.5537    
METAIRDB1 -0.3480  0.1468 -2.3706  0.0265    
METAIRDB2 -0.0187  0.0576 -0.3244  0.7486    
METAIRDB3  0.4290  0.0810  5.2976  0.0000    
METAIRDB4  0.5576  0.1310  4.2554  0.0003    
METAIRDB5  0.1407  0.0277  5.0733  0.0000    
C  0.1045  0.0667  1.5671  0.1308    
EQMETAIRI Dep. Var: METAIRI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
METAIRIA1  1.0664  0.1652  6.4562  0.0000 0.8189 25.7714 0.0000 
METAIRIA2  1.0663  0.2152  4.9545  0.0000    
METAIRIA3  0.2355  0.3060  0.7697  0.4447    
METAIRIA4  0.1050  0.1160  0.9056  0.3690    
METAIRIA5 -0.0543  0.1420 -0.3824  0.7036    
METAIRIB1 -0.2759  0.1972 -1.3992  0.1672    
METAIRIB2 -0.0681  0.0573 -1.1883  0.2396    
METAIRIB3 -1.1143  0.1792 -6.2169  0.0000    
METAIRIB4  0.1358  0.0710  1.9147  0.0606    
METAIRIB5  0.0635  0.1413  0.4492  0.6550    
C  0.2881  0.1491  1.9329  0.0582    
EQMRI Dep. Var: M_RHLDI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
M_RHLDIA1  0.0374  0.0645  0.5806  0.5639 0.8968 47.8173 0.0000 
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M_RHLDIA2 -0.0041  0.0054 -0.7597  0.4506    
M_RHLDIA3  0.0690  0.0462  1.4929  0.1412    
M_RHLDIA4 -0.0554  0.0640 -0.8663  0.3901    
M_RHLDIA5  0.9777  0.0713  13.7195  0.0000    
M_RHLDIB1  0.0175  0.0038  4.5754  0.0000    
M_RHLDIB2 -0.1477  0.0851 -1.7355  0.0883    
M_RHLDIB3 -0.0304  0.0533 -0.5712  0.5702    
M_RHLDIB4 -0.2669  0.0930 -2.8701  0.0058    
M_RHLDIB5 -0.0523  0.0602 -0.8690  0.3886    
C  0.2153  0.0543  3.9634  0.0002    
EQNAMPAKI Dep. Var: NAMPAKI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
NAMPAKIA1  0.2434  0.0659  3.6909  0.0004 0.9527 175.4258 0.0000 
NAMPAKIA2  0.0775  0.0530  1.4627  0.1472    
NAMPAKIA3  0.0538  0.0615  0.8754  0.3838    
NAMPAKIA4 -1.0720  0.0324 -33.1032  0.0000    
NAMPAKIA5 -0.1513  0.1493 -1.0139  0.3134    
NAMPAKIB1 -0.2810  0.1620 -1.7349  0.0863    
NAMPAKIB2 -0.7473  0.2026 -3.6879  0.0004    
NAMPAKIB3  0.3371  0.1340  2.5153  0.0137    
NAMPAKIB4 -0.0248  0.0731 -0.3399  0.7347    
NAMPAKIB5 -0.0078  0.0324 -0.2414  0.8098    
C  0.2989  0.1109  2.6942  0.0085    
EQNEDBANKI Dep. Var: NEDBANKI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
NEDBANKIA1 -2.2416  0.5584 -4.0143  0.0002 0.9557 114.4574 0.0000 
NEDBANKIA2  0.0867  0.0750  1.1556  0.2530    
NEDBANKIA3  5.7598  0.3497  16.4691  0.0000    
NEDBANKIA4  4.3839  2.4888  1.7615  0.0839    
NEDBANKIA5  0.9512  0.3559  2.6727  0.0100    
NEDBANKIB1 -0.0477  0.8590 -0.0556  0.9559    
NEDBANKIB2 -0.6073  0.5418 -1.1210  0.2674    
NEDBANKIB3  1.2211  2.7855  0.4384  0.6629    
NEDBANKIB4 -0.6396  0.1477 -4.3289  0.0001    
NEDBANKIB5 -18.9041  3.1798 -5.9450  0.0000    
C  2.9548  0.7862  3.7582  0.0004    
EQNICTUSD Dep. Var: NICTUSD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
NICTUSDA1  1.0941  0.1658  6.6006  0.0000 0.4384 6.9471 0.0000 
NICTUSDA2  0.6182  0.2017  3.0647  0.0029    
NICTUSDA3 -0.6456  0.2053 -3.1440  0.0023    
NICTUSDA4 -0.0429  0.4296 -0.0999  0.9207    
NICTUSDA5 -0.7430  0.2813 -2.6409  0.0098    
NICTUSDB1 -0.0728  0.2529 -0.2880  0.7740    
NICTUSDB2  0.0355  0.0416  0.8533  0.3958    
NICTUSDB3 -0.1542  0.1628 -0.9474  0.3460    
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NICTUSDB4 -0.0105  0.0268 -0.3937  0.6947    
NICTUSDB5  1.0044  0.5923  1.6958  0.0934    
C -0.4711  0.5263 -0.8952  0.3731    
EQNICTUSI Dep. Var: NICTUSI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
NICTUSIA1  0.0249  0.1681  0.1483  0.8823 0.3174 7.1146 0.0000 
NICTUSIA2 -0.0853  0.1638 -0.5207  0.6033    
NICTUSIA3 -3.8440  0.4706 -8.1682  0.0000    
NICTUSIA4  0.7621  0.6862  1.1106  0.2685    
NICTUSIA5  0.2415  0.8096  0.2983  0.7659    
NICTUSIB1  0.0265  0.0746  0.3554  0.7228    
NICTUSIB2 -0.0027  0.0749 -0.0356  0.9717    
NICTUSIB3  0.0051  0.1683  0.0304  0.9758    
NICTUSIB4  0.2287  0.6329  0.3614  0.7183    
NICTUSIB5  0.0073  0.0727  0.1005  0.9200    
C  0.6504  1.5022  0.4329  0.6657    
EQNORTHAMI Dep. Var: NORTHAMI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
NORTHAMIA1  0.8405  0.0473  17.7649  0.0000 0.8551 74.3641 0.0000 
NORTHAMIA2 -0.0084  0.0053 -1.5908  0.1142    
NORTHAMIA3 -0.2324  0.0849 -2.7377  0.0071    
NORTHAMIA4  0.0816  0.0940  0.8682  0.3870    
NORTHAMIA5  0.0714  0.1065  0.6710  0.5034    
NORTHAMIB1  0.0000  0.0001  0.2239  0.8232    
NORTHAMIB2  0.0000  0.0001  0.7157  0.4755    
NORTHAMIB3  0.1850  0.0696  2.6590  0.0089    
NORTHAMIB4  0.0000  0.0001  0.6244  0.5335    
NORTHAMIB5  0.1205  0.0647  1.8638  0.0647    
C -0.2037  0.0782 -2.6054  0.0103    
EQNUWORLDD Dep. Var: NUWORLDD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
NUWORLDDA1  0.5096  0.1842  2.7672  0.0071 0.5522 9.3700 0.0000 
NUWORLDDA2  0.6003  0.1237  4.8531  0.0000    
NUWORLDDA3  0.0738  0.1318  0.5602  0.5770    
NUWORLDDA4 -0.0529  0.0694 -0.7629  0.4479    
NUWORLDDA5  0.3099  0.1443  2.1479  0.0349    
NUWORLDDB1 -0.8606  0.2000 -4.3022  0.0000    
NUWORLDDB2  0.5457  0.1298  4.2055  0.0001    
NUWORLDDB3  0.3282  0.1945  1.6875  0.0956    
NUWORLDDB4 -0.2030  0.1227 -1.6538  0.1023    
NUWORLDDB5 -0.0776  0.0374 -2.0755  0.0413    
C -0.0587  0.1084 -0.5410  0.5901    
EQOCEANAD Dep. Var: OCEANAD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
OCEANADA1  0.0511  0.1178  0.4339  0.6693 0.9043 17.9615 0.0000 
OCEANADA2 -0.0613  0.0276 -2.2245  0.0384    
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OCEANADA3  0.9892  0.3914  2.5274  0.0205    
OCEANADA4  0.2632  0.0487  5.4087  0.0000    
OCEANADA5 -0.4252  0.3969 -1.0713  0.2975    
OCEANADB1 -0.0708  0.2951 -0.2399  0.8130    
OCEANADB2 -0.0381  0.0202 -1.8818  0.0753    
OCEANADB3 -0.0579  0.0298 -1.9432  0.0670    
OCEANADB4 -0.0202  0.0118 -1.7151  0.1026    
OCEANADB5 -0.6644  0.2605 -2.5508  0.0195    
C  0.1283  0.0674  1.9045  0.0721    
EQPNPI Dep. Var: PNPI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
PNPIA1 -0.0486  0.0532 -0.9143  0.3649 0.7404 14.5476 0.0000 
PNPIA2  0.4637  0.1511  3.0686  0.0034    
PNPIA3  0.1242  0.0580  2.1395  0.0372    
PNPIA4 -0.0417  0.0345 -1.2095  0.2321    
PNPIA5  0.0932  0.0685  1.3600  0.1798    
PNPIB1  0.1657  0.1364  1.2145  0.2301    
PNPIB2 -0.3087  0.0778 -3.9666  0.0002    
PNPIB3  0.0527  0.1686  0.3125  0.7559    
PNPIB4  0.0582  0.0490  1.1865  0.2409    
PNPIB5  0.3890  0.1515  2.5684  0.0132    
C  0.0373  0.0498  0.7495  0.4570    
EQPPCD Dep. Var: PPCD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
PPCDA1 -0.9029  0.5683 -1.5887  0.1286 0.6286 3.2153 0.0137 
PPCDA2  0.0334  0.1544  0.2160  0.8313    
PPCDA3  0.1447  0.1321  1.0949  0.2872    
PPCDA4 -0.0891  0.2537 -0.3511  0.7294    
PPCDA5 -0.4460  0.2182 -2.0438  0.0551    
PPCDB1  0.2184  0.3861  0.5658  0.5782    
PPCDB2 -0.0229  0.0891 -0.2569  0.8000    
PPCDB3 -0.6015  0.2335 -2.5764  0.0185    
PPCDB4 -1.3111  0.7550 -1.7366  0.0986    
PPCDB5 -0.0933  0.0809 -1.1534  0.2631    
C  0.2434  0.1014  2.4007  0.0268    
EQPPCI Dep. Var: PPCI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
PPCIA1 -0.0071  0.0162 -0.4390  0.6623 0.3497 3.0117 0.0041 
PPCIA2 -0.0068  0.0140 -0.4838  0.6304    
PPCIA3  0.6339  0.2204  2.8759  0.0057    
PPCIA4  1.0918  0.4644  2.3509  0.0223    
PPCIA5 -0.4772  0.2039 -2.3402  0.0229    
PPCIB1 -0.0461  0.0514 -0.8960  0.3741    
PPCIB2 -0.0423  0.0535 -0.7903  0.4327    
PPCIB3  0.1379  0.0839  1.6429  0.1060    
PPCIB4 -0.0019  0.0082 -0.2319  0.8175    
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PPCIB5 -0.0067  0.0079 -0.8493  0.3993    
C  0.2117  0.1039  2.0384  0.0462    
EQPUTPROPD Dep. Var: PUTPROPD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
PUTPROPDA1 -0.0338  0.0275 -1.2289  0.2214 0.3204 5.7995 0.0000 
PUTPROPDA2 -0.1688  0.0948 -1.7811  0.0774    
PUTPROPDA3  0.0009  0.0016  0.5367  0.5925    
PUTPROPDA4 -0.4215  0.0935 -4.5077  0.0000    
PUTPROPDA5 -0.0015  0.0266 -0.0551  0.9561    
PUTPROPDB1  0.0228  0.0130  1.7514  0.0824    
PUTPROPDB2  0.0343  0.0639  0.5365  0.5926    
PUTPROPDB3  0.0991  0.0821  1.2072  0.2297    
PUTPROPDB4  0.3633  0.1183  3.0699  0.0026    
PUTPROPDB5 -0.2041  0.0559 -3.6540  0.0004    
C  0.1105  0.0832  1.3274  0.1868    
EQPUTPROPI Dep. Var: PUTPROPI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
PUTPROPIA1 -0.4712  0.1923 -2.4501  0.0169 0.6450 12.1752 0.0000 
PUTPROPIA2 -0.6261  0.1009 -6.2028  0.0000    
PUTPROPIA3  0.3060  0.1453  2.1061  0.0389    
PUTPROPIA4  0.6804  0.1767  3.8511  0.0003    
PUTPROPIA5  1.0828  0.1566  6.9145  0.0000    
PUTPROPIB1 -0.1240  0.1648 -0.7525  0.4544    
PUTPROPIB2 -0.2244  0.0837 -2.6795  0.0093    
PUTPROPIB3  0.3918  0.0972  4.0299  0.0001    
PUTPROPIB4  0.0230  0.1058  0.2177  0.8283    
PUTPROPIB5 -0.3184  0.1494 -2.1308  0.0368    
C  0.1523  0.1007  1.5135  0.1348    
EQREUNERTD Dep. Var: REUNERTD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
REUNERTDA1 -0.0816  0.1229 -0.6640  0.5096 0.9712 178.8961 0.0000 
REUNERTDA2  0.5210  0.1312  3.9702  0.0002    
REUNERTDA3 -0.4854  0.1706 -2.8462  0.0063    
REUNERTDA4  1.0203  0.0245  41.6342  0.0000    
REUNERTDA5 -0.0423  0.0941 -0.4497  0.6547    
REUNERTDB1  0.1662  0.1707  0.9737  0.3347    
REUNERTDB2 -0.1782  0.0636 -2.8012  0.0071    
REUNERTDB3 -0.9381  0.0886 -10.5836  0.0000    
REUNERTDB4 -0.2560  0.1090 -2.3488  0.0226    
REUNERTDB5 -0.0143  0.0053 -2.7009  0.0093    
C  0.0967  0.0579  1.6682  0.1012    
EQREUNERTI Dep. Var: REUNERTI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
REUNERTIA1 -0.0109  0.0097 -1.1196  0.2662 0.1991 2.0390 0.0394 
REUNERTIA2 -0.3890  0.3103 -1.2535  0.2136    
REUNERTIA3 -0.0179  0.0102 -1.7506  0.0838    
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REUNERTIA4  0.0917  0.2015  0.4550  0.6503    
REUNERTIA5  0.0345  0.0746  0.4622  0.6451    
REUNERTIB1 -0.0095  0.1054 -0.0901  0.9284    
REUNERTIB2 -0.1630  0.0871 -1.8716  0.0648    
REUNERTIB3  0.2683  0.2369  1.1324  0.2608    
REUNERTIB4  0.0008  0.0094  0.0892  0.9292    
REUNERTIB5  0.3589  0.1386  2.5896  0.0114    
C  0.3508  0.1296  2.7064  0.0083    
EQSANTAMD Dep. Var: SANTAMD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
SANTAMDA1 -0.0602  0.2083 -0.2890  0.7739 0.8356 22.8640 0.0000 
SANTAMDA2  0.0474  0.0531  0.8936  0.3763    
SANTAMDA3  0.3243  0.0391  8.2970  0.0000    
SANTAMDA4 -0.1687  0.1058 -1.5940  0.1179    
SANTAMDA5  0.0492  0.1072  0.4589  0.6485    
SANTAMDB1 -0.4510  0.1325 -3.4045  0.0014    
SANTAMDB2 -0.4438  0.1957 -2.2671  0.0282    
SANTAMDB3 -0.2384  0.2171 -1.0979  0.2781    
SANTAMDB4  0.8328  0.5097  1.6339  0.1092    
SANTAMDB5 -0.4349  0.1942 -2.2390  0.0301    
C  0.3097  0.1508  2.0542  0.0458    
EQSANTAMI Dep. Var: SANTAMI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
SANTAMIA1 -0.0086  0.0362 -0.2379  0.8124 0.4470 8.0846 0.0000 
SANTAMIA2  0.0802  0.1580  0.5076  0.6128    
SANTAMIA3 -0.0846  0.1089 -0.7769  0.4391    
SANTAMIA4 -0.0715  0.0308 -2.3248  0.0221    
SANTAMIA5 -0.0045  0.1846 -0.0245  0.9805    
SANTAMIB1 -0.6123  0.1343 -4.5579  0.0000    
SANTAMIB2 -0.0804  0.0354 -2.2675  0.0255    
SANTAMIB3  0.3275  0.1264  2.5903  0.0110    
SANTAMIB4 -0.1049  0.0296 -3.5373  0.0006    
SANTAMIB5  0.2097  0.0877  2.3917  0.0186    
C  0.2841  0.1098  2.5870  0.0111    
EQSAPPII Dep. Var: SAPPII      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
SAPPIIA1  0.0079  0.0189  0.4201  0.6789 0.7457 6.5147 0.0002 
SAPPIIA2  0.6707  0.1928  3.4784  0.0024    
SAPPIIA3  0.0260  0.0727  0.3580  0.7241    
SAPPIIA4 -0.0752  0.1041 -0.7226  0.4783    
SAPPIIA5 -0.2162  0.1795 -1.2041  0.2426    
SAPPIIB1 -0.0645  0.0977 -0.6602  0.5166    
SAPPIIB2  0.3308  0.2080  1.5904  0.1274    
SAPPIIB3 -0.0125  0.2884 -0.0433  0.9659    
SAPPIIB4  0.0419  0.2999  0.1398  0.8902    
C  0.0635  0.1183  0.5370  0.5972    
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EQSASFINI Dep. Var: SASFINI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
SASFINIA1 -0.3626  0.2898 -1.2514  0.2165 0.3024 2.2106 0.0319 
SASFINIA2 -0.0757  0.1358 -0.5575  0.5796    
SASFINIA3 -0.2346  0.2810 -0.8350  0.4076    
SASFINIA4  0.0029  0.1914  0.0152  0.9879    
SASFINIA5 -0.4442  0.6263 -0.7092  0.4814    
SASFINIB1 -0.0035  0.3192 -0.0109  0.9913    
SASFINIB2  0.0782  0.1389  0.5632  0.5758    
SASFINIB3  0.0223  0.0085  2.6181  0.0116    
SASFINIB4  0.0328  0.1236  0.2652  0.7920    
SASFINIB5  0.0188  0.0086  2.1921  0.0330    
C  0.4533  0.2086  2.1727  0.0345    
EQSASOLI Dep. Var: SASOLI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
SASOLIA1 -0.1098  0.1377 -0.7974  0.4288 0.8722 36.1593 0.0000 
SASOLIA2 -1.1122  0.1930 -5.7618  0.0000    
SASOLIA3 -0.0389  0.2619 -0.1486  0.8824    
SASOLIA4  0.8072  0.5677  1.4218  0.1609    
SASOLIA5  1.2228  0.4394  2.7826  0.0075    
SASOLIB1 -1.1180  0.6243 -1.7908  0.0790    
SASOLIB2  0.2284  0.2991  0.7634  0.4486    
SASOLIB3  0.9947  0.3584  2.7755  0.0076    
SASOLIB4 -0.1775  0.7366 -0.2410  0.8105    
SASOLIB5 -0.3794  0.6051 -0.6270  0.5334    
C  0.5080  0.2234  2.2738  0.0271    
EQSEARDELD Dep. Var: SEARDELD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
SEARDELDA1  0.0054  0.3185  0.0168  0.9867 0.3199 2.4926 0.0156 
SEARDELDA2 -0.1910  0.5957 -0.3207  0.7497    
SEARDELDA3  0.3416  0.1630  2.0955  0.0409    
SEARDELDA4 -0.9315  0.4741 -1.9646  0.0547    
SEARDELDA5 -1.8795  0.7275 -2.5833  0.0126    
SEARDELDB1 -3.3033  2.0138 -1.6403  0.1069    
SEARDELDB2 -0.3107  0.7403 -0.4197  0.6764    
SEARDELDB3  2.0676  0.7373  2.8042  0.0070    
SEARDELDB4  0.8282  0.7505  1.1036  0.2748    
SEARDELDB5 -0.2820  0.5322 -0.5298  0.5985    
C -0.3047  0.9372 -0.3251  0.7464    
EQSEARDELI Dep. Var: SEARDELI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
SEARDELIA1 -0.3387  0.1876 -1.8052  0.0854 0.7711 7.0730 0.0001 
SEARDELIA2 -2.4747  0.6509 -3.8022  0.0010    
SEARDELIA3 -0.7191  0.8951 -0.8034  0.4307    
SEARDELIA4  0.1165  0.0321  3.6290  0.0016    
SEARDELIA5 -0.0378  0.1129 -0.3348  0.7411    
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SEARDELIB1  0.0584  0.0692  0.8441  0.4081    
SEARDELIB2 -0.5873  0.2008 -2.9246  0.0081    
SEARDELIB3 -0.0140  0.0768 -0.1824  0.8570    
SEARDELIB4  1.1405  0.4698  2.4275  0.0243    
SEARDELIB5  0.5840  0.1086  5.3788  0.0000    
C  0.1724  0.1546  1.1151  0.2774    
EQSPANJAARDD Dep. Var: SPANJAARDD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
SPANJAARDDA1 -0.7259  0.1320 -5.4996  0.0000 0.7723 34.2561 0.0000 
SPANJAARDDA2 -0.0799  0.0876 -0.9120  0.3640    
SPANJAARDDA3  0.5160  0.0667  7.7356  0.0000    
SPANJAARDDA4 -0.0323  0.1044 -0.3091  0.7579    
SPANJAARDDA5  0.1815  0.1237  1.4672  0.1454    
SPANJAARDDB1 -0.1045  0.1226 -0.8521  0.3962    
SPANJAARDDB2 -0.2263  0.1048 -2.1605  0.0331    
SPANJAARDDB3  0.5616  0.0748  7.5113  0.0000    
SPANJAARDDB4 -0.6235  0.1126 -5.5386  0.0000    
SPANJAARDDB5 -0.0391  0.0351 -1.1119  0.2688    
C  0.1217  0.1108  1.0987  0.2745    
EQSPANJAARDI Dep. Var: SPANJAARDI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
SPANJAARDIA1  0.0498  0.2167  0.2299  0.8193 0.8518 24.1354 0.0000 
SPANJAARDIA2  0.5538  0.0827  6.6949  0.0000    
SPANJAARDIA3  0.6145  0.2399  2.5614  0.0141    
SPANJAARDIA4 -0.1751  0.0981 -1.7837  0.0817    
SPANJAARDIA5 -0.0224  0.1234 -0.1818  0.8566    
SPANJAARDIB1 -0.0310  0.1069 -0.2902  0.7731    
SPANJAARDIB2 -0.2925  0.0712 -4.1066  0.0002    
SPANJAARDIB3 -0.6068  0.0970 -6.2570  0.0000    
SPANJAARDIB4  0.0838  0.0369  2.2717  0.0283    
SPANJAARDIB5  0.0417  0.0476  0.8770  0.3855    
C  0.1560  0.0652  2.3920  0.0213    
EQSTANDARDBANKI Dep. Var: STANDARD_BANKI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
STANDARD_BANKIA1 -1.9856  0.4301 -4.6171  0.0001 0.8993 18.7567 0.0000 
STANDARD_BANKIA2 -2.4167  0.4266 -5.6655  0.0000    
STANDARD_BANKIA3 -0.5746  0.2788 -2.0611  0.0519    
STANDARD_BANKIA4 -3.7238  1.8160 -2.0506  0.0530    
STANDARD_BANKIA5 -0.9461  0.8040 -1.1768  0.2525    
STANDARD_BANKIB1  2.6711  1.3746  1.9431  0.0655    
STANDARD_BANKIB2  2.6125  0.4383  5.9601  0.0000    
STANDARD_BANKIB3  0.6619  0.1858  3.5631  0.0018    
STANDARD_BANKIB4  3.6001  0.5333  6.7504  0.0000    
STANDARD_BANKIB5 -0.0432  0.0667 -0.6477  0.5242    
C  0.3245  0.2197  1.4770  0.1545    
EQSUNINTD Dep. Var: SUNINTD      
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
SUNINTDA1  0.7156  0.0676  10.5778  0.0000 0.9607 139.1602 0.0000 
SUNINTDA2 -0.4539  0.0891 -5.0931  0.0000    
SUNINTDA3 -0.2193  0.1287 -1.7045  0.0937    
SUNINTDA4  0.0341  0.0215  1.5862  0.1182    
SUNINTDA5  0.0526  0.0216  2.4392  0.0179    
SUNINTDB1  0.2155  0.0527  4.0869  0.0001    
SUNINTDB2 -0.0087  0.0066 -1.3300  0.1888    
SUNINTDB3  0.0331  0.0201  1.6495  0.1046    
SUNINTDB4  0.1536  0.0454  3.3828  0.0013    
SUNINTDB5 -0.0033  0.0066 -0.5011  0.6182    
C  0.0274  0.0275  0.9970  0.3230    
EQSUNINTI Dep. Var: SUNINTI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
SUNINTIA1 -0.1289  0.1300 -0.9917  0.3233 0.2716 4.6247 0.0000 
SUNINTIA2 -0.5526  0.3282 -1.6839  0.0947    
SUNINTIA3 -1.1669  0.3085 -3.7828  0.0002    
SUNINTIA4 -1.1363  0.5274 -2.1543  0.0332    
SUNINTIA5  0.9029  0.4532  1.9922  0.0485    
SUNINTIB1 -0.0267  0.0090 -2.9717  0.0036    
SUNINTIB2 -0.0017  0.0248 -0.0703  0.9441    
SUNINTIB3 -0.0009  0.0057 -0.1649  0.8693    
SUNINTIB4  0.0015  0.0248  0.0615  0.9510    
SUNINTIB5 -0.2288  0.0584 -3.9156  0.0001    
C  1.0788  0.4128  2.6132  0.0101    
EQTIGERBRANDSD Dep. Var: TIGERBRANDSD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
TIGERBRANDSDA1 -0.5198  0.2725 -1.9073  0.0598 0.9053 83.1418 0.0000 
TIGERBRANDSDA2  0.0534  0.0897  0.5952  0.5533    
TIGERBRANDSDA3  2.6585  0.5223  5.0897  0.0000    
TIGERBRANDSDA4 -0.0033  0.7465 -0.0044  0.9965    
TIGERBRANDSDA5  0.7899  0.2524  3.1300  0.0024    
TIGERBRANDSDB1 -0.0691  0.1663 -0.4159  0.6785    
TIGERBRANDSDB2 -0.1129  0.1694 -0.6664  0.5069    
TIGERBRANDSDB3 -1.2203  0.4139 -2.9485  0.0041    
TIGERBRANDSDB4  0.0997  0.4102  0.2432  0.8085    
TIGERBRANDSDB5 -0.3519  0.2247 -1.5659  0.1210    
C  0.0835  0.2508  0.3331  0.7399    
EQTIGERBRANDSI Dep. Var: TIGERBRANDSI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
TIGERBRANDSIA1 -0.1018  0.0549 -1.8563  0.0688 0.6971 12.6586 0.0000 
TIGERBRANDSIA2 -1.0350  0.1689 -6.1286  0.0000    
TIGERBRANDSIA3 -0.9854  0.2184 -4.5127  0.0000    
TIGERBRANDSIA4 -1.0357  0.2058 -5.0318  0.0000    
TIGERBRANDSIA5 -0.9528  0.2707 -3.5200  0.0009    
TIGERBRANDSIB1  0.5682  0.1601  3.5492  0.0008    
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TIGERBRANDSIB2  0.4377  0.4155  1.0534  0.2968    
TIGERBRANDSIB3  0.6102  0.2725  2.2393  0.0292    
TIGERBRANDSIB4  0.1310  0.0610  2.1476  0.0362    
TIGERBRANDSIB5  0.3997  0.1205  3.3176  0.0016    
C  0.1557  0.0840  1.8535  0.0692    
EQTRENCORD Dep. Var: TRENCORD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
TRENCORDA1  0.0318  0.0429  0.7421  0.4656 0.8856 17.8070 0.0000 
TRENCORDA2 -0.6980  0.2726 -2.5610  0.0175    
TRENCORDA3  0.5855  0.4796  1.2210  0.2345    
TRENCORDA4 -0.5507  0.2260 -2.4367  0.0230    
TRENCORDA5 -0.3073  0.3354 -0.9163  0.3690    
TRENCORDB1  0.9061  0.2507  3.6149  0.0015    
TRENCORDB2 -0.0536  0.1109 -0.4835  0.6333    
TRENCORDB3 -0.1916  0.2982 -0.6424  0.5269    
TRENCORDB4 -0.0010  0.0868 -0.0118  0.9907    
TRENCORDB5 -0.7992  0.2767 -2.8890  0.0083    
C  0.0767  0.1804  0.4250  0.6748    
EQTRENCORI Dep. Var: TRENCORI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
TRENCORIA1  0.0194  0.0556  0.3479  0.7293 0.8185 24.7949 0.0000 
TRENCORIA2  0.5864  0.1184  4.9508  0.0000    
TRENCORIA3 -0.0758  0.0542 -1.3971  0.1680    
TRENCORIA4 -0.0885  0.0773 -1.1441  0.2575    
TRENCORIA5  0.1562  0.0475  3.2908  0.0017    
TRENCORIB1 -0.0275  0.0435 -0.6322  0.5299    
TRENCORIB2  0.0017  0.0432  0.0403  0.9680    
TRENCORIB3  0.1010  0.0211  4.7973  0.0000    
TRENCORIB4  0.0003  0.0087  0.0378  0.9700    
TRENCORIB5 -0.0584  0.0406 -1.4384  0.1560    
C  0.2280  0.0676  3.3720  0.0014    
EQVILLAGEI Dep. Var: VILLAGEI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
VILLAGEIA1  0.1876  0.0618  3.0340  0.0037 0.5433 6.4247 0.0000 
VILLAGEIA2 -0.2733  0.0504 -5.4170  0.0000    
VILLAGEIA3  0.2672  0.1532  1.7435  0.0869    
VILLAGEIA4  0.0000  0.0643  0.0006  0.9995    
VILLAGEIA5  0.0019  0.0155  0.1236  0.9021    
VILLAGEIB1 -1.0524  0.5201 -2.0232  0.0480    
VILLAGEIB2  0.0166  0.0162  1.0263  0.3093    
VILLAGEIB3  0.0130  0.0177  0.7347  0.4657    
VILLAGEIB4  0.0001  0.0867  0.0011  0.9992    
VILLAGEIB5 -0.0283  0.0396 -0.7144  0.4780    
C -0.3255  0.3451 -0.9432  0.3498    
EQWINHOLDD Dep. Var: WINHOLDD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
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WINHOLDDA1 -0.0100  0.0564 -0.1782  0.8592 0.3808 3.3824 0.0017 
WINHOLDDA2  0.0019  0.0020  0.9534  0.3446    
WINHOLDDA3 -0.5237  0.1526 -3.4319  0.0011    
WINHOLDDA4  0.1077  0.0338  3.1866  0.0024    
WINHOLDDA5  0.5507  0.1353  4.0701  0.0002    
WINHOLDDB1 -0.1437  0.1089 -1.3196  0.1924    
WINHOLDDB2  0.1255  0.0939  1.3361  0.1870    
WINHOLDDB3  0.0213  0.0335  0.6364  0.5271    
WINHOLDDB4 -0.0223  0.0161 -1.3841  0.1719    
WINHOLDDB5  0.0002  0.0017  0.1101  0.9127    
C  0.1268  0.0659  1.9224  0.0597    
EQWINHOLDI Dep. Var: WINHOLDI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
WINHOLDIA1 -0.0015  0.0030 -0.5132  0.6127 0.8540 13.4503 0.0000 
WINHOLDIA2 -0.0074  0.4476 -0.0164  0.9870    
WINHOLDIA3  1.4629  0.9550  1.5320  0.1392    
WINHOLDIA4  0.7910  0.5151  1.5357  0.1383    
WINHOLDIA5 -0.3162  0.6906 -0.4578  0.6514    
WINHOLDIB1 -0.0931  0.4181 -0.2226  0.8258    
WINHOLDIB2 -0.7617  0.3716 -2.0497  0.0520    
WINHOLDIB3  0.2340  0.4063  0.5759  0.5703    
WINHOLDIB4 -0.4488  0.0607 -7.3945  0.0000    
WINHOLDIB5 -0.1422  0.0795 -1.7898  0.0867    
C  0.2570  0.1535  1.6746  0.1076    
EQZURICHD Dep. Var: ZURICHD      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
ZURICHDA1 -0.4602  0.2024 -2.2738  0.0362 0.9611 41.9513 0.0000 
ZURICHDA2 -1.3363  0.9734 -1.3728  0.1876    
ZURICHDA3  2.1398  0.2861  7.4796  0.0000    
ZURICHDA4 -0.1437  0.3369 -0.4267  0.6750    
ZURICHDA5  0.5374  0.2232  2.4072  0.0277    
ZURICHDB1 -0.6198  0.8341 -0.7431  0.4676    
ZURICHDB2 -0.3926  0.2961 -1.3260  0.2024    
ZURICHDB3  1.0592  0.6402  1.6544  0.1164    
ZURICHDB4  0.0147  0.0109  1.3484  0.1952    
ZURICHDB5 -0.4886  0.2143 -2.2800  0.0358    
C  0.0336  0.1408  0.2383  0.8145    
EQZURICHI Dep. Var: ZURICHI      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. R-squared: F-statistic: Prob(F-stat): 
ZURICHIA1 -0.3420  0.0603 -5.6693  0.0000 0.9795 368.5516 0.0000 
ZURICHIA2  0.3841  0.0551  6.9686  0.0000    
ZURICHIA3  0.9115  0.0246  37.1280  0.0000    
ZURICHIA4  0.9543  0.0662  14.4210  0.0000    
ZURICHIA5  0.3417  0.0603  5.6705  0.0000    
ZURICHIB1 -1.0434  0.0765 -13.6420  0.0000    
ZURICHIB2 -0.4719  0.0659 -7.1610  0.0000    
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ZURICHIB3  0.0102  0.0524  0.1944  0.8464    
ZURICHIB4  0.0108  0.0364  0.2956  0.7683    
ZURICHIB5 -0.0411  0.0226 -1.8223  0.0723    
C  0.0770  0.0708  1.0883  0.2798    
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Analysis of group means with F-ratio 
Variable D group I group ANOVA F-test Probability 
LT DEBT current 0.2423 17.0040 0.9064 0.3417 
LT DEBT -1 6.5189 0.7733 1.1904 0.2760 
LT DEBT -2 0.2581 5.6318 1.0410 0.3083 
LT DEBT -3 6.2400 0.5462 1.1738 0.2794 
LT DEBT -4 0.1888 5.0373 0.8523 0.3565 
LT DEBT -5 20.7860 5.1761 0.6609 0.4168 
EQUITY current 1.5145 0.3553 3.0486 0.0817 
EQUITY -1 0.4021 0.6454 0.4258 0.5145 
EQUITY -2 0.7437 0.7453 0.00000595 0.9981 
EQUITY -3 0.3720 0.9057 0.7158 0.3981 
EQUITY-4 0.7674 0.2865 0.7091 0.4003 
EQUITY-5 0.3253 0.7507 0.4872 0.4857 
ST DEBT current 0.2762 40.1835 1.1660 0.2812 
ST DEBT -1 1.0748 3.6024 1.5847 0.2093 
ST DEBT -2 3.0455 2.9630 0.0010 0.9748 
ST DEBT -3 1.0749 2.1827 0.7863 0.3761 
ST DEBT -4 1.8273 1.2631 0.2736 0.6014 
ST DEBT -5 44.3060 1.3892 1.1552 0.2836 
CA/CL current 1.4571 1.0524 0.0882 0.7666 
CA/CL -1 1.4007 0.2641 0.9043 0.3423 
CA/CL -2 0.9819 0.2900 1.080 0.2995 
CA/CL -3 1.7209 0.6812 0.5852 0.4448 
CA/CL -4 0.7791 1.557 0.3261 0.5683 
CA/CL -5 1.5160 0.9448 0.1609 0.6886 
FA/INT.A current 8.1403 166.6778 0.8454 0.3591 
FA/INT.A -1 1.1387 165.4985 0.8461 0.3589 
FA/INT.A -2 2.3628 165.1372 0.8915 0.3464 
FA/INT.A -3 1.1915 1.4563 0.0468 0.8290 
FA/INT.A -4 1.9147 0.5340 1.5957 0.2082 
FA/INT.A -5 0.6925 1.9298 1.0507 0.3069 
DSCR current 9.555 -0.1290 1.9873 0.1597 
DSCR -1 4.8807 -0.9117 2.1832 0.1406 
DSCR -2 1.1231 4.4825 0.8465 0.3583 
DSCR -3 8.4520 -0.0897 1.3998 0.2377 
DSCR-4 4.7729 -0.3920 1.6139 0.2050 
DSCR -5 -0.0679 3.9641 0.8954 0.3448 
LOG TA current 0.0096 0.0179 2.6780 0.1027 
LOG TA -1 0.01190 0.0121 0.0014 0.9702 
LOG TA -2 0.00586 0.0156 4.1629 0.0421* 
LOG TA -3 0.0079 0.0098 0.2360 0.6275 
LOG TA -4 0.0055 0.0117 4.0298 0.0455* 
LOG TA-5 0.0081 0.0104 0.2777 0.5986 
OPERATING CASH current -1.0433 0.6023 0.8120 0.3682 
OPERATING CASH -1 0.6071 1.2747 0.3595 0.5492 
OPERATING CASH -2 0.5321 0.6256 0.0152 0.9020 
OPERATING CASH -3 0.4153 -0.9174 1.1488 0.2846 
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OPERATING CASH -4 0.1144 -0.2061 0.4371 0.5090 
OPERATING CASH -5 1.2138 -0.0380 1.5480 0.2144 
SHARES ISSUED current 0.5456 0.2635 1.0165 0.3141 
SHARES ISSUED -1 0.2729 0.5515 0.8806 0.3487 
SHARES ISSUED -2 0.0536 0.8395 4.5432 0.0338* 
SHARES ISSUED -3 0.1808 0.3815 0.7012 0.4030 
SHARES ISSUED -4 0.3563 0.2110 0.6728 0.4217 
SHARES ISSUED -5 0.4003 0.4142 0.0030 0.9566 
SHARE PRICE current 0.2292 0.1406 1.5031 0.2210 
SHARE PRICE -1 0.24387 0.1698 1.2210 0.2701 
SHARE PRICE -2 0.2043 0.2320 0.1486 0.7001 
SHARE PRICE -3 0.2368 0.2855 0.3926 0.5313 
SHARE PRICE -4 0.3010 0.1424 5.0200 0.0257* 
SHARE PRICE -5 0.1747 0.2100 0.1991 0.6558 
MARKET CAP. current 1.0211 0.4904 0.9491 0.3306 
MARKET CAP. -1 0.5403 1.0234 0.7707 0.3806 
MARKET CAP. -2 0.2586 1.2464 3.0655 0.0809** 
MARKET CAP. -3 0.4094 0.9637 1.1839 0.2773 
MARKET CAP. -4 0.7689 0.2802 5.6070 0.0184* 
MARKET CAP. -5 0.5915 0.6970 0.0997 0.7524 
PE current 0.5631 0.3774 0.0595 0.8075 
PE -1 0.4554 0.6674 0.0811 0.7759 
PE -2 -0.0747 1.4251 0.9442 0.3319 
PE -3 1.9320 0.3762 0.9890 0.3207 
PE -4 0.0744 0.3086 0.1257 0.7231 
PE -5 0.5089 1.9463 0.8447 0.3587 
% CHANGE IN OI current 11.9500 11.2800 0.0023 0.9619 
% CHANGE IN OI -1 13.7682 6.6830 0.2460 0.6203 
% CHANGE IN OI -2 1.5750 13.4591 0.9054 0.3420 
% CHANGE IN OI -3 4.6432 16.0479 0.6345 0.4263 
% CHANGE IN OI -4 0.9857 1.6658 0.1873 0.6655 
% CHANGE IN OI -5 16.1107 1.1801 1.2214 0.2699 
OI/TA current 1.7750 -0.3775 3.3184 0.0694** 
OI/TA -1 0.0441 -0.4010 0.9282 0.3360 
OI/TA -2 -0.1445 0.3327 1.6939 0.1940 
OI/TA -3 1.3576 0.2536 0.9156 0.3393 
OI/TA -4 -0.2065 0.0965 0.5757 0.4485 
OI/TA -5 0.0803 0.0809 0.00000207 0.9989 
TAX RATE current -0.0026 2.8167 2.8417 0.0928** 
TAX RATE -1 1.3860 0.1316 1.1426 0.2859 
TAX RATE -2 0.1410 0.1095 0.0005 0.9830 
TAX RATE -3 -1.2235 1.7040 3.2961 0.0704** 
TAX RATE -4 1.1799 0.6120 0.1985 0.6563 
TAX RATE -5 0.2648 0.6151 0.0437 0.8345 
ROI current 14.4931 -3.0652 2.8827 0.0906** 
ROI -1 -2.3680 5.1540 0.4670 0.4949 
ROI -2 16.3002 -1.4567 2.8775 0.0908** 
ROI -3 -3.6721 6.4463 0.8703 0.3516 
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ROI -4 5.3464 1.8880 0.1079 0.7427 
ROI -5 10.9230 -0.1293 1.1377 0.2870 
 *Significant at 5% 
 **Significant at 10% 
 
